David Khalfa

Co-Director, MENA Observatory @J_Jaures Foundation | Co-founder, Atlantic Middle East Forum | Contributor, leading French media, made in @sciencespo

[David Khalfa @dkhalfa]

Portrait croisé dans @libe avec mon amie & collègue Yasmina Asrarguis. Deux parcours en miroir, deux regards croisés & une même volonté de ne pas céder aux simplifications & aux assignations en tout genre, même sur les sujets les plus inflammables. Merci @vblochlaine @j_jaures 🙏

[Ronan Tésorière aka Ron T. @RonTesoriere]

« Trump a sifflé la fin de la partie » : ce que révèle l’échange houleux entre le président américain et Netanyahou https://t.co/ZbSdkpvX8D cc @dkhalfa

[David Khalfa @dkhalfa]

Citer Cruyff & son « football total » mais aussi le 18 Brumaire de Marx dans l’excellente émission de @Myriamencaoua sur @franceinfo consacrée aux enjeux sportifs, communicationnels & géopolitiques du fantastique back to back réalisé par le #PSG en #champi̇onsleague: check🤗 !

[ابتسام الكتبي @ekitbi]

The article is intellectually bold and correctly identifies that the war with Iran accelerated a major strategic shift in the Gulf, particularly in the UAE’s pursuit of greater strategic autonomy. It is also right to argue that the UAE’s exit from OPEC reflects something far larger than energy policy alone.

However, the analysis overstates the extent to which Abu Dhabi is moving into a rigid US-Israeli axis. The UAE’s strategic culture has historically been built on flexibility, diversified partnerships, and maintaining channels even with rivals such as Iran. Abu Dhabi is not abandoning pragmatism in favor of ideological alignment.

The article also reduces the Emirati project primarily to hard security, while overlooking its deeper objective; protecting a post-oil model centered on connectivity, technology, finance, and geopolitical adaptability. Security, from the Emirati perspective, is a means to safeguard that model—not an end in itself.

Most importantly, the article falls into a binary framework of “Iran versus Israel,” whereas Gulf states have spent years trying to avoid exactly that kind of regional polarization. The UAE is not seeking permanent alignment within a closed bloc as much as it is trying to maximize its room for maneuver in an increasingly unstable regional order.

In that sense, the article succeeds in capturing the scale of regional change, but it moves too quickly in defining its final direction.

[Elliot Kaufman @ElliotKaufman6]

Hamas “is taxing people in the street who have nothing left to give,” said Nickolay Mladenov, a senior official of the Board of Peace.

He said Hamas was blocking workers from building temporary housing to help Gazans get out of rodent-infested tents.
https://t.co/pWsKtrqhdW

[Realign For Palestine @rfpalestine]

Who profits from Gaza’s hunger?
Inside the Hamas-run networks controlling goods, prices, and access

Anger is turning inward
Across Gaza, public discourse is shifting dramatically. While Israeli military pressure and externally imposed restrictions remain, many civilians are increasingly identifying Hamas-run institutions and affiliated networks as profiteering from scarcity and causing the suffering in Gaza.

Hardship is no longer understood only as a consequence of war, but of how goods, access, and resources are managed within Gaza.
Who gets to eat?

At the center of this anger is the tansiq system: a coordinated structure linked to Hamas officials. Imports are restricted to a narrow set of ‘approved’ traders, and access is filtered through coordinated networks.
Goods may exist in Gaza but remain out of reach for many civilians, filtered through those with the power to release or withhold them.

Profiteering off scarcity
Public conversations increasingly describe these market dynamics as intentionally engineered. Prices have surged dramatically, with basic goods rising far beyond prewar levels.
More than supply constraints, these increases are widely attributed to practices such as hoarding, restricted release, and layered fees that accumulate at every stage of distribution.

Anger is growing
This system is fraying Gaza’s social fabric, with a perception of ‘two Gazas’. One Gaza has plentiful access through Hamas-adjacent networks, traders, and coordination systems. The other is trapped in survival mode: displaced, dependent, and priced out of basic goods.

Resentment and anger is deepening among those struggling to meet basic needs, eroding the sense of collective endurance that once defined wartime conditions.

Zero trust
As prices rise and aid distribution remains opaque, trust in Hamas-run institutions is low. Civilians increasingly accuse these systems of protecting institutional survival over public welfare.
The Ministry of Economy and related networks are being scrutinized not simply for failing to relieve hardship, but for appearing to benefit from it.

Alternate measures
In response, civilians are turning toward alternative means of survival. Informal markets, digital finance, and decentralized money networks are expanding, offering new pathways to access goods and services. These channels can offer better ways to access food, cash, and services, but they also empower new unregulated actors.

Regardless, the focus is shifting away from formal authority toward those who can deliver tangible outcomes in real time.

Scepticism toward the ‘resistance’ narrative
Many Gazans are increasingly skeptical of the regional war being framed as a ‘theater of resistance.’ Hamas and its allies may present the confrontation with Israel, the United States, and Iran as part of a wider struggle, but civilians are judging it by outcomes.

So far, it has only worsened aid access, mobility, prices and humanitarian conditions on the ground.

What comes next
These trends matter for Gaza’s future. As Hamas-linked systems, monopolistic traders, and informal networks continue to shape access to goods, future governance will inherit a fractured society and depleted public trust.

Beyond diplomatic measures, stabilization will require fair, transparent, accountable systems that Gazans believe serve them rather than exploit them.

[Jacob Magid @JacobMagid]

🧵New: US thought Iran war would hasten Gaza’s demilitarization. Instead, Hamas is emboldened (1/14) https://t.co/PiQV73juUU

[Adla Massoud @Adlamassoud]

🚨Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan sent a joint letter to the UN condemning Iran’s threats over the Strait of Hormuz and rejecting any attempt by Tehran to impose “new legal rules” or unilateral control over the strategic waterway.

The letter also condemned the alleged Iranian drone attack on an ADNOC tanker and called on the UN Security Council to force Iran to fully reopen the Strait and comply with UNSC Resolution 2817.

[Gregory Brew @gbrew24]

Reports like this emphasize the importance of humility.

A lot happened during the war that is not yet public (and may not become public for a while, if ever). https://t.co/ki1ahqpvCv

[Amit Segal @AmitSegal]

A few striking details regarding the new of Netanyahu’s visit to the UAE:

1. A covert flight reportedly took place while Israeli airspace was fully shut—without leaks or detection.

2. Sources suggest a deal was reached on an Iron Dome shipment.

3. UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan has publicly hosted Israeli leaders like Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid—but not Benjamin Netanyahu. Until now, their contacts stayed behind closed doors.

[The New York Times @nytimes]

Breaking News: U.S. intelligence reports show that Iran retains substantial missile capacity, despite President Trump’s claims otherwise. https://t.co/gHLM1oA9yh

[Elizabeth Tsurkov @LizHurra]

It takes immense courage to protest against Hamas inside Gaza, especially since the militia consolidated its control over the Strip since the start of the formal ceasefire. During the war, multiple protests erupted against Hamas' authoritarian and predatory rule over Gaza.
More on Gazans' anger toward Hamas for bringing ruin upon the Strip by launching the Oct 7 attack: https://t.co/D6WlKJ5f1L
Long but interesting interview with a former adviser to Ismail Haniyyeh lambasting the militia https://t.co/BdCyJtIlAt
On the religious rulings of the Mufti of Gaza, Sheikh a-Dayah criticizing Hamas
https://t.co/QtUrmyCdPD

[Arab News @arabnews]

#BREAKING: Satellite images show that oil storage facilities on Kharg Island are nearing maximum capacity https://t.co/Il7QsmLt9i - Bloomberg

[Yasmine Farouk ياسمين فاروق @YasFarouk]

4th call between #Saudi and #UAE heads of states since the war started.

[David Khalfa @dkhalfa]

15. La polarisation Us-Israël vs Iran occulte une transformation + profonde des équilibres stratégiques du Golfe : les monarchies arabes ne se contentent plus d’une posture défensive, mais réintroduisent la coercition militaire & la dissuasion directe ds leur doctrine régionale.

[David Khalfa @dkhalfa]

1. Les informations rapportées par @Reuters sur des frappes de représailles saoudiennes contre l’#Iran, après celles attribuées aux Émirats, marquent un tournant historique dans les équilibres stratégiques du Golfe.

[OSINTdefender @sentdefender]

According to Reuters, citing both Iranian and Western officials, the Saudi Arabian Air Force conducted retaliatory strikes on Iran, following Iranian strikes on their oil, civilian, and military infrastructure in late March. Per the report, citing a Western official, the strikes were characterized as “tit-for-tat strikes in retaliation for when Saudi [Arabia] was hit.” This follows recent revelations that the United Arab Emirates also carried out retaliatory strikes before and after the nominal ceasefire, following the vast majority of Iranian drone and missile strikes across the Gulf region being directed at them. This now makes two Gulf nations that have retaliated directly for Iranian strikes against the Gulf.

[David Khalfa @dkhalfa]

14. Ces divergences montrent qu’il n’existe pas de « bloc du Golfe » homogène. Si les golfiens convergent ds leur perception de la menace 🇮🇷, ils diffèrent ds approche tactique de cette menace qui est un enjeu central de sécu mais aussi de pérennité de leur modèle de prospérité.

[David Khalfa @dkhalfa]

13. Pour autant, il serait erroné d’homogénéiser les approches saoudienne et émiratie. Les deux puissances restent engagées dans des dynamiques de compétition sur plusieurs théâtres régionaux, notamment au Yémen, en Somalie ou encore au Soudan .

[David Khalfa @dkhalfa]

12. La diplo ne disparaît pas pour autant mais n’est plus considérée comme un mécanisme suffisant de stabilisation régionale. Les monarchies du Golfe semblent désormais vouloir réintroduire explicitement le rapport de force militaire ds leur gestion de la relation avec l’Iran.

[David Khalfa @dkhalfa]

11. Le recours à des frappes de représailles brise un tabou & acte la fin de la phase de détente irano-golfienne. La logique de normalisation portée par Riyad & Abou Dhabi cède désormais la place à une relation structurée avant tout par la défiance et la dissuasion coercitive.

[David Khalfa @dkhalfa]

10. Le rapprochement saoudo-iranien & irano-émirien parrainé par Pékin reposait précisément sur l’idée qu’une stabilisation diplomatique permettrait de contenir les dynamiques d’escalade après une décennie de confrontation indirecte.

[David Khalfa @dkhalfa]

9. C’est précisément ce qui donne à la séquence actuelle sa portée historique. C’est un moment de bascule, une rupture d’autant plus importante qu’elle intervient après la phase de détente avec l’Iran engagée sous l’égide de la Chine par l’Arabie & les Émirats entre 2022 & 2023.