he opened by telling a room of MBA students to pick the
classmate they would short.
October 1998. Warren Buffett, eighty seven minutes, no
slides, no script, one microphone at the University of
Florida. the copy most people watch sits on a YouTube
channel with 1,580 subscribers.
the exercise comes before a single stock. you may buy ten
percent of one classmate's lifetime earnings, and you have
to go short another. he says you will not pick the highest
IQ on either side. every quality you would buy is achievable
and every quality you would short can be dropped, and it is
easier at twenty six than at sixty eight. the chains of
habit are too light to be felt until they are too heavy to
be broken.
he was speaking three weeks after Long Term Capital had to
be rescued. sixteen men, two Nobel laureates, nearly four
hundred years of experience between them, most of their own
net worth in the fund. to make money they did not have and
did not need, they risked what they did have and did need.
then he says the part your broker never will. Wall Street
makes its money on activity and you make yours on
inactivity. your broker is a doctor paid by how often he
changes your pills. ninety nine percent of people should buy
an index fund at the lowest cost they can find and stop
touching it.
the arithmetic is on the tape too. Coca-Cola went public in
1919 at forty dollars and was nineteen a year later. one
share, dividends reinvested, was worth about five million by
the time he was speaking. his head office runs forty five
thousand employees out of three thousand five hundred square
feet with twelve people in it.
eighty seven minutes. free since 1998. the people selling
you a two thousand dollar course have watched it. you
probably have not.
in March 2001 the Nasdaq had just fallen sixty three percent
and five trillion dollars of American equity had gone. one
man walked into a room of financial reporters and instead of
a forecast he read them the bill. line by line. on camera.
the people at the head table worked for Bloomberg, Dow
Jones, the Washington Post, BusinessWeek, USA Today and
Kiplinger's. the tape has been free ever since.
his name is John Bogle. he had called it a year earlier, in
public, in a speech titled Risk Control in an Era of Greed,
and at the top of the market he had read his audience a line
about the vast fund of stupidity in human nature, written by
Cato two thousand two hundred years before.
then he did the arithmetic out loud. management fees one
point six percent. sales charges half a percent. hidden
trading costs seven tenths. cash drag three tenths. three
point one percent a year before a dollar of tax. on a ten
percent market that is thirty one percent of your return.
add the tax on all that churning and the fund investor keeps
about half of what the market paid.
he gave them a number and not one of them printed it. ten
thousand dollars in the average fund over the previous
decade turned into a forty six thousand dollar profit. the
same ten thousand in the market itself made a hundred and
fifty four thousand. you got less than a third, and you were
told you had done well.
the part nobody repeats is what he said about the people in
front of him. he told the financial press, to their faces,
at their own lunch, that their embrace of the new economy
and their focus on last year's performance had helped lead
fund investors astray. then he thanked them for having him.
there are too many croupiers in the mutual fund casino, he
said, and their rakes sweep too wide a swath. that was
twenty five years ago. now go and look at the expense ratio
on the account you are holding right now.
fifty seven minutes. National Press Club. March 21, 2001. it
has been sitting there the entire time.
in March 2001 the Nasdaq had just fallen sixty three percent
and five trillion dollars of American equity had gone. one
man walked into a room of financial reporters and instead of
a forecast he read them the bill. line by line. on camera.
the people at the head table worked for Bloomberg, Dow
Jones, the Washington Post, BusinessWeek, USA Today and
Kiplinger's. the tape has been free ever since.
his name is John Bogle. he had called it a year earlier, in
public, in a speech titled Risk Control in an Era of Greed,
and at the top of the market he had read his audience a line
about the vast fund of stupidity in human nature, written by
Cato two thousand two hundred years before.
then he did the arithmetic out loud. management fees one
point six percent. sales charges half a percent. hidden
trading costs seven tenths. cash drag three tenths. three
point one percent a year before a dollar of tax. on a ten
percent market that is thirty one percent of your return.
add the tax on all that churning and the fund investor keeps
about half of what the market paid.
he gave them a number and not one of them printed it. ten
thousand dollars in the average fund over the previous
decade turned into a forty six thousand dollar profit. the
same ten thousand in the market itself made a hundred and
fifty four thousand. you got less than a third, and you were
told you had done well.
the part nobody repeats is what he said about the people in
front of him. he told the financial press, to their faces,
at their own lunch, that their embrace of the new economy
and their focus on last year's performance had helped lead
fund investors astray. then he thanked them for having him.
there are too many croupiers in the mutual fund casino, he
said, and their rakes sweep too wide a swath. that was
twenty five years ago. now go and look at the expense ratio
on the account you are holding right now.
fifty seven minutes. National Press Club. March 21, 2001. it
has been sitting there the entire time.
HE WON HIS FIRST WORLD CHAMPIONSHIP WITH THE WORST HAND IN POKER. YEARS LATER HE DID NOT CALL IT GENIUS. HE CALLED IT A BRUTAL BEAT HE PUT ON SOMEBODY.
His name is Doyle Brunson. 1976, ten and deuce against Jesse Alto's ace jack. The flop came ace, jack, ten. Brunson was beaten and knew it. At 0:25 he says why he called anyway:
"I had just beat Jesse a pot and I knew he was kind of on tilt, so I called him, hoping to catch a ten or a deuce."
A deuce came. He was still behind. He moved all in, and the ten arrived on the river. At 0:55:
"which was a pretty brutal beat to put on a player like Jesse Alto's caliber."
Watch what he is claiming. Not that he had solved the cards. He had spotted that one man at the table had stopped thinking, and priced that above his own hand. The cards were luck. Picking the target was not.
HE WON HIS FIRST WORLD CHAMPIONSHIP WITH THE WORST HAND IN POKER. YEARS LATER HE DID NOT CALL IT GENIUS. HE CALLED IT A BRUTAL BEAT HE PUT ON SOMEBODY.
His name is Doyle Brunson. 1976, ten and deuce against Jesse Alto's ace jack. The flop came ace, jack, ten. Brunson was beaten and knew it. At 0:25 he says why he called anyway:
"I had just beat Jesse a pot and I knew he was kind of on tilt, so I called him, hoping to catch a ten or a deuce."
A deuce came. He was still behind. He moved all in, and the ten arrived on the river. At 0:55:
"which was a pretty brutal beat to put on a player like Jesse Alto's caliber."
Watch what he is claiming. Not that he had solved the cards. He had spotted that one man at the table had stopped thinking, and priced that above his own hand. The cards were luck. Picking the target was not.
THE FIRST BOOK HE READ AT BUSINESS SCHOOL SIXTY-ONE YEARS AGO GAVE HIM ONE SENTENCE. HE SAYS MOST PEOPLE HEAR IT AND REFUSE TO BELIEVE IT.
His name is Howard Marks, co-founder of Oaktree Capital. The book was called Decision Making Under Uncertainty in Oil and Gas. At 0:23:
"The greatest lesson I remember learning from that book is that you can't tell the quality of a decision from the outcome."
Then he gives the test that tells the two apart. At 1:04:
"The ingredients in success are aggressiveness, timing, and skill. And if you have enough aggressiveness at the right time, you don't need much skill. Now, that can make you right once or twice. But to be right repeatedly over an entire career, now you're talking about skill. You can't rely on luck for decades."
Read that as a unit of measurement. One win tells you nothing about the person who made it. The only thing aggressiveness cannot fake is the length of the record.
THE FIRST BOOK HE READ AT BUSINESS SCHOOL SIXTY-ONE YEARS AGO GAVE HIM ONE SENTENCE. HE SAYS MOST PEOPLE HEAR IT AND REFUSE TO BELIEVE IT.
His name is Howard Marks, co-founder of Oaktree Capital. The book was called Decision Making Under Uncertainty in Oil and Gas. At 0:23:
"The greatest lesson I remember learning from that book is that you can't tell the quality of a decision from the outcome."
Then he gives the test that tells the two apart. At 1:04:
"The ingredients in success are aggressiveness, timing, and skill. And if you have enough aggressiveness at the right time, you don't need much skill. Now, that can make you right once or twice. But to be right repeatedly over an entire career, now you're talking about skill. You can't rely on luck for decades."
Read that as a unit of measurement. One win tells you nothing about the person who made it. The only thing aggressiveness cannot fake is the length of the record.
A CHAUFFEUR MEMORISED A NOBEL PRIZE WINNER'S LECTURE AND DELIVERED IT HIMSELF. A BILLIONAIRE TOLD THAT STORY TO A ROOM OF GRADUATES AND SAID IT EXPLAINS ALMOST EVERYONE THEY WILL MEET.
His name is Charlie Munger. Max Planck toured Germany giving the same lecture until his driver knew it by heart. One night they swapped places. At 0:37:
"A physics professor stood up in the rear and asked a perfectly ghastly question. And the chauffeur said, I'm surprised that in an advanced city like Munich I get such an elementary question. I'm going to ask my chauffeur to reply."
He did not tell it for the joke. At 0:52:
"In this world we have two kinds of knowledge. One is Planck knowledge, the people who really know. They've paid the dues. Then we've got chauffeur knowledge. They have learned to prattle the talk."
That was a century ago, when sounding like an expert took a year of memorising. It now takes seconds. Everyone can hear chauffeur knowledge in someone else. Almost nobody checks which one they are being paid for.
@mireltrace How strong is the belief that our situation is unique that limits losers from profit?
But on the chart it is just a small downward movement
A CHAUFFEUR MEMORISED A NOBEL PRIZE WINNER'S LECTURE AND DELIVERED IT HIMSELF. A BILLIONAIRE TOLD THAT STORY TO A ROOM OF GRADUATES AND SAID IT EXPLAINS ALMOST EVERYONE THEY WILL MEET.
His name is Charlie Munger. Max Planck toured Germany giving the same lecture until his driver knew it by heart. One night they swapped places. At 0:37:
"A physics professor stood up in the rear and asked a perfectly ghastly question. And the chauffeur said, I'm surprised that in an advanced city like Munich I get such an elementary question. I'm going to ask my chauffeur to reply."
He did not tell it for the joke. At 0:52:
"In this world we have two kinds of knowledge. One is Planck knowledge, the people who really know. They've paid the dues. Then we've got chauffeur knowledge. They have learned to prattle the talk."
That was a century ago, when sounding like an expert took a year of memorising. It now takes seconds. Everyone can hear chauffeur knowledge in someone else. Almost nobody checks which one they are being paid for.
TWO PERCENT A YEAR SOUNDS LIKE NOTHING. OVER FIFTY YEARS IT TAKES $63,000 OUT OF EVERY $100,000. A REPORTER PUT THAT TO ONE OF THE WORLD'S BIGGEST FUND MANAGERS, WHO SAID IT SOUNDED HIGH.
His name is John Bogle. He built the first index fund in 1976 and spent forty years repeating one sum. The clip opens on him:
"The magic of compound returns is overwhelmed by the tyranny of compounding cost. It's a mathematical fact. There's no getting around it."
Frontline took that claim to JP Morgan Asset Management. At 0:23:
"So I don't know the math behind the example that you're citing... It sounds, it sounds high."
So the reporter checked it himself, on a free calculator, on camera. A $100,000 balance, minus 2% a year, fifty years. It leaves a little over $36,000.
Nobody hides this number. It is disclosed, legal and ordinary. It is just small enough, and dull enough, that almost nobody ever multiplies it out.