To celebrate the launch of https://t.co/p4LJsNovDt we’ve started our promised $BNKR buybacks.
As part of the @bankrbot code we’re letting the fees if $POOLBOT flow back into the Bankr architecture.
Our official treasury wallet:
0x062bD56784b6D7f9f94eE6d15cdD3a1B760F0eb5
one other slight nuance technicality to the bankr situation
deployer didn’t even create $bnkr
in 2024 some idiot on farcaster tricked two ai agents to collaborate on the social feed and create bankr coin
could have been doa at that point, but it wasn’t…
bc deployer made the decision to adopt it and has since created insane value while building far and away the best agentic consumer crypto product to date
massive buybacks, major cex listings, huge liquidity, airdrop after airdrop after airdrop, so much more
i know who im backing and its not the spiteful hater founders and teams who dunk on success of others bc they have none of their own
We transferred 5,014 BTC between Metaplanet custodial addresses over the past 24 hours. This was a routine custody operation. No bitcoin was sold, and our holdings remain 43,000 BTC.
All of our addresses are published, which is why the transfers were observable in real time.
Total network fees to move $322 million in bitcoin: approximately $8.
Coming soon: $BNKR
$BNKR powers Bankr (https://t.co/oEzPZr9SCe), the financial OS for the agent economy by @0xdeployer.
Trading starts July 29
Get ready → https://t.co/47fNCUnRqD
the bankr x account has been secured. you will be able to interact with the bankr agent on x in the coming days.
reminder: if you use bankr, enable MFA on your bankr account at https://t.co/1np4M7miko. this ensures that even if your x is compromised your bankr account remains safe.
either two things are happening imo. 1) there's a critical security vulnerability in X backend systems that they haven't found or 2) its an inside job.
why do i think this?
1. We had a passkey on the account, arguably one of the most secure 2FA mechanisms.
2. This is the screen we got when trying to sign in to the bankrbot X account. clicking the start button took us to a page to appeal a suspended account.
3. The attackers were still able to sign into the account to push malicious links -- the latest being long after we were already locked out of the account.
Why was it that the attackers had full access to log in and post, but we were blocked by this screen? Why weren't the attackers blocked?
4. We started getting 503 (service unavailable) errors from the X api, but the attackers had full access to sign in and post. If all sessions and keys lost access, how did the attacker still have access?
there has been a string of high profile account takeovers recently including the CEO of robinhood and even the spacex account and others who apparently also had MFA enabled on their X accounts. i would love to see this blow up and for the X team to have to be accountable for this.