@RadioFreeTom @zoobadger Federal civil verdict has to be unanimous absent stipulation otherwise (Rule 48(b)). Not aware of any stipulation. So the Carroll jury was unanimous.
@StrategicTrends I think you’re right about how complicated their plans are, and the problems that raises. I think that we also tend to think about China’s capabilities too statically (see: range rings). But there is a lot the US can and will do to further complicate or foil targeting.
@dekach1n@BDHerzinger If you’re interested, this Rand report does a much better job than me making the case re: Taiwan’s tough air defense problem given Chinese standoff missiles and numerical airframe advantages. 2016 but don’t think the state of things has changed that much
https://t.co/0NGLYP2A9C
@dekach1n@BDHerzinger Unless what I’m seeing is way off, they have 7 patriot and 18 Sky Bow batteries. Taiwan is small but that’s … not enough. Not with the number of missiles china can put into play.
The material disparity b/w china and Taiwan is an order of magnitude bigger than Russia/Ukraine.
@dekach1n@BDHerzinger I do not think Taiwans air defense is any thing as dense as Ukraine’s (and that’s an asymmetric capability I think they should improve). I also think Taiwans fighters are far more vulnerable than you do - at air or on the ground. Though certainly I would like for you to be right
@dekach1n@BDHerzinger China has more than a thousand 4th Gen fighters, can attack any part of Taiwan (and so any Taiwanese airfield) with missiles from the mainland, and dozens of destroyers and frigates for air and missile defense. If an air war goes hot it’s just not a fight Taiwan wins alone.
@dekach1n@BDHerzinger I imagine 60ish F16s will not last very long after they start firing on a Chinese blockade. Nor are asymmetric weapons going to be a ton of help there.
@dekach1n@BDHerzinger@AEIfdp That might be true as far as official policy goes. But we still have to have a plan for how we would respond to these events. I’m not sure we do, and most public discussion is about response to an invasion.
@BDHerzinger@AEIfdp Assuming we are de facto committed to respond to an attempt to unify Taiwan by force, what triggers that commitment? Blockade? Taking islands in the straits? And what’s the response anyway?
@BDHerzinger@AEIfdp I’ll be in the lookout for that! I agree that contingencies short of invasion don’t really justify what Taiwan is buying. On the other hand, also not sure we are thinking hard enough about how to deal with something short of a full invasion.
@JJintheUS@cdrsalamander@SubsidyFarmer The last point is the important one, of course. It doesn’t really make a difference if JSF started in 95, or is somehow tethered to some earlier program.
@cdrsalamander@SubsidyFarmer Assuming using predecessor programs a fair way to define when the F35 itself was “developed,” the best I can tell is CALF began in 1992 and JAST in 1993. JSF program started 1995. USSR ceased to exist in 1991.