ImanBudi

rhizomes. i'll be anything once.

[txtdaritaxpayer @txtdaritaxpayer]

Manusia yg diberkati akal sehat pasti langsung sadar ada yg salah ketika lihat Top 3 Kementerian/Lembaga dgn anggaran terbesar ini tidak men-generate economic growth

Khusus untuk Kemenhan dan POLRI even ikut contribute ke pelemahan rupiah krn mostly Alutsista dibeli pake dollar

[Bloomberg @business]

Indonesia has expanded the central bank’s objectives to include the expansion of the “real sector,” further broadening its mandate beyond currency stability and economic growth https://t.co/ifc128XKUx

[Naval @naval]

It’s the wisdom of markets, and the madness of crowds.

[Kai @sorejhvi]

Simplenya krn sadar kalau di dalam kapitalisme, nilai ekonomi tertinggi ngga dipegang oleh orang yg menciptakan barang (the creators), tapi di orang yang mengontrol perputaran uangnya (the orchestrators).

[Brive~ @brive__]

Satu project kantor yang menarik buat gw:

Flownya simpel:
Extract -> S3 -> Transform -> S3 -> Load -> S3 -> Convert to Excel -> Kirim Report ke SFTP

Tech Stack: Lambda, EventBridge, Step Functions, , SQS, DuckDB

Cost per month: Hampir $0

😂😂😂

[ImanBudi @ibpme]

banger

[ImanBudi @ibpme]

senjata terakhir BI belom dikeluarin.

lagu aku cinta rupiah.

[PROFESOR SAHAM @profesor_saham]

Suku bunga naik sudah
Bon dibeli sudah
Purbaya ceramah 1 dollar akan ke Rp 16000 sudah

Apalagi yang belum???

[crows @rcmmmy]

“mas tolong jangan merokok dekat bayi saya” bukan rokok bu ini sinte

[ImanBudi @ibpme]

Anggaran MBG 2026 = 335T ~ $ 17Bn
Market Cap BBCA = 770T - 850T = $ 30Bn - $ 45 Bn

[ImanBudi @ibpme]

just a note to make myself remember when reading all these numbers in news.

$1 Billion = 17 Triliun Rupiah ($ 1Bn = 17T)
$1 Million = 17 Billion Rupiah ($ 1Mn = 17M)
$100K = 1,7 Billion ($100k = 1,7M)
$1 Trillion = 17 Quadrillion (17.000 T)

[ImanBudi @ibpme]

APBN Indonesia = Rp 3.600T = $ 200Bn
Cadangan Devisa Apr 2026 = $ 150 Bn = 2.550 T

[kache @yacineMTB]

Claude opus is basically as bad as gpt 4o. You can immediately tell when a 125iqoid has gotten hypnotized by it. Their mannerisms and cadence changes. It's a little more subtle but just as grating. Really sad to see

[Ricky Ho @rickyho_1989]

@senituru In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run, it is a weighing machine — Benjamin Graham

[ImanBudi @ibpme]

call it karma, call it fate. is this it ?

[Ricky Ho @rickyho_1989]

President Prabowo’s speech was interesting because it revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of the current policy direction.

What I dislike is that there still appears to be insufficient discussion around upside inflation risk, fiscal vulnerability, and exchange rate stress if oil prices remain elevated for much longer than the government currently expects. Indonesia remains highly sensitive to energy prices through subsidies, imported inflation, fiscal pressures, and rupiah stability. If oil enters a prolonged higher-price regime, the impact on the budget deficit, subsidy burden, and external balances could become much larger than current assumptions imply.

This matters because global conditions are already becoming more difficult. US yields remain high, global liquidity is tightening, and capital is becoming increasingly selective toward emerging markets. In that environment, fiscal credibility and exchange rate management become extremely important.

That said, on the positive side, I do think Prabowo understands one of Indonesia’s deepest structural problems: the country’s persistently low tax revenue-to-GDP ratio.

Indonesia has been blessed with enormous commodity wealth for decades, yet state revenue collection has consistently underperformed relative to the scale of natural resources extracted from the economy. A large part of the issue historically comes from leakages across the commodity ecosystem itself.

One major mechanism is underinvoicing. For example, commodity exporters may sell coal, CPO, nickel, or other resources to related offshore trading entities at artificially lower declared prices. The offshore entity then resells the same commodities to final global buyers at the true market price. The profits effectively accumulate offshore rather than domestically, reducing taxable income reported inside Indonesia.

Another mechanism often discussed globally is transfer pricing optimization. Large conglomerates with complex cross-border structures can shift profits between subsidiaries across jurisdictions through management fees, financing structures, procurement contracts, intellectual property arrangements, or intra-group commodity transactions. If not monitored carefully, taxable profits inside the producing country become artificially suppressed while profits appear in lower-tax jurisdictions instead.

This is not unique to Indonesia. Resource-rich countries globally have struggled with similar issues for decades because commodities naturally involve international pricing, offshore trading hubs, and complicated ownership structures.

That is why I can understand the broader strategic logic behind stronger state monitoring over commodity exports and FX flows.

Assuming the execution remains disciplined and commercially rational, a stronger state presence could theoretically improve transparency around export proceeds, pricing declarations, royalty collection, and taxable income reporting. In turn, that could potentially increase state revenue available for infrastructure, healthcare, education, and poverty alleviation programs.

Similarly, regulations requiring export proceeds to remain domestically within the banking system for a certain period may help stabilize FX liquidity and reduce pressure on the rupiah during periods of external volatility.

In many ways, what Prabowo appears to be pursuing resembles a more assertive form of state capitalism where the state attempts to regain greater control over strategic sectors, commodity rents, and capital flows.

The challenge, however, is always execution and balance. If implemented professionally with legal certainty, transparency, and predictable rules, stronger oversight could improve fiscal capacity and state effectiveness.

But if execution becomes overly interventionist, politicized, or unpredictable, markets may instead interpret it as rising state intrusion and weakening investment freedom. That balance will define if this is a good move or not.

[Andrej Karpathy @karpathy]

Personal update: I've joined Anthropic. I think the next few years at the frontier of LLMs will be especially formative. I am very excited to join the team here and get back to R&D. I remain deeply passionate about education and plan to resume my work on it in time.

[dhn 🌧️🌼 @arman_dhani]

Clara terdiam. Di hadapannya laporan dari Mckinsey menunjukkan seluruh indikator krisis akan terjadi. Tapi ia masih teringat senyum hangat Michael, teman expatriat, yang dia temui di Aldis Burger, saat lburan di Manhattan, New York. Hanya dada Michael yang bisa membuatnya tenang.

[ImanBudi @ibpme]

we are seeing unprecedented levels of delusion.

[ImanBudi @ibpme]

@babehterbidji Jujur gua pertama kali shopping spree karena TikTok shop. Truly Supreme UI/UX.

[Ricky Ho @rickyho_1989]

Logically, rising global bond yields especially with US Treasury yields above 5% and JGB yields climbing toward multi-decade highs should normally pressure Bank Indonesia toward a more hawkish stance to defend the rupiah and preserve interest rate differentials.

However, the market increasingly senses that growth has become the dominant policy priority. That creates a difficult tradeoff. On one side, maintaining relatively lower rates may support credit growth, domestic demand, property activity, and the government’s broader growth ambitions. On the other side, if global yields continue repricing higher while Indonesia stays relatively dovish, the risk premium required to hold rupiah assets rises further.

This is especially important for Indonesia because the economy still relies meaningfully on foreign participation across bonds, equities, and strategic capital inflows. In a world where investors can suddenly earn 5%+ from US Treasuries with far lower currency and governance risk, emerging markets must offer sufficiently attractive compensation to retain capital.

The challenge is that defending growth and defending the currency do not always align.

Markets may initially tolerate a dovish BI stance if commodity prices remain supportive and global liquidity conditions stabilize. But if external pressure intensifies while real rates become less attractive, rupiah weakness itself can eventually become inflationary through imported costs, energy prices, and capital outflow pressures.

This is why the current environment feels increasingly delicate. The global cost of capital is moving higher precisely at a time when Indonesia appears prioritizing growth over macro tightening.

Historically, that balancing act becomes much harder once market confidence starts questioning whether monetary policy remains fully independent from political growth objectives.