Zeeshan Hafeez

[Zeeshan Hafeez @icicle_shan]

@RJLDilkie @DocPriyamMD The probability of that is significantly low, agreed accidents do happen but the protective gear could mitigate the injuries

[Zeeshan Hafeez @icicle_shan]

@thewirepak Another mistake to indulge in others affairs

[Zeeshan Hafeez @icicle_shan]

@ejazhaider The warmongers easily forget the harsh realities of war as they see it from afar

[Zeeshan Hafeez @icicle_shan]

@Ramandeep_Bajwa That's what technology should be used for

[Ammar Rashid @AmmarRashidT]

Am personally very uninterested in all the moralistic handwringing about 'deals' & 'NROs' re: IK & PTI that will be the subject of much feverish speculation in the coming days/weeks. For one, I think its far from a foregone conclusion at this early stage & in any case, every aspect of Pakistan's existing political economy is also downstream of some political settlement from the past, so it wouldn't be anything historically unusual.

I am more interested in what a potential new political settlement (in the sense of a broad-based agreement on rules and rent distribution between a wide range of political & institutional factions, like in the 18th amendment) will mean for Pakistan & its people.

We are currently in a situation where various elite factions are at odds with each other & locked into conflict with competing interests & possibly shifting alliances, with growing realization about the unsustainability of the existing political-economic status quo. I think such a situation is actually a good opportunity for having concrete debate about what the parameters (or reform priorities) of a new political settlement could look like (rather than just who gets to be in power).

Personally, I'm interested in what a new political settlement could mean for:

a) Economic management
b) Fiscal policies & distributive arrangements
c) Security and counter terrorism strategy
d) Devolution of powers and resources to grassroots levels
e) Bureaucratic reform
f) Industrialization, productivity & national productive capacity

There are certainly legitimate reasons to be sceptical about this fractious political conflict resulting in better, pro-people outcomes, rather than just continued political crises or a reshuffle of faces.

Nonetheless, think it would be a mistake for those interested in structural change in Pakistan to miss this opportunity to try and index a concrete reform agenda into the current factional infighting among our ruling elites.

[Yousuf Nazar @YousufNazar]

My latest:

Fifteen Years After 18th Amendment: What Have #Pakistan’s Provinces Delivered?

Pakistan has decentralised authority faster than it has built state capacity. The next phase of reform should focus less on drawing new provincial boundaries and more on building capacity, measurable outcomes, provincial revenue mobilisation, professional administration and genuinely empowered local government.

https://t.co/EWmdl2jsqB

[Yousuf Nazar @YousufNazar]

A thoughtful critique of Pakistan’s economists and level of debate by Dr Nadeemul Haque https://t.co/ZxfkZG58ac

[Yousuf Nazar @YousufNazar]

Pakistan does not need a hard state. It needs a development state. Egypt is a hard state. Vietnam is a development state.

If any politician is serious about Pakistan's future, he/she has to demonstrate an understanding of development state.

https://t.co/ML3VCVDp0F

[Yousuf Nazar @YousufNazar]

اشرافیہ کی گرفت: پاکستان کی معیشت پر سالانہ 36 سے 43 ارب ڈالر کا بوجھ؟

پاکستان کی معیشت کے مسائل کا ذکر ہو تو عموماً قرضوں، کمزور ٹیکس نظام، مالیاتی خساروں یا کرپشن پر بات کی جاتی ہے۔ مگر حقیقت یہ ہے کہ پاکستان کا سب سے مہنگا معاشی مسئلہ ان میں سے کوئی ایک نہیں۔ اصل مسئلہ ایک ایسا سیاسی و معاشی ڈھانچہ ہے جس میں ریاست تک رسائی اور اقتدار سے قربت خود ایک منافع بخش معاشی اثاثہ یا کاروبار
بن چکی ہے۔

[Yousuf Nazar @YousufNazar]

Elite Capture: How Pakistan’s Rich Are Killing The Economy | Dawn News https://t.co/K78LujUePF via @YouTube

[Yousuf Nazar @YousufNazar]

The hidden and invisible cost of elite capture is more than $25 bn in visible costs ($8.4bn in just tax exemptions and subsidies for businesses, etc) every year not to mention land and plot allotments, cheaper gas for fertiliser companies, profits for sugar companies, protection for automakers, etc, etc. The total estimated cost is north of $35 billion. Few talk about elephant in the room. @KlasraRauf @AmirMateen2 @alinashigri @abbasnasir59 @MazharAbbasGEO

[Zeeshan Hafeez @icicle_shan]

@YousufNazar Sir who will bell the cat?

[Zeeshan Hafeez @icicle_shan]

@Seraphinaf5 71

[Zeeshan Hafeez @icicle_shan]

@CraigMurrayOrg @Kathleen_Tyson_ What about handball sir?

[Sony Thăng @nxt888]

Here is what empire actually is, under all the flags and speeches and moral frameworks:

It is the arrangement by which one group of people gets to live comfortably without fully understanding the cost of their comfort.

And another group of people pays the cost without getting the comfort.

That is it. That is the whole system.

Everything else, the democracy promotion, the humanitarian intervention, the rules-based international order, the war on terror, the responsibility to protect, is the explanation comfortable people require to remain comfortable with the arrangement.

When the explanation is challenged, when the documents come out, when the survivors speak, when the numbers are counted, the comfortable people do not ask:

Was the arrangement unjust?

They ask: "Why are you making me feel bad?"

They ask: "Don't you think we should focus on solutions rather than blame?"

They ask: "What about the good things America has done?"

They will ask anything, follow any conversational detour, pursue any rhetorical exit that leads away from the simple recognition sitting in the center of the room:

The comfort was not free.

Someone else paid for it.

And that person is still waiting.

Not for an apology.

Not for guilt.

For the arrangement to end.

[farrukh saleem @SaleemFarrukh]

Iran without sanctions: Pakistan’s $36b upside

PAKISTAN shares a 900-kilometre border with one of the world’s largest energy endowments: 208 billion barrels of proven oil — about 12 per cent of global reserves, the third largest in the world — and nearly 1,200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the second largest after Russia. Combined, this resource base carries an estimated market value of around $20 trillion.

The 900-km border is the most under-traded, under-piped, under-utilised asset Pakistan has. What can move across it? One: crude oil — 8–10 million tonnes a year, worth $4–6 billion. Two: diesel, petrol, furnace oil — $2–3 billion. Three: LPG, ethane, naphtha — $1–2 billion. Four: fertilizer and downstream chemicals — $1–2 billion. Five: cross-border electricity — 1,000–2,000 MW, worth $1–1.5 billion. Total tradable energy basket: $9–14 billion a year.

Red alert: Pakistan’s most valuable corridor is not blocked by geography—it is blocked by policy. What can be piped? Natural gas — 750 to 1,000 mmcfd through the Iran–Pakistan pipeline — replacing imported LNG and saving $5–7 billion a year. Refined fuels through product pipelines — diesel, petrol — cutting logistics costs and import leakages by another $1–2 billion. Add it up: $6–9 billion annually. Not from new discoveries. From moving molecules more intelligently.

How can the 900-km border be monetised? Start with Gwadar — storage, blending, transshipment — a $1–2 billion opportunity. Add transit: Iran–Pakistan–China flows, pipelines and trucking corridors, another $2–3 billion annually. Then the real prize — petrochemicals. Feed cheap ethane, LPG, and naphtha into fertilizer, plastics, and polymers. Export more. Import less. That’s $5–8 billion. Add it up: $8–13 billion a year.

Add it up. At the low end: $9 billion plus $6 billion plus $8 billion — $23 billion a year. At the high end: $14 billion plus $9 billion plus $13 billion — $36 billion a year. A $23–36 billion opportunity. The menu is large. Execution has been negligible. Red alert: This is not theoretical. This is not distant. This is sitting on a 900-km border. Pakistan’s balance-of-payments problem is, at its core, an energy problem (annual energy imports $20–25 billion). Every dollar saved on LNG, oil, and diesel is a dollar earned. Stack those savings — gas substitution, crude discounts, imported electricity — and they begin to behave like revenue. This is Pakistan’s energy arbitrage margin.

Remember: Pakistan does not run out of rupees — it runs out of dollars. And those dollars leave for three things: oil, LNG, and petroleum products. Why hasn’t Pakistan monetised the 900-km border? Three reasons. One: sanctions risk — banks, insurers, and contractors step back. Two: contract credibility — investors fear policy reversals and payment delays. Three: fragmented decision-making — multiple ministries, regulators, and provinces, each with veto power.

Red alert: Capital does not wait. It walks away. The day sanctions lift, capital will not queue — it will race. China will move from Gwadar inward. Turkey will position itself as a westward hub. Gulf players will secure upstream stakes. The first mover captures the corridor. The late mover pays transit. What does Pakistan need to do? Pakistan needs three decisions. One: ring-fence energy contracts with sovereign guarantees. Two: create a single-window authority with binding timelines. Three: pre-negotiate pipeline, refinery, and grid agreements before sanctions lift. Yes, sanctions may persist. Yes, geopolitics can shift. But Pakistan must prepare for upside, not just manage downside. Countries that wait for certainty miss opportunity.

Total impact: up to $36 billion – roughly 10 percent of Pakistan’s GDP. That’s nearly one-tenth of the entire economy. That’s equivalent to most of Pakistan’s annual export earnings. That’s a large chunk of total federal revenues. This is not a marginal opportunity—it is a balance-sheet event.

[Yousuf Nazar @YousufNazar]

Why a Large Debt-Servicing Burden Has Become a Brake on Pakistan's Economic Growth

The debate over Pakistan's public debt is often framed in moral or political terms. Yet the most compelling case against an excessive debt burden is not ideological—it can be demonstrated in purely logical and economic terms.

At its core, economic growth depends on a country's ability to increase the productive capacity of its economy. In standard macroeconomic models, long-term growth is driven by the accumulation of physical capital, improvements in human capital, technological progress, and productivity gains. Government policy influences all four.

A large debt-servicing burden directly undermines this process.

The starting point is the national income identity:

GDP = C + I + G + (X – M)

where C is consumption, I is investment, G is government spending, and X – M is net exports.

Not all government spending contributes equally to growth. Spending on education, health, infrastructure, research, and technology raises future productive capacity. Debt servicing does not. Interest payments merely transfer income from taxpayers to creditors. They do not build roads, educate workers, improve logistics, or increase productivity.

As debt servicing consumes a growing share of government revenue, it crowds out productive expenditure.

The budget constraint facing a government can be expressed as:

Revenue = Debt Service + Current Expenditure + Development Expenditure + Defence + Other Spending

When debt service expands faster than revenue, something else must shrink. In practice, development spending is usually the first casualty because salaries, pensions, subsidies, and security expenditures are politically difficult to reduce.

The result is lower public investment.

This matters because investment is one of the most important determinants of long-term growth. In the Solow growth model, output is determined by:

Y = A × F(K,L)

where Y is output, A is productivity, K is capital, and L is labour.

Growth occurs when the capital stock expands and productivity improves. Public investment contributes to both. Infrastructure lowers business costs. Education raises worker productivity. Technology investments increase efficiency.

Debt servicing contributes to none of these variables.

The damage extends beyond public finances.

When governments borrow heavily from domestic banks to finance fiscal deficits, they absorb a large share of available savings. This creates the classic "crowding-out" effect. Private firms find less credit available, or face higher borrowing costs.

In macroeconomic terms:

National Savings = Public Savings + Private Savings

A large fiscal deficit reduces public savings. Lower national savings mean less funding is available for productive private investment.

Lower investment today translates into a smaller capital stock tomorrow, reducing future growth.

The arithmetic becomes particularly severe when interest rates exceed economic growth rates.

Debt dynamics can be summarized by the equation:

Δ(Debt/GDP) ≈ Primary Deficit + (r – g)(Debt/GDP)

where:

r is the effective interest rate on government debt,
g is nominal GDP growth.

If the interest rate exceeds the growth rate, debt tends to rise relative to GDP even without large new borrowing.

This creates a vicious cycle.

Higher debt leads to higher interest payments. Higher interest payments increase borrowing requirements. Additional borrowing raises debt further. More debt generates even larger interest obligations.

Eventually, fiscal policy becomes dominated by debt management rather than economic development.

The consequences are visible in many heavily indebted economies. As debt service absorbs fiscal space, governments struggle to invest in human capital, infrastructure, innovation, and institutional capacity—the very factors that determine long-run growth.

The opportunity cost is enormous.

Consider two countries with identical tax revenues. One spends 40 percent of revenue on debt service and 10 percent on development. The other spends 10 percent on debt service and 40 percent on development. Over time, the second country accumulates better infrastructure, a more skilled workforce, stronger institutions, and higher productivity. The growth differential compounds year after year.

This is why excessive debt servicing is not merely a fiscal problem. It is a growth problem.

A country cannot borrow its way to sustained prosperity if an ever-larger share of its resources is devoted to servicing old obligations rather than creating new productive capacity. The mathematics of growth are unforgiving: economies expand when resources are invested in capital, people, and technology. When those resources are diverted to debt service, future growth is sacrificed to pay for the past.

That is the fundamental challenge facing heavily indebted economies. The issue is not debt itself. Debt can finance growth-enhancing investments. The problem arises when debt becomes so large that servicing it crowds out the very investments needed to generate growth. At that point, debt ceases to be a tool of development and becomes an obstacle to it.

[Yousuf Nazar @YousufNazar]

The budget speech will not tell you about this:

"$8.7 billion subsidies for the rich and entitled in Pakistan are rarely discussed nor subject to parliamentary approval or oversight. To understand how large these numbers are, consider this: they exceed the entire federal development budget. They are larger than Pakistan’s annual spending on health and education combined. And here is the killer: in a single year, Pakistan gives away more in tax exemptions than it borrows from the IMF over three years.

This is how the system works. Tax the people. Exempt the powerful. Organised interests lobby for exemptions. The executive grants them through SROs. Parliament never votes. The FBR publishes sectoral totals that obscure more than they reveal. The IMF demands reform. The government commits. The exemptions remain. The people bear the burden. The cycle repeats. The Tax Expenditure Report 2025 shows us what we lose: $8.7 billion annually. It does not show us who gains. But we know."

https://t.co/8vPy6W6Zw4

[Zeeshan Hafeez @icicle_shan]

@Its_ereko Fully endorse