@joefrancis505@JamesConran1 It's not just "vibes".. most has been long-running and public peer reviewed methodological debate. Personalized attacks on integrity of PSZ methods blowing up on X now in part bc motivated hacks like TC want to defeat CA tax. I'd stay out of this one for now!
@joefrancis505@JamesConran1 *can* but may or may not, so Gini, which responds mostly to changes in the middle, is a bad measure (Palma critique). Just bc studying top income, wealth, and power is hard to measure or agree on methods, doesn't mean it doesn't matter or should be studied!
@joefrancis505 AI tools will raise standards, but progress is cumulative. We need allowance for earlier work that lacked today’s tools or was exploratory. Calling out malpractice is a service + your audits are thoughtful, but there is danger in these tools weaponized. https://t.co/MjNrqVD9Oh
If you believe that mindless AI evaluations are legitimate then why would you spread the evaluation of Saez & @gabriel_zucman without first subjecting it to its own mindless AI evaluation?
I just did and it turns out the critic's errors all go in one direction.
Thank you Jason Furman @jasonfurman for creating this. As noted by many, this AI evaluation of Saez and Zucman is essentially worthless, replete with the treatment of modelling choices and judgments as mistakes.
Overall, very unimpressed with the current use of AI to critique papers. With reference to critics, if someone uses AI and finds an error in a paper, the author(s) should be contacted to see whether there is an explanation before a grand public announcement is made. With reference to journals, protocols need to be developed now so that the products of these exercises, if valid, quickly appear *in the journal* as errata. The existing system for assessing comments on papers, already working poorly, is completely unequipped to address the widespread reevaluations that are coming.
@noac_mit@gabriel_zucman@elonmusk@tylercowen Surely just pure coincidence that your "poking around" landed on a former student of Tyler Cowen's who works full time for billionaire-funded (Koch, Walton, Pope..) libertarian Institute dedicated to fighting climate science, anti-trust regulation, and taxes on the rich. 😂
Why does enclosure sometimes unfold gradually—and sometimes become a property race? We model tipping points, strategic incentives, and customary governance.
New paper by @mbaker21231 & @JonathanConning
https://t.co/iYyQORdwIr
#REStud#EconX#EconTwitter
@Tyler_Menzer@paulnovosad Couldn't agree more. If we don't allow complicated but messy questions & data to be explored we're condeming ourselves to only explore under the proverbial brightly lit lamppost and nowhere else, crushing the possibility of understanding in the name of purity & perfection.
Secretary Marco Rubio: You have just lost any trust Venezuelans ever had on you, and it will come to haunt you. You opted to use US power, not to free Venezuelans, but to go to bed with our oppressors. You opted to push an asset grab, an unconstitutional deal with an illegitimate oppressive government, instead of using US leadership to re-establish constitutional rule and democracy first, and then deal with a legitimate government that could have made credible long-term commitments, in due course. This announced deal will not stand. Delcy, contrary to what you boss just stated [see below] is not "highly respected" by any Venezuelan I know, or by any American outside of the Mar-a-lago kleptocracy. She has no legitimacy or constitutional power to commit Venezuela to any such deal. Venezuelans will not respect this illegitimate deal and no major US oil company will take it seriously because they know it will not last. No wonder you are using wanted criminals - like Alejandro Betancourt - to make this shameful deal. You are also preventing our leader - Maria Corina Machado - from returning to Venezuela, and you have conspired to delay elections and the return to democracy. Shameful.
@yohaniddawela invaluable for policy & targeting prediction tasks, but I worry these vars can't be used as valid regressors in casual regression bc model trained on outcome vars. Research on how to combine these amazing advances with casual understanding remains vital
Everybody has heard of the Luddites, but few know Sir Thomas Maitland, the man who defeated them. Rather than using brute force to take them all out, Maitland simply identified the men he took to be ringleaders, had them arrested on evidence that was often thin, and executed them. Hit one, educate a hundred.
This is the strategy that the British magazine The Economist seems to have adopted toward the new version of the Luddites: AI critics. Rather than the public execution, they use the public humiliation of the anti-AI ringleaders, with equally scant evidence. Whatever its editors intended, the critical piece against @DAcemogluMIT, published by the magazine on August 17th, functions less like a conventional assessment of scholarship than like an act of intellectual discipline.
I have long criticized important parts of Daron’s work, and I am not afraid to expose weaknesses in his reasoning, as I have in the latest episode of my Capitalisn’t podcast: https://t.co/OykREa1JB5. But I would never have written that piece.
If The Economist had objections to his Nobel Prize, it should have raised them when it was awarded. But it did not. If it had objections to his paper on demography, it should have raised them when the paper came out. But it did not.
Why does the British magazine raise these questions only now? Why does it do a review of a book that is not about AI, but only reviews the half-chapter he wrote about AI? I have read The Economist for more than thirty years. I cannot remember it ever attacking a living economist in this ad hominem way, let alone one of Daron's caliber.
The piece is not really about Daron. It is a warning shot. If the Economist can humiliate the leading economist of my generation, imagine what it can do to anybody else who criticizes AI. Criticize the new incarnation of the latest technological wonder, and your weakest paper becomes your body of work. Praise it, and your weakest paper is never mentioned at all or even celebrated like a great piece of scholarship.
If AI delivers even half of its promises, it will be transformative, ushering in a new era of productivity and growth, as the first industrial revolution was and possibly even more. Many professional economists only see these long-run benefits. Yet, the path to Nirvana is littered with the bodies of the people hurt during the transition. It took between 50 and 70 years after the start of the First Industrial Revolution for workers' wages to begin rising. In the meantime, life expectancy stagnated, and average height declined, a clear sign that the Dickensian stories of squalor and misery were not the product of their author’s imagination but a real account of what the country went through.
Criticizing AI is not necessarily resisting progress; it is pointing out the costs it entails. Unlike 19th-century Great Britain, today, the democratic West is not forced to maximize the speed of innovation at all costs. We need a serious public debate on the costs and benefits of acceleration, with concrete proposals for minimizing transition costs. This debate needs critical voices like Daron’s.
In the undemocratic Great Britain of the early 19th century, Lord Maitland was not serving the British people, but the British merchant elite, who had only to gain by putting the innovation pedal to the metal, since the costs were borne by others. In the interest of whom is The Economist publicly humiliating Daron?
@WSJopinion Brilliant article, ruined only by the non-sequitur gratuitously tossed into the very last sentence. Was that the author, it is it required to get published in the ip-ed section of the WSJ?
This is a post about lessons from the World Cup for ethnic integration and patriotism.
When the German footballer Deniz Undav, brought in as a sub in the second half, followed his first goal in the 68thminute, with a second in stoppage time to give his national side a 2-1 win over Ivory Coast, there weren’t many German fans who didn’t see him as the hero, epitomizing the spirit of their national team. Undav, the son of a Turkish-born and Syrian-born Kurdish Yazidi parents, didn’t have the classic German look. No matter. He was delivering an exciting victory to the German side and a glimpse of what makes the beautiful game so exhilarating.
Undav was also offering a rebuke to the obsessions of both the hard right and the hard left. Not just him but the entire German squad was a living demonstration that people of very different origins and appearances can be woven into a shared enterprise that, at its best, becomes a source of collective pride rather than a threat to it; and loving your country and welcoming newcomers into it are not incompatible impulses. The right insists the first half of that sentence is dangerous; the left often flinches at the second.
This isn’t the message from just the German team. The World Cup, played this summer across the United States, Canada, and Mexico, puts ethnically-mixed squads in front of billions of fans. Every serious contender in the tournament is fielding players whose families arrived a generation or two ago. And almost every one of them is generating a joyful patriotism shared by their team and supporters alike. The combination of diversity and pride, together, is precisely what the political extremes insist is impossible.
Consider the right first. Across much of the industrialized world, mainstream politics has become consumed by anxiety over the immigration of culturally and ethnically different peoples – and the supposed discord it brings. Ideas once confined to the darker corners of the internet, from the “Great Replacement” to “remigration,” are now aired and debated in respectable forums. In a recent YouGov poll, 45% of Brits, 50% of Danes, 51% of the French, 53% of Germans, 51% of Italians, 52% of Poles, and 46% of Spaniards expressed support for a scenario in which immigration stopped and many recent migrants departed. To be clear, the harshest version of such an agenda, which involves forced expulsion (sometimes bordering a modern version of ethnic cleansing) commands little support, and survey wording may be inflating softer concerns. But even allowing for those caveats, this is a striking reversal from less than a decade ago, when many of the same publics welcomed those fleeing war in the Middle East.
The left has traveled in a different but still troubling direction. Among some activists and philosophers, the world came to be read almost entirely through the lens of oppressor-oppressed dynamics, with Western nations placed firmly in the former camp. Patriotism – which at its best allows one to identify with the customs and history of one’s country while remaining free to criticize its failings – came to be viewed with suspicion, even disdain. The shift shows up in the data: the share of US Democrats reporting “extreme pride” in being American, according to Gallup, fell from the mid-60s in the early 2000s to just 22% in 2019 (even if it recovered somewhat since then).
That last figure deserves a caveat. Much of the collapse coincided with a presidency many Democrats sharply disagreed with, so some of it may reflect disaffection with who governed rather than a principled rejection of country. But the deeper trend is real: on parts of the left, the very vocabulary of national pride has become an embarrassment. This is troubling because without a shared identity it becomes harder for national politics to coalesce around policies that will watch out for and support those who are losing out – as the working classes, especially those without four-year college degrees, have been over the last several decades throughout the industrialized world.
Sport, of course, is not a perfect mirror of society. A national squad is a small, lavishly resourced, intensely managed group united by a single unambiguous goal-– hardly the same as integrating large populations into housing, schools, and labor markets. Nor is sporting integration as frictionless as the cheering suggests. England’s Black players were deluged with racist abuse after losing the Euro 2020 final; France’s “Bleus” are perennially dragged into arguments about who counts as truly French; and the US has an ugly history of racism not just in baseball but throughout many sports. Integration in sport is celebrated by the many and contested by a loud minority – exactly the pattern we see in the wider society.
The World Cup does not prove that integration is easy. What it nonetheless shows is something the extremes deny categorically: ethnic integration (rejected as impossible or even undesirable by the hard right) and patriotic pride (often looked down upon by the progressive left) routinely coexist. Most fans, watching their multi-ethnic team carry the national flag, simply experience both at once and think nothing of it.
If the hard right and the hard left could climb down from their high horses long enough to watch a few matches, they might rediscover what the rest of us already know: that integration and pride are not enemies. As on the pitch, they can be teammates.
@joefrancis505@RiccardoIorio4@JonSteinsson Just to understand you better, let me turn that around, and ask you to point to a few recent papers that do make meaningful contributions to empirical economic history. What are there defining characteristics?
@joefrancis505@RiccardoIorio4@JonSteinsson Sacrificed or handed a lifeline? But for few exceptions (you!) history depts sacrificed ec history. In econ: by 1990s most programs hardly taught it. Today, a sizeable fraction of new students are drawn by its revival. Not answering to ur standard, but asking history Qs.
@joefrancis505@RiccardoIorio4@JonSteinsson OK but addressing e.g. Conley/Kelly spatial correlation concerns demands amounts of data that (but for a few narrow questions) is not available in historical research. Risk ending up like randomistas, chasing perfect measures of impact, but only of things under the lampost?
@joefrancis505@RiccardoIorio4@JonSteinsson Their project is/was to put politics/history back into "political economy" when, in 1990s, both had been reduced. Econometricians, historians, pol scis, anthros will (for good reasons) find fault, but they shifted the field and conversations to asking better questions.
@joefrancis505@RiccardoIorio4@JonSteinsson "Why not a political Coase Theorem?"
"Are endowments fate?"
"Why did the West extend the franchise?"
"Why nations fail?"
"Does democracy cause growth?"