ken

[松林人家 @Rusong_Machunbo]

我一直在强调，这是一个白银货币化的周期。
过去一些年无论央行、金融机构、财富基金等都不会储备白银以支撑自己的资产负债表；当白银货币化进程开启、白银开始承担金融职能之后，央行等机构就会建立储备。

这个进程开始了——《福布斯》：俄央行正在买入白银。

[宏观边际MacroMargin @MacroMargin]

中国4月金融数据太差了，
居民中长贷、企业中长贷双双为负，且创近十年最低

[zerohedge @zerohedge]

China silver imports unexpectedly go through the roof: Beijing imported 528 tonnes of silver in March, the most on record

[Aelia Capitolina @Areskapitalon]

现在回头看去其实事情变得很清楚，当美债成为与美股同向运动的风险资产，当美联储在这里失去了维护周期的能力，那么川普实际上能做的事情就无限小了，因为美国作为一个帝国能承担的风险已经变得无限小了。

[华尔街日报中文网 @ChineseWSJ]

#本周热读 对冲基金桥水创始人达利欧认为，伊朗冲突或演变为下一场世界大战。https://t.co/4QHsWmAHsm

[小牛 @Xiaoniu6161]

中国公司 BrainCo 推出了 Revo 3，这是一款具有更高自由度和精确度的灵巧机器人手。

创始人：韩璧丞（哈佛大学脑科学中心博士）
公司研发起源在美国波士顿，全球总部在中国杭州

2026 年初完成约20 亿元人民币融资，为中国脑机接口领域单笔最高纪录，全球仅次于 Neuralink（马斯克）。

[金融汪 @yuyy614893671]

【布林肯：过去47年中，伊朗只妥协过2次，而此刻特朗普把自己逼近了“死胡同”】

这段CNN对布林肯的专访谈了5个重要的问题：

【1】 伊朗极少做出根本性妥协，美国现政府陷入了困境

在过去47年的历史中，伊朗只做出过两次根本性的妥协（结束两伊战争以及与奥巴马政府达成核协议）；目前特朗普政府采取了某种“缓兵之计”，但已经将自己逼入了一个难以脱身的角落

【2】 美国若要重启战争，将面临两个核心掣肘

经济市场制约：包括对石油、天然气、化肥价格以及债券和股票市场的敏感性。

弹药库存不足：进攻性和防御性弹药的严重消耗，甚至削弱了美国在其他地区的威慑力（包括亚太）。

【3】 美国取得了战术上的成功，但面临战略上的失败

表现：行动结束后，伊朗政权依然稳固，且依然保留着高浓缩铀、可以重新启动的离心机，以及重建导弹生产能力的基础。

【4】霍尔木兹海峡的底线被打破，伊朗获得了巨大的谈判筹码

过去，美伊双方都在霍尔木兹海峡问题上保持克制，以避免引发关乎存亡的危机。但现在这种默契已经被打破，导致伊朗在僵局中获得了巨大的筹码。

面对这种情况，美国总统必须做出抉择：要么重返高风险且代价高昂的战争；要么进行谈判，而谈判势必需要给伊朗一些好处，比如允许其在霍尔木兹海峡收取通行费或解除制裁。

【5】 铀浓缩问题上存在“保全面子”的妥协空间

特朗普政府主张伊朗“零浓缩铀”，而伊朗则坚称作为《不扩散核武器条约》（JCPOA）缔约国拥有浓缩铀的权利。

根据过去伊核协议（JCPOA）的经验，双方完全可以达成一种务实的妥协：美国在名义上不承认伊朗的浓缩权利，但实际上允许伊朗保留极低水平、极小库存的铀浓缩能力。这样既能给伊朗保全面子，又能确保伊朗若想突破协议制造核武器，至少需要一年以上的时间。
FULL INTERVIEW: Former Secretary Of State Antony Blinken Weighs In On U.... https://t.co/9BQbteHY6a via @YouTube

[Eason Mao☢ @KELMAND1]

大家都觉得日本石油储备数据造假，但是苦于找不到什么突破口，这样，我教大家一个办法来算，很简单，小学生都会算。

第一步：先看日本官方给的"254天"是怎么来的

日本经济产业省公布的数据显示，截至2025年底，日本石油储备约为4.7亿桶，号称相当于254天用量。其中：国家储备相当于146天，民间储备相当于101天，产油国共同储备相当于7天。

这个数字看起来很唬人，但里面藏着两个关键问题。

问题一：这4.7亿桶包括"在途石油"

日本统计石油储备时，把已经装船、但还没运到日本的石油也算进去了。这就好比一个人说自己家里存了100斤大米，但实际上有30斤还在快递路上，能不能送到、什么时候送到都不确定。对于日本这样一个94%的进口石油依赖中东、必须经过霍尔木兹海峡的国家来说，当海峡被封锁时，这些"在途石油"就等于零。

问题二：民间储备里包含"运转库存"，根本拿不出来

日本石油储备中的"民间储备"（101天），指的是炼油厂和商社的商业库存。但这101天里，有大约45天是维持工厂正常运转的最低库存（运转库存） ，紧急情况下根本无法动用。

也就是说，日本真正能拿出来的"救急油"，大概只有：

国家储备的146天，但要减去已经被宣布释放的部分

民间储备里勉强能挤出来的部分（最多约56天）

共同储备7天（但那是产油国的油，人家让不让你用还两说）

所以"254天"从一开始就是个虚数。

第二步：按"小学减法"公式来算实际库存

公式很简单：

年初库存 + 年总进口量 - 年总消耗量 = 理论年底库存

如果这个理论库存和官方公布的4.7亿桶差距太大，就说明数字掺水了。

更简单粗暴的方法：直接用2026年第一季度的进口量和消耗量来倒推实际库存。海峡封锁从3月初开始，3月是第一个完整的影响月份。

先看已知数据：

日本2026年3月原油进口量约为5200万桶，降至2013年以来最低水平。

3月到港原油大多是在封锁前已装运出港的，4月以后的进口量预计将进一步大幅下滑。

日本官方在计算储备天数时，使用的日消费量大约是180万桶/天。

但实际石油消费量更接近320万桶/天（参考2024年数据）。

第三步：算两笔账，看看水分多大

情景一：按日本官方用的"180万桶/天"消费量来算

3月进口5200万桶

3月消耗约5400万桶（180万×30天）

3月缺口约200万桶，即消耗了约1.1天的储备

看起来好像还行。但问题是，3月到港的油大多是封锁前装运的，4月进口量会断崖式下跌。日本自己预计5月进口量才能恢复到去年同期的约60%，那么4月进口量可能只有正常水平的三四成，甚至更低。

按这个趋势：

假设4月进口量跌至2000万桶左右

4月消耗约5400万桶

4月缺口约3400万桶，相当于消耗约19天的储备

一个季度下来，储备消耗可能在30-40天左右。

情景二：按实际消费量"320万桶/天"来算（这才是关键）

日本官方公布254天储备时，用的是180万桶/天的消费量。但专家指出，如果用实际消费量约320万桶/天来算，同样的4.7亿桶储备，天数会从254天暴跌到143天。

如果再用143天作为基数，减去第一季度已经消耗的量：

3月：进口5200万桶，实际消耗约9600万桶（320万×30天），缺口4400万桶，消耗约13.8天的储备

4月（预计）：进口暴跌至2000万桶左右，消耗约9600万桶，缺口7600万桶，消耗约23.8天的储备

一季度总消耗约37.6天的储备

143天减去37.6天，还剩约105天。

但这里还没减掉两个东西：

官方从3月16日起已释放了约8000万桶储备（45天用量），又宣布5月追加释放约20天用量，这部分要从国家储备里扣除。

民间储备里那45天运转库存根本拿不出来，要从143天里先剔除。

综合以上计算，日本的实际石油储备天数，大致落在以下区间：

官方宣传数字：254天（水分很大）

按实际消费量折算后：143天（但运转库存占45天，不能动）

扣除运转库存后：约98天

扣除一季度消耗和已宣布的释放量后：实际剩余可能不到50天。

换句话说，日本所谓的"全球最长石油储备"，在剔除统计水分（含在途油、含运转库存）并还原实际消费量之后，真实可用的储备天数可能只有官方宣传数字的三分之一甚至更少。

[Robert A. Pape @ProfessorPape]

With collapse US-Iran talks & new US naval blockade on Hormuz (stopping the little oil passing), where is this all heading?

Obvious next US move:  ground ops to seize enriched uranium soon. 10k troops on ground for weeks, minimum 

Stage 3 of Escalation Trap on horizon

[Bull Theory @BullTheoryio]

China is banning sulfuric acid exports starting May 1, 2026.

The last time China did something similar, it was silver and it moved from $30 to $83 in 3 months.

In October 2025, China announced export restrictions on silver. The ban had not even started, but the market reacted immediately.

Now compare that to sulfuric acid.

This is not a tradable metal or a niche commodity. This is one of the most critical industrial inputs in the world.

It sits at the center of:

• Fertilizers that support global food production
• Copper extraction used in electrification
• EV battery manufacturing
• Semiconductor processing
• Oil refining
• Pharmaceuticals

If sulfuric acid supply tightens, it does not hit one sector. It hits multiple supply chains at the same time.

The sulphur was already under stress before this ban.

The Middle East produces 44% of global sulfur, which is the key input for sulfuric acid.

When the Iran war escalated and flows through Hormuz were disrupted, sulfur shipments dropped.

Prices reacted immediately.

Sulfur prices went from around $101 per ton in mid-2024 to over $600 per ton today. Sulfuric acid prices are already up more than 200% since the war started, and over 500% in the last two years.

This is not a new shock. The market was already tight.

Some copper producers are now operating with just 30-60 days of sulfur inventory.

There are already warnings from industry leaders that production cuts may begin if disruption continues.

China just removed the last stable supply source.

China is the largest exporter of sulfuric acid globally.

In 2024 alone, it exported around $349 million, more than any other country. A large portion of this comes as a byproduct of copper and zinc smelting.

Now, starting May 1 exports are being restricted. This is important because:

- The Middle East supply is already disrupted.
- Now China is stepping out at the same time.

Two major supply sources are being hit simultaneously. This directly impacts core global production.

Sulfuric acid is not optional in many processes. Around:

• 20% of global copper production depends on it.
• 45% of DRC copper output relies on acid based leaching.
• 50% of global uranium production uses it.
• 30% of global nickel production depends on it.

Chile, the largest copper producer in the world, imports over 1 million tonnes of Chinese sulfuric acid every year.

Estimates suggest around 20% of its copper output is now exposed to disruption. This is not a small part of the supply chain. It is a core dependency.

THE BIGGEST RISK IS FOOD.

Around 60-70% of sulfuric acid production goes into fertilizers.

And China has already restricted phosphate fertilizer exports through 2026. Now it is restricting the acid needed to produce those fertilizers.

That compounds the problem.

- Phosphate exports are expected to drop from 5.4 million tonnes to 1 million tonnes.

- Urea prices at U.S. ports are already up more than 25% since late February.

This is starting to move into food supply, not just industrial metals.

There is no short term solution. Sulfuric acid capacity cannot be replaced quickly.

New systems take 2-3 years to build.

Transport is complex and limited. It requires specialized tankers and infrastructure. Alternative suppliers do not exist at the scale needed.

So the situation is clear:

- Middle East supply disrupted
- China supply restricted
- Demand unchanged across multiple industries

The last time China restricted exports of a key commodity, the market moved 150% before the ban even took effect.

This time, the commodity being restricted is far more deeply embedded in the global system.

[Atom -宏观经济观察员 @hongsv11]

一周之后再看，市场信号很清晰：

上半段炒预期，下半段看出货

分化，本质是对叙事兑现能力的再定价

[Aelia Capitolina @Areskapitalon]

指望和谈破裂的朋友们可能要失望了，我认为周末的和谈大概率成功。因为现在美国的首要利益根本不是什么铀浓缩，也不是开放霍尔木兹海峡。而是：不要再被卷入和伊朗的战争里。而这恰恰也符合伊朗的利益。霍尔木兹海峡的控制权是伊朗的首要利益，美国可能会不爽，但是这并不会有什么根本问题。

既然两者在美伊之间不再有战争这件事情上利益是重合的，那么就大概率成功。谈出来的东西日后如何执行甚至到底是否执行压根就不重要，其中也包括海峡开放，大概率会有一个时间表——但是，开放与否完全取决于伊朗的心情，美国也不可能有任何强制执行的兴趣。这个和平其实就是美国的抽手宣告。所以大可以在周末交易和谈成功，下周过了再交易后面和谈无法执行的事情。

所以，我会加点中概多仓，有油气和put的朋友可以上些短期对冲。

[Bull Theory @BullTheoryio]

BREAKING: The world's largest banks, sovereign governments, and multilateral institutions are quietly abandoning dollar debt and borrowing in Chinese yuan instead.

The numbers are too large to ignore.

In March 2026, foreign issuance of Panda bonds tripled year on year to 27.8 billion yuan ($4 billion) in a single month.

Total yuan denominated financing by foreign borrowers hit a record 218 billion yuan ($31.6 billion) in just the first weeks of 2026. The entire full year of 2025 saw only $167 billion raised through yuan notes and loans combined.

Look at who is actually doing this.

- Deutsche Bank issued the largest single panda bond by a foreign bank in history, 5.5 billion yuan, oversubscribed 1.55x on the 3-year and 1.63x on the 5-year

- The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank issued 3 billion yuan the same month, with 58% of allocation taken by overseas investors

- Indonesia sold 9.25 billion yuan at roughly one full percentage point below what it paid on its euro denominated debt issued the same week

- Morgan Stanley and Barclays both became repeat yuan bond issuers in 2026

- Hungary issued sovereign panda bonds

- The Asian Development Bank raised a record 8.3 billion yuan in March 2025

The reason comes down to one number.

China's 10-year government bond yield is 1.82%. The equivalent U.S. Treasury yields 4.46%. That is a spread of 260 basis points, the widest gap since August 2025.

Borrowing in yuan is approximately 60% cheaper than borrowing in dollars right now. For governments and institutions that trade heavily with China, that calculation is straightforward.

Now look at what is happening to the dollar at the same time.

- The DXY fell 9.6% in full year 2025, the worst annual performance since 2017
- In the first half of 2025 alone it fell 10.7%, the worst first half performance in over 50 years
- The U.S. dollar's share of global foreign exchange reserves fell to 56.32%, the lowest level since 1995, down from a peak of 72% in 2001
- China's U.S. Treasury holdings fell to $682.6 billion in November 2025, down from a peak of $1.32 trillion in 2013, a 48% decline over 13 years
- China has been selling U.S. Treasuries for nine consecutive months as of late 2025

Something more structural is also breaking down inside the Treasury market itself.

Research from the National Bureau of Economic Research found that U.S. Treasuries' convenience yield, the premium investors historically paid just to hold the safest asset in the world, has turned negative, currently sitting at -0.25% for 10-year maturities.

This premium used to save the U.S. government hundreds of billions in borrowing costs annually.

State Street confirmed that since early April 2025, rising Treasury yields now signal fiscal risk, not economic strength. That is the opposite of how a safe haven behaves.

During the global bond sell off in March 2026, triggered by geopolitical tensions and surging energy prices, U.S. Treasury yields spiked to 4.4055%, a nearly eight month high. UK, Australian, and New Zealand government bonds all hit multi-year yield highs.

China's 10-year yield moved from 1.80% to 1.84%. Chinese bonds were almost stable while everything else sold off.

Now look at what just happened today.

A ceasefire between the US and Iran has been announced. The Strait of Hormuz is reopening. But Iran is charging every oil tanker that passes through $1 per barrel of cargo, with payments accepted in Bitcoin or Chinese yuan.

A Very Large Crude Carrier carrying 2 million barrels pays up to $2 million per transit. Iran's National Security Committee has already passed legislation codifying this fee structure into law.

The system is specifically designed to bypass the dollar based financial system and U.S. sanctions. At least two vessels had already paid in yuan before the ceasefire was even announced.

The world's most critical energy chokepoint is now priced in yuan and Bitcoin, Not dollars.

The trade picture makes the shift more structural than it looks.

The yuan now accounts for 34.5% of China's cross-border goods trade settlements, up from just 10% in 2017.

China is the dominant trading partner for more than 120 countries. When your largest trading partner settles trade in its own currency, you eventually need to hold that currency as a working reserve and you buy yuan denominated bonds to do it.

The offshore dim sum bond market hit a record 870 billion yuan ($123 billion) in full year 2025, its eighth consecutive year of growth. Around 30% of global central banks are expected to increase their RMB holdings over the next decade.

UBS Asset Management said the yuan's share of global central bank reserves could rise to 10% over the medium term. It currently sits at 1.93%.

For decades, there was no real alternative to the dollar. That is what made it dominant.

What is changing now is not that the dollar is broken. It is that the world has stopped assuming it is the only option. Once that assumption breaks, it does not come back.

[Robert A. Pape @ProfessorPape]

The Iran ceasefire is being called a “pause.”

It’s not.

It’s a revelation:
The U.S. used overwhelming force—and still could not control the outcome.
That’s a structural shift in power.

[Robert A. Pape @ProfessorPape]

The key shift:

Power isn’t just about what you control.
It’s about what you can put at risk.

In a global economy,
risk = power.

[RJ @RJDAIGOGO]

格雷厄姆参议员：

这场灾难的一个潜在威胁是，如果我们开始允许人民币与石油进行交易，那将会损害美元（世界货币的地位）。

[Aelia Capitolina @Areskapitalon]

我觉得局势短期内不会再显著升温，至少现在我已经不再会这么去押注。只会判断冲突进入低烈度长期化，伊朗正在用谈判作为武器，继续完成它之前在中东建立霸权的目的，而美国现在缺乏反制意愿和手段。

因为美国这两天肉眼可见选择了万斯路线，比我的预期是要更彻底的。这个结果就是以色列在很长一段时间内无法再拉美国下水，摩擦从以色列和伊朗之间，过渡到了美国和以色列之间。

[Nullable @NullableX]

nice，和我前面几条说的一样，换人了就是真要谈了。简直是复刻去年4月

[Shanaka Anslem Perera ⚡ @shanaka86]

BREAKING: The United States Navy is about to provide security escort for commercial vessels passing through a toll booth that charges in Chinese yuan.

Read Trump’s post again. “The United States of America will be helping with the traffic buildup in the Strait of Hormuz.” Now read AP’s confirmation of the ceasefire terms. Iran and Oman will charge fees on ships transiting the strait. Iran’s parliament pre-approved the Hormuz Management Plan on March 31st with rial-based tolls and coordination with Oman. Bloomberg and Lloyd’s List confirmed that at least two vessels have already paid in yuan through IRGC-linked intermediaries using secret safe-passage codes.

The ceasefire that Trump announced does not prohibit the toll. It does not mention the toll. The post that promises American logistical support for the traffic buildup does not reject the toll. The carrier strike groups that will be “hangin’ around” to make sure everything goes well will be providing the security umbrella under which Iranian military personnel collect yuan from every tanker that passes.

The United States fought a 39-day war that destroyed 85 percent of Iran’s weapons-chemistry capacity, dismantled 130 air defence systems, severed the transport network, struck Kharg Island, and killed the IRGC intelligence chief. The campaign cost billions in munitions, fuel, and deployed assets. And the ceasefire that concluded Phase 1 created a toll booth at the chokepoint the war was fought to reopen, denominated in the currency of the nation that applied last-minute pressure to make the ceasefire happen, collected by the military force the campaign was designed to degrade, and protected by the navy that prosecuted the war.

The Gulf states see it. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain are alarmed. AP reported their concerns about Iranian gatekeeping, economic leakage, and the precedent of charging fees on what was previously a free international waterway under UNCLOS transit passage rules. Oman is co-charging, which fractures the GCC response. Kuwait and Qatar are quiet, prioritising energy security over confrontation. The Gulf is paying the toll. America is providing the escort. China is collecting the currency benefit. And Iran is funding its reconstruction with the revenue.

Deutsche Bank called the war the inception period of the petroyuan. That phrase was published before the toll booth was formalised. Now the toll booth exists, it is legislated, it is operational under the ceasefire, and the world’s most powerful navy is positioned to ensure the traffic flows smoothly through it.

Trump’s strategic logic is sound at the bilateral level. The campaign achieved its military objectives. Hormuz is reopening. Iran is at the table. The tools remain available. Islamabad begins Friday. But at the systemic level, the architecture the ceasefire created is a yuan settlement layer embedded inside an American security guarantee. The molecules that flow through the strait will be priced, insured, and tolled in a framework that did not exist six weeks ago, and the precedent does not expire when the ceasefire does. Iran’s parliament legislated the toll. The legislation does not have a sunset clause.

The Golden Age of the Middle East may arrive. The petrochemical reconstruction will take years regardless. The centrifuges are still spinning. The ghost fleet is still sailing. And the toll booth that the US Navy is about to protect charges in yuan.

Full analysis on Substack.

https://t.co/0fIdGsM5qH