Juan Manuel Salazar Lerou

Nuevo por estos lados (X). Volvamos a hablar seriamente y sin verguenza sobre asuntos relevantes para el país. No respondo a ataques; solo a argumentos

[Slava 🇺🇦 @Heroiam_Slava]

Russian fuel is no go

One night – 10 tankers and 4 ferries in the Sea of Azov.

[Rohoza (Дев'ятий) Mykhailo 🇺🇦🇱🇹🇨🇦 @Oct7NeverForget]

It appears Russia has suffered one of the most absurd logistical failures of the entire war in the Sea of Azov.

According to published reports, dozens of fuel barges, cargo vessels, tugboats, and auxiliary ships have been hit in less than four days. Some are still burning, several have reportedly sunk, while others were abandoned by their crews or are limping toward Kerch after sustaining damage.

The plan was simple: after strikes on roads, bridges, fuel tankers, and oil depots in Crimea, fuel shortages emerged. Russian authorities reportedly decided to assemble a large convoy to transport gasoline and diesel across the Sea of Azov. The apparent goal was to showcase on television how a "fuel armada" was coming to Crimea's rescue.

Instead, Ukrainian drones turned that propaganda image into a burning graveyard of ships.

As a result, Russia may have lost a significant portion of the Volga–Don Basin's fuel transport fleet along with tens of thousands of tons of fuel. According to reports, the Volga–Don Canal has been restricted or closed over fears that barges could be struck while passing through its locks. Fuel deliveries to Crimea, as well as grain shipments through Rostov, Azov, and Taganrog, have also reportedly been put at risk.

The main takeaway is not simply the number of vessels that were destroyed. Ukraine has demonstrated that it can project drone power across virtually the entire Sea of Azov—from Kerch to Taganrog.

Russia wanted to demonstrate that it could save Crimea.

Instead, it demonstrated the scale of its own incompetence.

[Juan Manuel Salazar Lerou @lerou11134]

Cómo estamos @FACh_Chile con esto? No se olviden que Bolivia tienen SHAHED 136 y que ustedes son responsables de proteger el espacio aéreo nacional (y no solo sus bases aéreas) @ElArlequin1 @Lautaro_Chile @r_pizarro_p @RICHARDJOHNKOU1 @JoseJavierGo @AlvaroMoraPardo @CarlosPaezS

[defensayseguridad.es @defyseguridad]

🇺🇦🛡️Ucrania convierte la defensa aérea de Cuerpo en una red móvil contra drones, misiles y aviación.
El 1030º Regimiento de Misiles y Artillería Antiaérea del 3er Cuerpo ucraniano muestra su gran y radical evolución: sensores, MANPADS, artillería, drones interceptores, digitalización y mando distribuido para cubrir desde la primera línea hasta la retaguardia https://t.co/d2LqP7GvDU

[Juan Manuel Salazar Lerou @lerou11134]

La lección más barata es la menos entrenada: pensar.
Planificar, dudar de los supuestos, mirar con los ojos del enemigo. El fierro destruye; la estrategia decide.
¿Qué guerra ensayamos y cuál nos tocaría @mindefchile ? 📄 Bloomberg Opinion, julio 2026 (7/7)
#Defensa #Geopolitica

[Juan Manuel Salazar Lerou @lerou11134]

¿Puede una potencia ganar todos los combates y perder la guerra? Hal Brands, en Bloomberg: EE.UU. e Israel arrasaron a Irán. Irán sobrevivió, estranguló Ormuz y firmó un acuerdo que apenas lo compromete.
No decidió el fierro. Decidió la estrategia (1/7). https://t.co/5s1WeO8CfG

[Juan Manuel Salazar Lerou @lerou11134]

El puente regional incomoda.
Cerrar el mar es barato: minas, drones, misiles costeros. Abrirlo es carísimo: contraminado, convoyes y quizá tropas en la costa enemiga. Sudamérica vive de rutas marítimas que no controla. ¿Cuánto contraminado y protección portuaria tenemos? (6/7)

[Martin Tuitero @TuiteroMartin]

Video ruso, tanque UKR alcanzado por drones en el cruce de la carretera desde Nykonorivka (C-051401) y la M-03 (Bakhmut-Sloviansk), entre Yurkivka y Orikhvatka. Parece que trataba de ejecutar una misión de fuego directo sobre posiciones rusas en alguna de esas localidades, W Canal Donbas.

Interesante que desde Kramatorsk usa una ruta a través de Nykonorivka, lo que indica que esta localidad está libre de rusos.

[hartpunkt @hartpunkt]

Der NATO-Gipfel in Ankara brachte ungewöhnlich viele Lizenzvereinbarungen für Flugkörpersysteme hervor. Besonders hervorzuheben sind die 🇺🇸-🇺🇦 Produktion von Patriot-Abfangraketen in der 🇺🇦 sowie die 🇩🇪-🇺🇦 Fertigung von „Bars“-Mini-Marschflugkörpern in 🇩🇪.
https://t.co/SUhF6LC8XB

[J.Victor Fauli @Victor35571262]

🚨⚓️🇬🇧🇪🇸Navantia UK posiciona al astillero de Appledore como centro clave de la flota híbrida británica: capacidad de producción industrial para fabricar dos buques autónomos (LASV75) al año. 🚢🤖🇬🇧
🧵👇
https://t.co/p31jr5LDNW

[medoyid_ua @LetsArmUKR]

Petr Pavel didn't drop some bombshell intelligence in that Telegraph interview. He simply said what every serious analyst already knows: Putin will not touch mobilization before the September Duma elections because even his own circus needs a veneer of normalcy. After the votes are counted the window slams shut and another wave becomes inevitable. Not because of some mystical deadline, but because 721 thousand troops cannot finish the job in Donbas, let alone deliver the maximalist prize Putin still openly demands: the whole of Ukraine.

Strip away the polite diplomatic phrasing and the reality is brutal. Moscow is bleeding men faster than it can recruit them. Ukrainian forces are currently destroying around 35,000 invaders per month, more than the Kremlin can sustainably mobilize even with coercion. Every fresh wave of meat just accelerates the math. Z-bloggers and Kremlin mouthpieces quietly admit it: more bodies do not change the trajectory, they only increase the corpse count charged to Moscow's account.

This is not speculation. It is the observable trend on the battlefield. Ukrainian long-range strike capacity is growing month by month. By the end of 2026 those capabilities will be two to five times stronger. Operational-level logistics will burn, Crimea will be isolated, and the occupiers' rear areas will keep exploding on a daily schedule. Moscow has no path to victory left, only the ability to prolong the slaughter and terrorize civilians while it still can.

The useful idiots in the West who keep whispering about "negotiations" or "frozen conflicts" are either ignorant or actively laundering Kremlin talking points. Putin cannot stop this war even if he wanted to. Demobilizing a million traumatized conscripts and sending them home to ask what the hell they were sacrificed for is political suicide for a regime that rules by fear and imperial myth. The only off-ramp is complete military defeat on the battlefield. Everything else is theater.

Europe should stop treating Ukraine as a charity case and start seeing it for what it is: the only force currently capable of grinding down the imperial threat so the rest of the continent does not have to. Every drone, every shell, every sanctioned barrel of oil is cheaper than stationing your own troops on the eastern flank after Moscow finishes digesting its neighbor. Pavel is right that pressure must continue. The only correction is that two months was always optimistic. The real countdown is measured in Russian corpses and Ukrainian resolve, and that clock is ticking faster than the Kremlin can reload.

[Der Gepardkommandant @gepardtatze]

Zukünftige moderne Luftverteidung.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

Last night, Russia struck Ukraine with a variety of missiles. One stands out, the Kh-31. It is designed to take out radars and support other missions.

It is somewhat an unusual choice given almost everything else fired were shaheds.

We know very little, other than the Kh-31's were used in the southern axis i.e. Zaporizhzhia or Kherson. We saw these were used as well on July 10th. Back to back. One clue is they may have been used alongside Kh-59 or Kh-69 missiles. All there are pictures below and labeled.

Kh-31 are similar in role to the U.S. HARM missile. These are used to suppress enemy air defenses. Their goal is not exactly to destroy targets, but rather https://t.co/oG914j0SpK on air defense radars. This forces the radara to shut off and move before the missile arrives. These missiles are fast but relatively short ranged.

As an example, if a flight of aircraft are on a strike mission, fights may fly forward and attempt to sweep enemy fighters. Aircraft carrying missiles like thr Kh-31 shoot at SAM radars. Then the aircraft with strike munitions fly forward. These are complex missions and require significant practice to get the timing right.

So what were they used for. We don't know for sure, but we have some clues. For werks now I have been saying the only realistic way Russia has to stop the Ukrainian Hornet and other UAV threat that is ravaging their logistics around Crimeais to use their air force to aggressively target Ukrainian Drone Forces on the ground.

I assumed Russia may try to use their FAB glide bombs as they can stay relatively safe.

The Kh-59 and Kh-69 are kind of reasonable alternatives. The Kh-59 is a missile with final guidance TV controlled by the launching aircraft, so it can see and directly strike a target. Good for this role, but the launching aircraft has to stay in comma range.

The Kh-69 is the Russian equivalent of a Storm Shadow and not really formmoving targets

If both the Kh-31 and Kh-59 are being used together, we may be seeing the first attempts to go after the Hornets, FP-2's, etc targeting Crimea. This would be an improvement in Russian capabilities and/or training for future missions.

Worth keeping an eye on.

As always, sources in a thread below

[Robert Zubrin @robert_zubrin]

In the final months of WW2 Nazi Germany fired over 3,000 V2 missiles at England. The missiles carried 1000 kg warheads, and the allies had no defense against them.
Except one.
They got rid of Nazi Germany.
Fascist Russia can probably fire about 1000 missiles at Ukraine over the next year.
Ukraine can’t stop that with Patriots.
The only defense is to get rid of Fascist Russia.
Destroying Russia’s oil industry will do the job.
Once Russias oil industry is gone, Russia will experience hyperinflation and collapse..

[Roy🇨🇦 @GrandpaRoy2]

The Russians have confirmed that this new strike UAV is called the K-8 “Dvushka” (Двушка).
They claim it can carry a 5 kg warhead and can reach speeds of 150 km/hr, significantly faster than the common “Molniya” UAV (70–120 km/hr) and a challenge for Ukrainian FPVs to intercept.

[Juan Manuel Salazar Lerou @lerou11134]

https://t.co/75KV3aF6Yz @ElArlequin1 @fmoralesh1985 @Lautaro_Chile @r_pizarro_p
@RICHARDJOHNKOU1 @JoseJavierGo @AlvaroMoraPardo @CarlosPaezS @jpberlinger @LatrincheraCL @HoplitaPluma @FernandoWilsonL @Donpatoinfowars @ISSEYJM @OIFB
@JuanPabloToroV (6/6)

[Juan Manuel Salazar Lerou @lerou11134]

¿Las drones van a hacer obsoletas a las armadas? No creo que sea tan rápido. En el Mar Negro y el Golfo Pérsico, los drones ucranianos e iraníes han dañado y desplazado buques, pero no han logrado control del mar. https://t.co/75KV3aF6Yz @AthenaLabOrg (1/6)

[Juan Manuel Salazar Lerou @lerou11134]

Drones complican el juego, pero el poder marítimo sigue siendo clave. Las armadas del futuro combinarán buques + drones con mayor profundidad, logística y adaptabilidad. #NavalPower #SeaPower #Drones #UnmannedSystems #MaritimeSecurity #IndoPacific #Defence #MilitaryStrategy (5/6)