PLARF has constructed an unknown type of fixed launch system at the 1st Test and Training District in Jilantai that appears capable of launching multiple missiles.
#Xi is digging new holes. Learn about what the #PLA is doing in @CASI_Research ‘s article by Eli Tirk New Silo Type Built at 1st Test and Training District in Jilantai
at https://t.co/lpYYS3TevQ
The array width of this Liaoning #LPAR is ≈ 16.5 m, it's relatively small compared to other known, fixed-installation LPAR.
Based on the current site facilities, it looks more like an experimental platform.
#Radar#PLA ?
Yet another #PLAAF#LPAR Radar site in Xinjiang.
I was just wondering 20 days ago when they would build a new system (was thinking of P-band) for the #MiddleEast, now here it is.
Special thanks to @MIKE76665355725 and @Hurin92 for helping to find this site!
Rather perplexing image here showing a 🇨🇳PLA DF-17 TEL with what it seems to be a DF-16 warhead missile.
Two hypotheses here: either the DF-16 missile could now be launched from a DF-17 TEL, or there is a new (low-cost) variant of the DF-17 missile
SpaceSail doing the samba, as one of China's leading #NGSO constellations gets long-awaited landing rights in #Brazil 🇧🇷
The company's landing license comes directly from Brazilian regulator Anatel, and includes a few noteworthy stipulations:
1️⃣ SpaceSail must provide service in Brazil within 2 years of the awarding of the license (i.e. by Feb 2028)
2️⃣ The license only covers 324 satellites, half of the 648 that SpaceSail initially requested, as per Brazilian media (below)
3️⃣ The license is valid until July 2031, with SpaceSail planning to commence services by Q4 2026...a highly ambitious target considering China's launch shortage, and the priority given to China SatNet for the limited number of constellation-oriented rockets
At any rate, a big win for SpaceSail, and validation of their differentiator of being an internationally-focused Chinese NGSO constellation. Time will tell whether cachaça is in order for the Shanghainese constellation project 🛰️
#ChinaSpaceGuy
https://t.co/kz7tbW9zKw
[BREAKING]
Chinese shipbuilder Bohai this week moved the first Type 09V new generation nuclear powered attack submarine into the launch bay at Huludao 🇨🇳
Analysis by @AlexLuck9 with input from HI Sutton. Illustration by HI Sutton.
https://t.co/PN1dOhJiJ6
@Orbital_Perigee 25 years of investing in new generation of launchers and their associated skills & infrastructure + 10 years of diversification of the astronautics supply chain + The World's Factory (tm) means you can just build a new rocket with a new diameter in 1.5 years from scratch.
🇨🇳 The closest part of China to the continental United States, excluding Alaska, is a small area of land along the Amur River near the Russian city of Khabarovsk. Seattle is some 7000 kilometers from China's most northeasterly point.
https://t.co/fcwe3yppEJ
1/2 Russia appears to be operating a PRC satellite, providing 0.5 m EO imaging resolution, motivated by Ukraine war.
A fascinating article by Bart Hendrickx in "The Space Review" -> https://t.co/qILMhK900d
Launched on 23 Jan 2024, the satellite appears to be Taijing-3-02 (NORAD 58822 / 2024-016C) and is known in Russia as "Stilsat-1". In the US catalog it is simply identified as "OBJECT C" as the multiple payloads on this PRC launch by a Lijian-1 (aka Kinetica 1) rocket have not been definitively identified.
Development status of upcoming Chinese Launch Vehicles by the end of Q3 2025
The Trimester saw 5-6 static fires of new stages.
As it stands maybe 4 RLV and 1 ELV have a decent chance of launching in Q4 (2 of which will attempt a landing), with a few more possible in H1 2026.