@thsottiaux@midotalks Unfortunately you at OAI don't: overhyped PR / disappointing the set expectations + no dots in Europe but paying the same as in US, well
=> cancelling my Pro sub and go Max @ Anthropic instead.
@AgustinLebron3@DrinkEveryDrink It's banned on our house, Insta being the compromise...
But your starting observation from above is something I've been thinking about a lot recently.
@chesscoachandra I thought about Rf6 first (even calculated something x g3 but that's too crazy yet). However, after Ne5 white is probably defending. So perhaps Bxf3 first?
Btw, white has obviously to play on the K-side. Not a5 or stuff.
@AgustinLebron3@TheyCallMeCheng@andrewho03 Same. Usefulness is one thing; the G in AGI another. Like chess, Carlsen reportedly hated losing to “something that stupid.” AlphaZero was more tree search than understanding; dynamics, weaknesses and endgames are human concepts. Agree that AGI will need much more time.
@preshtalwalkar I think this is a misprint. Area A has wrongly not been shaded.
Otherwise, I'd hesitate to give this to small children, regardless of nationality.
@ps_ilove_me "A system can obey perfectly deterministic equations while having a finite practical prediction horizon because finite initial-state errors grow exponentially."
Yes.
“Chaos is the default setting of anything with coupled nonlinear parts.”
No, sir.
We asked an unreleased research version of Claude to take a stab at the Riemann hypothesis.
It didn’t solve it, but it did make strides on a related problem: it increased the lower bound for the fraction of zeros of the Riemann zeta function that satisfy the hypothesis from 41.6% to 67.2%.
https://t.co/aZDvqqhHRi
@AgustinLebron3@ccatalini Not sure, because "noise" sounds like if it wasn't interesting - but maybe rather something we'd have found the classical way (without them) as well, eventually?
@Big_Orrin Yeah 1978 was also bad. I meant the final in 2014 where Chris Kramer got a concussion and Schweinsteiger's face was bleeding. But I bet you can find many more Argentina's games like that.
For example their semifinal vs England (which Tuchel lost but that's a different story)
@ungemeve Finde ihren Ansatz richtig und sehe für Israel auch keine kurzfristige Alternative zur militärischen Verteidigung.
Zum Thema "Israelkritik": was fehlt, ist eine Strategie 👇🏻
https://t.co/Q3vpo2LpHY
What you often hear from Israelis or even American Jews is: "You don't live in Israel. You don't understand Israeli security concerns."
Fair enough. But I've spent my career working on national security. So let's put morality and idealism aside for a moment and ask a simple question: Is Israel's current strategy actually making it safer?
The answer is clearly: no. And frankly it hasn’t been for 20 years arguably even much longer.
Israel has repeatedly demonstrated extraordinary military superiority over Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. Yet after each conflict, it finds itself confronting many of the same threats often in a worse strategic position than before. That's not because the IDF isn't capable. It's because military success alone is not a strategy.
Israel's greatest strategic achievements came when military victories created opportunities for diplomacy. Between 1948-1973 the IDF excelled at fighting conventional state-on-state wars and those victories eventually translated into peace with Egypt and Jordan fundamentally transforming Israel's security. Military power mattered, but it was used to achieve a political end state.
Today's conflicts are different. Asymmetric wars can't be won through military force alone. The United States learned that in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Israel has experienced it in Lebanon and Gaza. Killing terrorists matters. Replacing them with legitimate political and security alternatives matters even more. And when your strategy results in killing thousands of civilians that doesn’t help you on the battlefield and it turns the world against you.
That was one of the biggest strategic failures after October 7. The United States consistently urged Israel to pair military operations with a plan to empower a credible Palestinian alternative to Hamas. Instead, politics prevailed over strategy. Hamas was weakened militarily, but no viable replacement was built.
The same pattern is visible in Lebanon. Israel achieved remarkable tactical success in Lebanon in 2024, but two years later rather than turning that into a strategy where it works with a new Lebanese government more willing to take on Hezbollah and with the Lebanese Armed Forces, it is instead drawing itself into a new occupation, like the previous 20 year occupation that ended in failure.
And with Iran. Israel demonstrated remarkable capacity to dominate Iranian airspace, take out thousands of missiles heading its way, and kill Iranian leadership. But where is it now that the war is ended. Isolated, while the United States negotiates a deal that Israelis don’t like and that is far weaker than the Iran nuclear agreement negotiated by President Obama in 2015 that Israel fought so hard to undo.
None of this means Israel should abandon military strength. Israel should maintain the strongest military in the Middle East. It is useful for deterrence, leverage, and if you do need to fight to defend yourself. But military power cannot be a substitute for strategy.
The alternative isn't naïve. It means building credible Palestinian institutions that can replace Hamas (There is a 20 point plan on the table to try to do that), supporting and strengthening the Palestinian Authority while pushing for reform, working with Arab partners, strengthening the Lebanese state against Hezbollah, and pursuing the strongest realistic agreement that constrains Iran while maintaining military deterrence. Ultimately, all of that takes you to what at J Street we call the 23 state solution – Israel at peace with all of its neighbors including the new state of Palestine.
Many Israelis will understandably point to Oslo or the Gaza disengagement and say “we have no partner. We have no choice.” Those failures should inform future policy, but the answer isn’t to pursue an approach that Israel has for 25 years and led to the disaster of October 7 and the horrific wars that followed which have come at great cost to Israelis, have isolated Israel internationally, and are turning Americans against the Israeli government and undermining Israel’s most important alliance.
Take the withdrawal from Gaza, which was largely unilateral and uncoordinated. Israel did little to build a viable alternative to Hamas – and Netanyahu, once elected, actively strengthened it. The apt analogy is President Obama’s decision to withdraw from Iraq. When that decision helped lead to the rise of ISIS, Obama did not conclude that the only solution was a permanent American reoccupation and a return to 2003. That strategy had already failed. Instead, the United States developed a different strategy – one that relied on local partners, sustainable political arrangements, and much more limited use of U.S. forces.
Israel should draw the same lesson. The failure of disengagement does not prove that perpetual occupation is the only option. The 20-point plan, if fully executed with active cooperation from the Israeli government, offers a viable alternative to building a replacement for Hamas.
From a purely security perspective, the conclusion is straightforward: what Israel is doing today is not making it safer. Military power remains indispensable, but only if it serves a broader political strategy. Israel has repeatedly shown it can win battles. The challenge now is building a strategy that can turn military power into a more stable peace.
@SusanPolgar After 1.-Bb4+ is 2.Kd1 no good because it runs into 0-0-0+ and after Bd2+and Qe4+ (if allowed with Kb1) gets at least the piece back+further attack.
So, 2.Ke2. Here I thought b5 but Qxb5 and Nc6 is pinned. Maybe better 2.-Qd7 3.Qd1 Nd4+4.Kd3 Qb5+ 5.,Ke4 f5+ and happy hunting...