I don't recommend anyone scramble to move their funds to new wallets today. But we should take the risks to cryptography from AI-accelerated math seriously, and minimize our exposure to not just quantum-vulnerable cryptography, but also potentially AI-vulnerable cryptography.
The core new area of risk from this viewpoint is, unfortunately, ML-DSA / FHE / lattices.
(and it's also another reason, along with quantum, why ECDSA might fall even faster than expected, hence the "fresh address" recommendation)
So far most people have been in the mode of thinking "elliptic curves broken, hashes safe, lattices safe". But there is a good chance that the concrete security of lattices will take serious hits from the next two years of AI math.
The basic threat model is: factoring is something that naively takes 2^(n/2) time, but over decades smart people have found and optimized number field sieves, and degraded that to 2^O(n^(1/3)), which is why RSA keys and signatures need to be ~400 bytes (and not 64 bytes). What if there are skeletons in the closet like that, both for elliptic curves and lattices, that we are simply not smart enough to discover - but bots soon will be?
This is a major part of the reason why for the past year ethereum's lean roadmap has been going in the "hash-only" direction: no lattices, no ML-DSA, no Falcon, no lattice-based commitments inside ZK proofs, etc. Signatures in lean ethereum are all hash-based, either WOTS or SPHINCS-.
For signatures and proofs, we already know how to go hash-only. The bigger challenge is for *public-key encryption* - and this goes far beyond blockchains. Secure communication, anonymizing protocols, lots of things need public-key encryption.
And unfortunately there are long-standing mathematical theorems showing why public-key encryption cannot be done with hashes alone. You have to have some kind of trapdoor object that has at least one form of usable "structure" - either group theory (incl. isogenies) or lattices or code-based or potentially in the future even more newfangled and spooky things (local mixing?). But for anything that has structure, you should assume that AI will make at least some progress in breaking that structure. Here, one reasonable inference is that if you want to make something plausibly long-term secure, multiply the key sizes by 10.
To me that's a very plausible world and something not at all extreme to predict. If AI will bring us 50 years of math in 2 years, then that 50 years of math may very plausibly include a "naive factoring -> GNFS" level of improvement to our ability to break lattices. In that world, lattices will still exist, but they will have to be significantly bigger to guarantee the same level of safety.
And at those new larger sizes, hash-based constructions will beat lattice-based constructions on concrete efficiency in every use case where hash-based constructions are possible at all.
Theoretically, of course it's possible that hashes are broken too (eg. P = NP would imply that). But I think P = NP is very unlikely. And intuitively, it's much more likely that a mathematical object has exactly no exploitable structure (like hashes are intended to), than that a mathematical object has exactly ~3 forms of exploitable structure (for elliptic curves: associativity, Schoof, pairings) and not some secret fourth form of structure we have not yet discovered that greatly degrades its security (for elliptic curves, ECDLP and pairing security). Similar for LWE, SVP, RLWE and the zoo of lattice problems.
For this reason, we do not yet see any reason to worry and start padding the byte size of hashes (if we start to worry more, we would pad the round count first before doing anything to the byte size).
Concrete TLDR, my own personal views:
* Hash-based > lattice-based, in those situations where hash-based is possible at all
* For anything lattice-based, be much more paranoid on param sizes. Remember that blockchains are only a small portion of the cryptography story; this point goes far beyond blockchains and applies to eg. access to websites, secure messaging, Tor / VPNs ...
* For privacy protocols, strongly favor NOT putting encrypted notes onchain. Instead, send them offchain through some third-party mechanism.
* If it's not difficult for you, keeping your funds in addresses which have not yet been used to make a transaction is a good idea. If it's easy for you, do it. **But be careful about migrations; I personally have lost more money in botched migrations than I have lost in all hacks combined**.
* For multisig wallets, doing confirmations offchain is better than onchain, because this way the signatures of signer wallets do not get exposed to the public, so if ECDSA falls to AI much faster than expected, at least the multisig "gracefully degrades" to a 1-of-1 where the 1 is whoever was gathering the signatures - a much better place to be than "anyone can take the money"
https://t.co/oVjwZog2lL
Deep|Optics: OCS Content per Accelerator Grows with Each Generation as Demand Widens Beyond Google
A year ago, optical circuit switches were mostly a Google program with one outside supplier shipping under $10m a quarter. Lumentum now expects its September-quarter OCS revenue to exceed $100m, and we believe its OCS revenue will pass $2.5b next year. TPU 8i put OCS ports into inference pods for the first time and the 6D torus would give the next training chip four times as many OCS ports as today.
Demand for OCS is widening beyond Google. We expect Nvidia to adopt OCS once their scale-up domains pass eight racks, from late 2028. We see more than $20b a year of OCS demand by 2030. Lumentum leads merchant OCS shipments today, and Coherent is the other US-listed supplier. Google remains the only hyperscaler confirmed to buy OCS and nothing at Nvidia is in production yet.
An OCS connects one fiber to another with a mirror, a liquid crystal cell or a chip and leaves the light untouched. With no transceiver and no DSP inside it, the same switch works at 800G, 1.6T or 3.2T and uses about 80% less power than a packet switch on Lumentum’s figures. Google has run OCS in their datacenter network for a decade and in their TPU pods since TPU v4. Until last year they built almost all of their switches themselves. Below is an illustration from Lumentum of how an OCS can fit within a datacenter.
A TPU in Google’s 3D torus has 1.5 OCS ports. Google’s inference pods had none until TPU 8i, which links 36 groups of chips through OCS at about 1.25 ports per chip. The 6D torus reported for the next training chip would take the count to six ports per chip from 2027, or three if two transceivers share a port. Nvidia has no OCS in production. Direct fiber links tie up to eight racks together. Beyond eight racks, our model gives each GPU four ports, $800–1,200 of content at $200–300 a port.
Some of this is already in reported numbers. Lumentum targets $400m of OCS for the second half of 2026 on a backlog from three customers. Coherent doubled its addressable market estimate to $4b by 2030 between February and March. Nvidia took part in iPronics’ $125m round on September 2.
We attended ECOC in Málaga in late September and met with teams from Oriole Networks, Salience Labs, iPronics, LightDance and others. OCS was one of the topics discussed during the week. This note updates the OCS market outlook and presents both the bull case and the pushback we heard from the industry.
The companies discussed in this report include:
1. Lumentum
2. Coherent
3. Huber+Suhner
4. Google
5. Nvidia
6. Broadcom
7. Marvell
8. Astera Labs
9. Arista Networks
10. Ligent
11. nEye (private)
12. iPronics (private)
13. Salience Labs (private)
14. LightDance (private)
15. Oriole Networks (private)
Detailed Report
https://t.co/6ra46zvxJb