KOSPI contagion will come for US markets eventually. Overleveraged bets on semis will leak into US LETFs and cause a cascade. Vol control and CTA will deleverage, compounding the unwind into dealers who refuse to provide liquidity. Throwing it out there now for the “I told ya so”
so who's left?
the big one.. the Dec 31 7250 put
~27,600 contracts, $173 million paid in October, and as of Wednesday's close none of it has been sold
MMs are short all of it
My view = the holders with a shot clock are done. the one that's left is insurance into year end, and I wouldn't wait on a sale to mark the low
@ImreSG Changing the surface sounds cleaner but are we actually seeing it in price action. Gamma rules and vol gets sold. Sounds reasonable in theory but is it being done in practice
geek alert....
there's "vol", "vol of vol"...and dare I say it..."vol of vol of vol"... good god. In simpler terms: "the variability of implied vol on VIX options" ...that's vol of vol of vol.
and by at least one count, this has reached a record...below, the 1m realized vol of the VVIX. higher than Volmaggedon, the Covid Crash, the Aug'24 VIX event, the Tariff Tantrum.
In the last month, the $VVIX has had up moves of 18.7%, 14.2% and 49.3% (Thursday, 11/5). It also had a 15.8% down day (11/4). the surge last Thursday drives a tremendous proportion of the overall 1m realized vol. when it comes to vol, "big moves matter most."
in markets, p/l is about prices. we talk about vol only because it can be a shorthand for prices. if you move the implied vol (VVIX) on a 1m $VIX straddle up by 20%, you move the straddle price up by the same amount. if you move the implied vol input down by 20%, the straddle price declines by 20%.
اليوم قريت مقال في Bloomberg عن اللي صار أمس في السوق الأمريكي، وهذا ملخصه:
جلسة استثنائية مسحت ~3.7$ تريليون من قيمة الأسهم الأمريكية!!!
المفارقة أن الهبوط ما بدأ بأخبار سلبية عن الشركات بل بجني أرباح من الأفراد. لكن أنظمة التداول الآلي هي اللي ضخّمت الحركة وحوّلتها إلى كرة ثلج -ان صح التعبير.
وش صار بالضبط؟ (Flow Dynamics):
1- المتداولين الأفراد كانو هم الشرارة الأولى للبيع وصافي بيعهم كان ثالث أعلى مستوى حسب بيانات Vanda وما يسبقه إلا يومين وقت كورونا في مارس 2020!
2- بعدها بدأت صناديق التحوط ثم الصناديق التقليدية (Long-only) تبيع علشان تحافظ على أرباحها هالسنة قبل لا تتآكل، والمشكلة انه ما كان فيه مشترين كبار بشكل يذكر يشيلون هالمعروض ويوازنون الكفة!!
3-ووقتها بدأ البيع الآلي (Systematic Selling):
وهي صناديق تبيع تلقائياً حسب قواعد ثابتة بدون قرار بشري. وأمس اشتغلت ثلاث أنواع منها مع بعض وكل نوع كان عنده سبب مختلف يخليه يبيع:
• النوع الأول صناديق ال CTAs (اختصار لمستشاري تداول السلع)، واسمها جاي من أيام ما كان شغلهم محصور في عقود السلع والفيوتشرز- اليوم أغلبها صناديق كمية (Quant funds) تتبع الزخم- فلما كسر السوق مستويات فنية مهمة باعت عقود آجلة على المؤشرات بحوالي 13$ مليار حسب تقدير Vanda.
• النوع الثاني صناديق استهداف التذبذب (Volatility-control funds)، وهذي هدفها تحافظ على مستوى مخاطرة ثابت في محفظتها. فكل ما زاد تذبذب السوق تبيع جزء من الأسهم اللي عندها تلقائياً ومع قفزة الVIX تشير حسابات Nomura ان قواعدها فرضت عليها بيع ~61$ مليار!!
• النوع الثالث الصناديق المتداولة بالرافعة (Leveraged ETFs)، وهذي تضطر تشتري لما يرتفع السوق وتبيع آلياً لما ينزل علشان تحافظ على نسبة رافعة ثابتة بين حجم مراكزها وأصولها الفعلية، وبناءً على حجم النزول الي صار يرى Nomura ان هذا تسبب في ~47$ مليار بيع إضافي آخر اليوم!!
4- تحوط صناع السوق (Short Gamma): صناع السوق اللي باعوا عقود الخيارات يتحوطون ببيع الأسهم كل ما نزل السوق، ووفقاً لبيانات Nomura فإن كل نزول %1 كان يتسبب في ~7$ مليار بيع إضافي. يعني النزول يسبب بيع والبيع يسبب نزول وخذلك دوامة بيع قشرا!!
In honor of some “pods blowing up” and me being traveling I will outline some concepts about pod risk management about which I do know a thing or two, as my name might suggest.
It is a common perception that pods are factor beta neutral and thus largely hedged. That is not quite true. A truer statement is that they are factor beta neutral to the extent they can measure the exposures.
Most equity risk models are derivatives of the original axioma and barra factor models. There are now many things that go into this but at their core they are a 12 (IIRC) variable linear regression. And mathematically, the unexplained remainder, the error term, is assumed to be the alpha (Upon which the team gets paid). You well recognize most of these factors: size, momentum (short and long), quality, dividend, domicile, sector, etc.
Now even the dull among you may note that there are in fact many other things that go into a stock. That’s true and that’s one reason why many people at the pods are very rich. There is though a very active and live debate to the highest level of these firms as what you “want” in the other bucket. On the one extreme, scheduling a proprietary drone flyover on the Aurora AV truck up fitting facility to measure parking lot activity vs expected timeline….that feels like pretty good alpha. On the other extreme, going long the Canadian listing rather than the U.S. listing because the Canadian listing diversifies the domicile score so you get a higher portfolio level idio score…..that doesn’t feel like great alpha. But the range is wide: paying GS a billion dollars so your team is the first meeting at the conference? That’s kind of the pod scale advantage. Albeit less so if every other pod is in the room. Going balls long large cap domestic U.S. GLP-1 manufacturers vs non GLP-1? Well that kind of is thematic alpha (depending on the work put in by analyst), but even if you’re of the opinion fuck it, let the kids rip (a reasonable view) you also know at the levered portfolio level that we aren’t measuring that risk completely. This line can really be illustrated with the concept of a “custom factor”. Maybe going long a shit load of SPACs is alpha, maybe it isn’t, but how the FUCK are you gonna build a portfolio level SPAC factor exposure loading in late 2021 when spacs didn’t functionally exist until 2021????
Anyways, interesting & active philosophical debate but there are some downstream derivatives.
Firstly, as a well known matter, 6 sigma events happen in finance all the time. There’s one every year in some corner of the market. So ex ante we know our models aren’t “great”.
Second, everyone knows the agent is an unobserved blind spot. It’s impossible to actually “know” why the analyst and PM are doing anything. You like to think they’re doing it on the back of deep fundamental quality work, but the median analyst and PM isn’t good at their job. So that assumption is known to be unreliable. The capital allocation solution to this is momentum chasing at the portfolio level: you allocate more to winning pods and you cut the losers fast. This is a brilliant approach because it means the pod business model is capital light- they identify and scale the good teams without actually having to invest in knowing which pods have “good” process. It’s worth really appreciating that point because it’s one of the true genius aspects of the model, and at its core it’s why the GPs are so fucking rich. (Deep finance readers will note that some of the original papers on factors saw that one of the earliest possible explanations for the decade-long trend nature for factor performance is implicit fund flow pressure from the momentum chasing nature of capital at the LP level)
(Continued in reply)
What’s interesting about today’s price action is how consistent the selling was.
As shown in our below analysis, there were at least 5 intraday rallies in the S&P 500 and Nasdaq 100.
One of these intraday rallies was as big as +1.7%!
All of these rallies were sold without a SINGLE green 1-hour candlestick in the S&P 500.
Today’s trading session will be referenced for years to come.
By nature of being a vol trader, I’ve studied many different market crashes. Not just the common ones in the U.S., but episodes like Britain in 1720, Vienna in 1873, and the Dutch tulip mania of 1637.
There are some interesting behavioral takeaways that aren’t entirely intuitive unless you participate in markets every single day.
One of the biggest for me is that large market moves often need two-way action to develop. Behaviorally, you need participants willing to take the other side, because their eventual need to unwind can help accelerate the move. It’s almost like storing energy that gets released later. To create that dynamic, a “gray catalyst” can be particularly powerful one whose implications aren’t immediately black and white.
Here are two examples that helped produce massive moves in opposite directions that had gray area headlines that led to that two way flow.
COVID (March 2020): What often gets lost in the sauce is that many participants were aggressively betting against the idea that COVID would be severely disruptive. As stocks fell, they bought the dip and sold vol. When stocks kept falling and vol kept rising, some of those positions became fuel for the next leg of the move as participants were forced to unwind.
Looking back, the outcome seems obvious. In real time, the eventual scale of the disruption was far from clear. There was HOPE that it would pass quickly. Headlines about potential treatments, policy support, or a less severe impact repeatedly gave investors reasons to step back in. Stocks would rip 5% higher immediately on that news and hope, only to reverse again even lower when more negative news hit.
Those rallies matter. They give existing longs a reason to stay and new buyers a reason to enter. When the recovery fails, there is another round of positioning that may need to come out. Without that back-and-forth, it can be harder to produce the same degree of forced selling. The uncertainty helps keep replenishing the other side.
Meme mania (January 2021): Companies like GameStop and AMC surged hundreds of percent amid a speculative frenzy and short squeezes. Here, too, there was a gray area. Many investors saw businesses facing serious fundamental challenges, which made shorting them appear rational, especially as their share prices climbed further away from what those investors believed they were worth.
But a compelling fundamental argument does not tell you how far a stock can move before that argument pays off. As prices rose, some shorts covered, while others saw an even more attractive entry point and stepped in. That fresh short exposure created the potential for another round of forced buying if prices continued higher.
The gray area was the gap between the fundamental thesis and the path the market could take. Of course these weren’t great stocks, and the fact that people came in on that helped the waves move higher and higher.
That’s the behavioral dynamic I find so interesting. Uncertainty can keep attracting participants to the other side of a move. As the move extends, their conviction runs into their capital constraints, and an opinion can turn into a forced transaction.
The VIX is a derivative of the S&P. Every tick the S&P moves, the VIX is going to move. So the VIX positioning can be decomposed into a synthetic S&P position.
That means you can translate a lot of that short gamma on VIX onto the S&P. And once you do, the S&P probably looks a lot shorter gamma than the headline number.
So when I'm looking at positioning, I try to look at it holistically and include the VIX book. If you leave it out, you can end up thinking the market's better cushioned than it really is.
It's one of those things I think gets talked about less than it should, and it's pretty easy to miss if you're only staring at the S&P side.
@VolSignals you also monitor this, right?
The role of academic white papers in the practical side of finance is an interesting one. There’s a heavy emphasis placed on academic research by consultants, pensions, and the endowment community. But there’s also some irony in that, because those papers generally don’t contain alpha. And if they do, by the time the research makes its way into the journal and becomes widely circulated, much of that edge has likely already been competed away, or structurally changed by the market. You would be surprised by the amount of large institutions that ask me to point them to a white paper validating the edges we discuss. It’s a red flag for misunderstanding how things work.
For actual practitioners, I think white papers are much more valuable as a starting point for deeper idea generation than as a direct action point.
A good example would be the research from around 2010 on call-side skew predicting future equity returns. In today’s market ecosystem, it would be pretty naive to assume that a relationship like that, in isolation, remains directly tradable. But the underlying framework can still be extremely valuable.
Let’s say we take the general idea and begin layering in heuristic-based factors developed through actual trading experience. Instead of simply asking whether call-side skew predicts future returns, we might ask:
“What happens if we isolate call-side vol by floating-strike delta and tenor, then overlay a volatility-momentum component?”
Now we can test something much more specific and practical: when the 25-delta, one-month call increases by 200% in less than a day, do the subsequent seven day equity returns on that stock exhibit a statistically meaningful bias?
From there, you can keep going. What was spot doing beforehand? Was the move driven by actual end-user demand or a mechanical repricing of the surface? What happened to put skew simultaneously? Was the move isolated to one tenor or transmitted across the term structure?
Suddenly, an old academic observation has become the foundation for a much more nuanced research process.
There are countless directions you can take this if you’ve developed good trading heuristics through experience. But that last part is something you have to build yourself. A paper can give you the hypothesis; it can’t give you the intuition required to understand when, why, and under what market structure that hypothesis actually matters.
The market pays you over time for paying attention to it. There’s really no shortcut around that.
it's five lines on the screen-
SPX Sep 30 7500/7700 put spread.. 21,200
ES Sep 30 7550/7750.. 32,700
ES Oct 7500/7700.. 38,300
ES Oct 7550/7750.. 2,000
ES Dec 7500/7700.. 13,600
ES at 2:1 (the $50 multiplier). the Sep and Oct ES options settle into the Dec future, so 7550/7750 on the Dec forward sits at 7491/7691 in SPX terms ~ the same structure as the SPX line.
one buyer.. but he has been splitting flow across both exchanges now for a while
(*this means the entirety of the position doesn't technically show up in our VS3D profiles ~ but I have run custom simulations for this purpose)
I literally struck out the original redistribution disclaimer and abandoned the trademark in 2017 so people could use the data and the concept without paying me, you absolute muppet.
I don’t expect endless attribution, but what an ass you are, @spotgamma.
Something that reframes the whole options market once you see it: a market maker almost never picks the position they're in.
They don't wake up bullish and buy calls. They quote a price, somebody hits it, and now they own whatever that somebody wanted to get rid of. The position arrives. Then the job starts, which is managing risk they didn't ask for and getting flat as efficiently as they can.
That's why their holding periods are so much shorter than yours. You enter a trade out of desire and you're willing to sit in it. They entered out of obligation and want out.
It also explains the business model. They aren't trying to be right about anything. They're trying to take a very small margin from an enormous number of trades, and to do that they break the option into its components and try to stay neutral on all of them.
So when a market maker sells you an option, it doesn't mean they disagree with you. Most of the time they have no view on your view at all. They just think they can manage the Greeks well enough to keep a bit of the spread.
FULL INTERVIEW: @MartinShkreli breaks down the collapse of Leopold Aschenbrenner's Situational Awareness, and how Citadel capitalized on the liquidation.
01:00 Why Situational Awareness collapsed
03:00 SALP's 4x leverage, firms that were tapped to buy
08:00 Why Citadel did the deal
12:00 Where Leopold went wrong
14:30 Why AI funds could still be at risk
20:15 Why you can't just hit 'Sell' on a huge position as a hedge fund
26:15 Ken Griffin and Citadel
30:00 Can Leopold rebuild?