He slept with some women, who cares? He built the largest company in the world, is what he did! He was a brave Taiwanese engineer, and in this house, Jensen Huang is a hero. End of story!
Not confirmed publicly which pages loaded it. RUM embeds are usually site-wide, but Polymarket hasn't said. What matters is the payload: it needs a live session (auth params + CLOB key map in localStorage, a signer in React state). Logged out = nothing to steal. Logged in on a page where it ran = exposed, trading screen or not.
Polymarket users were drained again on October 29. Nothing public points to a smart contract bug. This was a client-side supply-chain attack through a third-party script.
The vector
A DebugBear Real User Monitoring (RUM) script, loaded on Polymarket's international site for page-performance metrics, carried wallet-draining code written specifically against Polymarket's frontend (Hudson Rock). The script was served from DebugBear's CDN, a host Polymarket's CSP allowed (WhoGetsMyData scan, cited by Hudson Rock). CSP trusts a hostname, not bytes: once the bytes behind that host changed, the payload ran with full page privilege inside authenticated sessions.
DebugBear, 18:00 UTC: "We're impacted by an ongoing security incident. If you use our RUM product, please remove the embed code from your website." Polymarket referred only to a "3rd party provider". DebugBear was named by a source to CNBC and in Polymarket's build metadata.
Payload (Hudson Rock capture)
cdn.debugbear[.]com/C7xcKKrjUnXK.js
15,187 bytes
SHA-256: 0755e767504d8103f6c27b9e765a1026507a17c04513242adb503df7777879e5
Hard-coded fallback recipient: 0x3F99139F1C5854bb628c2e576Aaf638e99dFfc18 (remote config could select another)
Stage 1: session reuse, not key theft
The script reads polymarket.auth.params, polymarket.auth.proxyWallet and poly_clob_api_key_map from localStorage and branches on eoa vs magic wallets. No seed phrase is needed. It reuses the authority already living in the page.
Stage 2: hijack the app, not the RPC
It walks React internals (component props and hook state) for an object exposing postOrder and createOrder or createMarketOrder, then attempts to drive it together with its signer. This is purpose-built tooling against Polymarket's client, not a generic drainer.
Stage 3: liquidate, then sweep
Per Hudson Rock's static analysis: SELL orders at increasingly aggressive prices, or an ERC-1155 batch transfer of position tokens. Then EIP-712 DepositWallet batches, signed through the page's own signer and submitted to Polymarket's relayer. Then swaps.
On-chain
The payout address received USDC.e to POL swaps via Relay (Arkham, per Decrypt) and peaked at about 28.64M POL (roughly $2.6M) around 18:10 UTC. Between 18:28 and 18:38 UTC it moved about 28.6M POL out in three transfers. Signed DepositWallet batches are a normal Polymarket flow, so on-chain the drains can look user-authorized. The $2.6M figure is the wallet's peak balance, not a confirmed total loss.
Timeline, Oct 29 (UTC)
17:10 first POL reaches the payout address
17:59 Polymarket build removing DebugBear RUM (#15337)
18:00 DebugBear discloses
18:05 cancel-only mode, relayer paused
18:33 Polymarket: provider compromised, law enforcement contacted, impacted users "will be made whole"
19:00 trading fully back online
Per CNBC, the US platform was not compromised and the case went to UK law enforcement. Open questions: victim count, exposure window, and how DebugBear itself was breached.
Pattern
June: same class, a compromised vendor script, about $3M from fewer than 15 accounts. May: a different layer, a compromised key on an internal top-up wallet, about $700k.
The contracts were not the way in. The browser was.
1/ How I infiltrated a Chinese organized crime syndicate that has laundered $1B+ across multiple exploits for Lazarus Group.
Posing as a client, I gathered intel that helped action freezes for the Feb 2025 Bybit exploit and attribute illicit activity onchain.
We have found one zeroday that preauth RCE'd Debian 13, Google, Meta, Roundcube, Plesk, Wikimedia, Box, Dropbox, Zoom, Forminator, Elementor, WordPress Core, among many more. Details soon!
Claude has discovered a previously unknown enzyme system hidden in the DNA of bacteriophages. Beside the enzymeโs gene sits a long array of repeating DNAโa structure that looks somewhat similar to CRISPR.
We donโt yet understand what this system does, but only a handful of known systems share its features, and all of them are able to cut, copy, and paste DNA. Historically, the discovery of such programmable systems has helped revolutionize medicine. CRISPR, for instance, is now the foundation of genetic medicines. But it will take much more work to learn what this system does, and whether it can be put to similar use.
Read more: https://t.co/RuEosScSMb
๐จ BGP Hijack at 2026-09-20 10:04 UTC
๐ฎ๐ทAS197207 (MCCI-AS) announced 190 prefixes, creating 10,865 conflicts with 1,524 ASNs in 100๐.
๐Max propagation: 100%
โฑ๏ธDuration: 8 min (first part) and 15 min (second part)
636606729769440499166579950236036751749912014371509557713570027508971809534551913252252094954941974952859310861988904737359709200557919
is a factor of RSA-896
https://t.co/yGWyEC8RpZ
BREAKING: ๐บ๐ธ Warren Buffett steps down as Berkshire Hathaway Chairman after more than 60 years at the company.
Berkshire has returned 6,642,000% since 1964, nearly 120x the S&P 500 returns.