the current delusional expectations are: you should understand the code, but you can't write the code.
the experience of coding suppose to come to you by the Divine Intervention 🧘♂️🪬
curl was accidentally Turing complete for nine months.
git fetch has been Turing complete the whole time.
git fetch is Turing complete - https://t.co/OatWWp4gqx
If your vulnerability policy is “only take exploits with execution roots seriously and close others that are PoC as informational” then I think researchers should feel entitled to just dump their non-critical findings publicly.
Just got two Apple CVEs (minor bugs). Short write-ups and PoCs:
- CVE-2026-112554 IOStorageFamily - kernel memory disclosure and panic https://t.co/uLDKU5oK9Y
- CVE-2026-112554 Quick Look - file names leak https://t.co/QWNoTEqufj
What if Jira, Unicode, basic text utilities or even a printer can compute far beyond their intended role?
At @hack_lu 2026, I'll present UNINTENDED COMPUTATIONS: from unexpected computers to a security methodology for finding hidden execution surfaces.
https://t.co/kXwse7Lsr9
@yo_yo_yo_jbo Regardless of the assert, an XNU panic triggered from an unprivileged, potentially sandboxed app crosses a security boundary: /sbin/reboot is reserved for root. Even if Apple treats it as a stability bug https://t.co/zWOSDUFQS5
For the second time in Google Chrome’s history, Google awarded a $250,000 bounty for a full-chain exploit… to @XBOW. Here’s the full story:
At an all-hands at the start of 2026 in Malta, I set the team a crazy challenge. A full-chain exploit of Chrome by the annual Black Hat cybersecurity conference in August.
I believed there were few better tests of whether @XBOW could move beyond web applications to desktop software, servers and devices.
Chrome is one of the most hardened pieces of software on the planet, used by more than half the world’s population.
A full-chain exploit lets an attacker take total control of a machine, where they can read every email, password and bank login the user types. You don’t need to download anything or click a phishing link. Visiting the wrong site is enough.
So @moyix, Andres Luksenberg, Baul Lee, and Willem Pinckaers took on the challenge along with a fifth teammate: OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol.
They built a chain they thought would win, but Google told us they already knew one of the bugs.
We were already in Las Vegas for Black Hat and DEF CON, and the team didn’t want to go home without the win.
So Brendan and the agents built a new exploit in just 6 days.
We submitted it to Google and waited.
The news came through that we'd done what should’ve been impossible. A full-chain bounty of $250,000, the first awarded under Google’s 2026 rules.
It took just 6 days and $40,000 of compute to construct an exploit that affects a billion users of Chrome on Windows. An intelligence-agency veteran told me his team used to spend 6 months on this kind of vulnerability.
My takeaway: the cost of finding truly critical vulnerabilities is collapsing, for attackers and defenders alike. Restricting powerful models is not the answer; GPT-5.6 Sol is already public.
But defenders have one advantage attackers never will: they can test their own code first.
Assume your software is exploitable. Whoever is hunting your bugs has the same building blocks we did.
This is cause for urgency but not panic.
XBOW is now developing an autonomous product for testing compiled software (desktop applications, servers, embedded devices), and partnering with the world’s top organizations to design that product.
If you’d like to be one of them, get in touch.
P.S. Restart Chrome whenever the Update button appears!
🍎🐛 I got Claude making this, maybe it's useful for others as well.
Every Apple security advisory since 2002 - parsed, indexed, charted. With links to writeups, POCs and presentations.
https://t.co/aSv0PZpQj3
New article! ncurses terminfo can simulate a two-counter Minsky machine, making repeated parameter expansion computationally universal https://t.co/wrHSDEeOjc demo: a parasitic Fibonacci computation inside /usr/bin/top