Rod Lyon

Strategic analyst

[Tom Moore, Nuclear-Capable Wonk @PaperMissiles]

Ever creeping and growing intermediate-range forces in Europe with extended deterrence on its back heels during war on Iran while we befuddle a declared, labored, weak pirouette to the Pacific and execute a vengeful vilification of NATO is the leeward slope of foreign policy.

[Good Shepherd @HoyasFan07]

The Canadian position is arguably far superior to Australia's since Australia has traditionally been on its own geographically. It is extremely far away from its key Western allies that are in north america and Europe. The Kiwis are nice but impotent strategically.

[Rod Lyon @rdyn51]

What is a peripheral middle power to do? https://t.co/eAEVzOzgRi

[Good Shepherd @HoyasFan07]

Many seem to not understand that the US built its defense treaty alliance network in the North Atlantic and Western Pacific in the post-WWII period not out of charity or 'globalism' or 'liberal internationalism' but rather to *protect & advance* CORE American national interests.

[Darya Dolzikova @DDolzikova]

The “cash-for-uranium concept” is literally just the JCPOA 😭

This MoU is increasingly sounding like a watered down version of the 2015 deal. The two sides appear to be negotiating over issues that the JCPOA had settled: the downblending or shipment of enriched uranium abroad (Annex I, Section J); options for medical isotope production (Annex I, Section H); supply of nuclear fuel for the TRR (Annex I, Section J).

The MoU will also - like the JCPOA - have to include time limitations and sanctions relief, which were at the heart of the criticisms JCPOA opponents levelled against the deal.

Yet, unlike the JCPOA, I have heard no mention of measures to monitor and verify compliance, cap uranium enrichment capacity into the future (through limits on centrifuge numbers, models and R&D), address potential for a plutonium pathway, manage procurement into Iran of proliferation-sensitive material, etc.

At this point, it’s at best useless - and, at worst, counter-productive - to bang the “we told you so” drum. Better that the anti-JCPOA camp realises that diplomacy is the only sustainable solution and that there is no such thing as a perfect deal late than not at all.

But there also needs to be accountability for the fact that the delay and the lesson-learning have come at devastating and needless cost.

Trump will of course sell whatever agreement he comes up with, however shoddily pulled together, as being better than the JCPOA. What would actually make an agreement better than the 2015 deal?

If the final agreement manages to secure a moratorium on enrichment, and if it re-establishes longer-term JCPOA-style restrictions on the full range of concerning nuclear activities, and if it gets similar or greater visibility of the programme as the JCPOA, and if it manages to include restrictions on Iranian missiles and disruptive regional activities - then, that would indeed be a better deal than the JCPOA.

But, as the Italians say, “if my grandmother had wheels, she would be a bicycle.”

[Robert Manning @Rmanning4]

He doesn’t understand Trump : there is no we.

[Rod Lyon @rdyn51]

Thread

[Robert A. Pape @ProfessorPape]

Within 10 days, parts of the global economy will start running short of critical goods
After 30 years studying economic sanctions and blockades, I don’t say this lightly:
--Not just higher prices
--Shortages.
Markets are not ready for this

[Stacie Pettyjohn @StaciePettyjohn]

What is new—and what makes this moment more dangerous—is treating long-standing allies as transactional partners. Expect this to get worse, not better. I wrote about this at the @RANDCorporation in happier times.

https://t.co/An9jiNBixt

[Rod Lyon @rdyn51]

The Unasked Question https://t.co/6YxhLVnf1d

[Stacie Pettyjohn @StaciePettyjohn]

There is no silver bullet. U.S. forces and bases cannot be made invulnerable. The answer is layered: robust active defenses and serious passive defenses — hardening, dispersal, redundancy, rapid repair. We've known this for decades. Time to actually build it.

[Good Shepherd @HoyasFan07]

The odds of Turkey, South Korea, Poland and possibly Sweden* pursuing a sovereign nuclear deterrent within the next decade have increased considerably over the past year, particularly the past 10 weeks. Unwise to ignore this.

[ProfTalmadge @ProfTalmadge]

Important analysis here from @NarangVipin regarding the implications of Macron's recent speech on France's nuclear posture: why Forward Deterrence is not Extended Deterrence
https://t.co/gE2O4SGOQJ

[Patrick M. Cronin @PMCroninHudson]

Japan’s Cabinet decision strengthens Japan's autonomous intelligence capabilities, bringing closer the realization of a centralized national intelligence agency. Yet, bureaucratic rivalry, perhaps more than postwar political culture or reliance on US, is still likely to constrain efforts. #Japan #NationalIntelligenceCouncil #RichardSamuels

[Rod Lyon @rdyn51]

Thread

[Good Shepherd @HoyasFan07]

France has better readiness levels than the UK. That's the main difference. The # of troops isn't terribly relevant. Quality also matters. With SSNs, for example, the UK has 6 and soon 7 SSNs. France has 5. And British SSNs are considered superior to their French peers, which

[Dr Lesley Seebeck 🌻🌻🌻 @lesleyseebeck]

https://t.co/JDFWZ1uKfA

[Embassy of France in the U.S. @franceintheus]

Joint declaration of 🇫🇷 President Macron and 🇩🇪 Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

[Bruno Tertrais @BrunoTertrais]

A short thread on Macron's deterrence speech:
(1/9) The speech delivered today at Île Longue is *the most significant update to French nuclear deterrence policy in thirty years*. In my view, it represents a major step forward, with two important turning points and three omissions.

[The Lowy Institute @LowyInstitute]

Hard conversations on Australia’s defence | Ely Ratner https://t.co/5E9vV6bWZk

[Rod Lyon @rdyn51]

US Presence is not a Nuclear Guarantee https://t.co/RroeYAM9af

[Rod Lyon @rdyn51]

Restoring nuclear capability to the entire B-52 fleet would put a dent in the hopes of those who believe that any B-52 deployments to Australia needn’t be an obstacle to Australian compliance with the TPNW

[Andrea Stricker @StrickerNonpro]

“U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command says it is prepared to load more warheads onto Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and restore nuclear weapons capability to the entire B-52 bomber fleet, if called upon to do so… ‘The conclusion of New START allows us to streamline our focus and dedicate more resources to our core mission: ensuring a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent,’ an AFGSC spokesperson told TWZ.” https://t.co/g2gQa6zdEk