Today we’ve raised $52M Seed and we are announcing the public launch of S2.1 Pro.
>It can clone a voice from 5 seconds of audio
>2x faster than Cartesia & 1/6th the cost of Eleven Labs
>most expressive model with word level control over emotion, intonation, pacing etc
We support frontier AI companies including HeyGen, LiveKit, Retell, Sanas, and OpenArt all run our model in production.
If you're a business and we can't cut your voice AI costs by 50%, we'll give you 1 year of Fish Audio for free.
Book a demo: https://t.co/vHkyZf9JoG
To celebrate our first birthday, we'll give you 1 month of S2.1 Pro for free. Like, retweet, and comment “Fish” to get it.
Last night, Internal Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s law mandating the execution of terrorists convicted of murder passed 62–48. Ben-Gvir attempted to propose a toast, but before he could pop the cork on his champagne, the Knesset speaker demanded he stop, and the ushers confiscated the bottle. The stunt was much like the law itself: all style, no substance.
Contrary to much of the rhetoric, Israel has had the death penalty for nearly 70 years. The original law was designed to execute Nazi war criminals but can technically apply to anyone who commits similarly genocidal crimes. Every prosecutor can request the death penalty, and under certain circumstances, judges may grant it. That’s why Ben-Gvir advertised his law as forcing left-wing prosecutors to request the penalty and left-wing judges to grant it for terrorists—particularly the Nukhba forces, who invaded Israel on October 7.
In reality, it does neither. The law explicitly excludes Nukhba terrorists from receiving the death penalty and provides no evidentiary infrastructure or procedural framework to secure convictions. Its wording actually helps judges avoid the penalty, mandating only “death penalty or life imprisonment” for convicted terrorists.
Those hoping this law would change the calculus of hostage deals should think again. Not only does it fail to reduce the number of terrorists in Israeli prisons, it does not abolish the president’s power of pardon—the primary mechanism for releasing terrorists in deals. Even if Ben-Gvir somehow manages to secure a death penalty, the law does nothing to prevent the conviction from being overturned or the terrorist from being handed over.
The law does more than fail in its objectives—it actively backfires. Despite being marketed as targeting Palestinian terrorists (raising its own legal problem of discrimination), it explicitly allows for the death penalty for Jews. The law defines terrorism as acts “to negate the existence of the state,” a definition that could apply to groups such as extremist Haredi factions and violent members of the “Hilltop Youth” (which Ben-Gvir supports).
Its most glaring flaw is that it mandates carrying out a sentence within 90 days—an explicit violation of the Geneva Convention’s mandatory 180-day waiting period. As a signatory, Israel could expose IDF officers to international lawsuits, with no tangible benefit. The IDF warned Ben-Gvir, but he disregarded their advice.
Its blatant illegality gives the Supreme Court clear grounds to strike it down, returning Israel to square one while damaging the country’s international reputation.
Had Ben-Gvir managed to keep his champagne, I would have proposed a toast—to a self-destructive law that makes Israel look terrible, benefiting no one but Ben-Gvir himself. L’chaim.
That said, while Ben-Gvir’s law is essentially a campaign stunt, a more responsible law is making its way through the system. Proposed by MKs Simcha Rothman and Yulia Malinovsky, the law establishes the practical mechanisms—procedural and evidentiary—to secure convictions of Nukhba terrorists, after which the death penalty could be imposed.
The Rothman–Malinovsky law was developed in consultation with all relevant authorities. The Shin Bet, IDF, and National Security Council have expressed similar concerns about Ben-Gvir’s law and consulted on this alternative.
The death penalty is a complex issue. Personally, I support executing terrorists who attempt to murder civilians—especially the monsters of October 7. Currently, these terrorists face one of two outcomes: spend the rest of their lives in prison at Israel’s expense, or eventually be released in a hostage deal and likely return to terrorism. Neither option is good for Israel.
What we can all agree on is that this issue demands a serious, responsible approach—one that prioritizes the security and best interests of the country over personal electoral ambitions.
To read the rest of today's newsletter click here.
https://t.co/DRwI5Ghjwz
Today we're introducing TRIBE v2 (Trimodal Brain Encoder), a foundation model trained to predict how the human brain responds to almost any sight or sound.
Building on our Algonauts 2025 award-winning architecture, TRIBE v2 draws on 500+ hours of fMRI recordings from 700+ people to create a digital twin of neural activity and enable zero-shot predictions for new subjects, languages, and tasks.
Try the demo and learn more here: https://t.co/VkMd1YpQWI
הטילים והמל"טים המתאבדים שאיראן שולחת למדינות המפרץ עשויים לסלול את הדרך להידוק שיתוף הפעולה הצבאי בינן לבין ישראל. ההשתוללות האיראנית המחישה למדינות המפרץ, גם אם לא יודו בכך בפומבי, כי ישראל צדקה כשהזהירה שמערך הטילים האיראני הוא איום אזורי, וכי הסדרים עם איראן ומאמצים לפייס אותה לא מספקים חסינות.
השינוי הקיצוני המסתמן ביחסים בין מדינות המפרץ לאיראן, מייצר הזדמנות אסטרטגית לישראל, להתניע מחדש את תהליך הנורמליזציה שנכנס להקפאה עמוקה על רקע המלחמה בעזה.
עם זאת, ההתקרבות בין ישראל למפרציות לא "מונחת בכיס", והצורך הדוחק של מדינות אלו ביכולות וידע מישראל להתמודדות עם האיום האיראני, בייחוד הבליסטי, אין פירושו התקרבות אוטומטית לישראל. כדי שזה יקרה, ישראל נדרשת למדיניות מעודכנת ולמדינאות אמיצה, אחרת היא עלולה להחמיץ את ההזדמנות.
למאמר המלא בנושא שכתבנו @UEvental ואני >>
https://t.co/OuPoHQOYGu
Eine interessante Entwicklung im Libanon: Gestern wurde gemeldet, dass nach Aussagen des libanesischen Informationsministers Paul Morcos Mitglieder der IRGC im Libanon ab sofort festgenommen werden. Militäroperationen der IRGC sollen verboten, die Verhafteten deportiert werden1/
Israel:
Killed the guy who tried to kill Trump
Killed the guys who killed 46 Americans on Oct. 7
Killed the guys who killed 241 Marines
Killed the guys who killed 17 Americans at US embassy
Killed the guys who tried to kill Pompeo and Bolton
Should I go on?
»Der Mossad hackte sich in die Kameras zur Durchsetzung der Hijab-Pflicht in Teheran, um Khameneis Sicherheitsdienst jahrelang zu beschatten.
Der eigentliche Clou der Geschichte: Nachdem sie Khamenei beseitigt hatten, löschten sie die Datenbanken der Sittenpolizei, die voller Daten über iranische Frauen und Mädchen waren.«
😂😂😂😂😂
Deutsche Staatsangehörige jüdischen Glaubens befürworten den Sturz des Mullah-Regimes in Teheran. Kein Wunder, denn jeder jüdische Kindergarten in Deutschland muss als potentielles Terrorziel des Irans geschützt werden. Menschen wie Josef Schuster sind im Fadenkreuz von Schläferzellen der Ajatollahs.
Und deutsche Journalisten, die selbst keinerlei Bedrohung ausgesetzt ist, wollen Juden den Mund verbieten. Wenn man in der sicheren Taz-Redaktion sitzt, sollte man vielleicht einmal kurz innehalten, sich fragen, ob man in dieser Situation Betroffene anpöbeln sollte – und einfach mal die Klappe halten.
https://t.co/IAMa8wMKQy
MUST READ 🔴
The Israeli military outlined how Israel and the U.S. are dividing responsibilities in the campaign against Iran.
Geographically, the Israeli Air Force is striking ballistic missile launchers and military assets in western and central Iran, areas used to fire long range missiles at Israel. U.S. forces are focusing on southern Iran, where shorter range missiles have been launched at American bases in the Gulf.
The two militaries have also split targets. U.S. forces are leading operations against the Iranian Navy, while Israel is concentrating on regime and strategic sites in Tehran and other critical infrastructure.
The Israeli Air Force is heavily relying on U.S. aerial refueling. The U.S. tanker fleet is roughly 10 times larger than Israel’s, and dozens of refueling aircraft have been deployed to support operations.
Israeli officials describe the campaign as the first full scale joint war between Israel and the U.S., following months of planning. Joint coordination cells in both countries are synchronizing intelligence, targeting, and defense operations, with more than 1,000 American troops currently stationed in Israel.
IDF Chief Zamir has been speaking daily with CENTCOM commander Adm. Cooper as the operation continues. @manniefabian
The Iranians, who sought to draw Israel into a multi-front campaign, have instead found themselves fighting on at least seven fronts (including their own domestic front). They brought this upon themselves when they chose to attack Gulf states, thereby expanding their circle of adversaries beyond Israel.
Meanwhile, aside from Qatar, which was attacked, it remains unclear whether we will see active military involvement from Gulf states or from European countries. This could take the form of offensive military cooperation between Israel and the U.S. and Gulf states, or joint defensive coordination and the application of diplomatic pressure. Either way, Iran has already turned the region against it.
On the northern front, Hezbollah – in what can only be described as a suicidal move – fired at Israel, effectively settling the question of where its loyalties lie. It chose to act first and foremost in service of Iranian interests, rather than out of any genuine concern for Lebanon’s defense, which it has long claimed to do.
Hezbollah’s entry into the conflict creates an opportunity for Israel to complete the task of dismantling the organization under more favorable conditions: at a historic low point for the group, and at a moment when its true objectives are clearer than ever – both to the Lebanese public and to the international community.
So long as the military effort in Lebanon does not detract from the main campaign against Iran, Israel should expand its strikes against Hezbollah’s centers of gravity to the point of dismantling the organization, or at the very least weaken it sufficiently to enable the Lebanese state to do so itself.
Steve Witkoff:
Let me say this, because I forgot this small little detail.
In that first meeting, both the Iranian negotiators said to us directly, with no shame, that they controlled 460 kilograms of 60% and they're aware that that could make 11 nuclear bombs, and that was the beginning of their negotiating stance.
So that's - they were proud of it.
They were proud that they had evaded all sorts of oversight protocols to get to a place where they could deliver 11 nuclear bombs.
Der Angriff der Hizbollah zeigt, dass international geforderte und unterstützte Waffenstillstände oftmals nichts bringen. Nicht nur, weil beide Seiten sich nicht konsequent daran halten, sondern auch, weil dann Zeit ist zur Wiederbewaffnung für den nächsten Waffengang. 1/