@TacticNotes Sensational work! This is exactly what I meant! It’s interesting because I think we use this mechanism to suffer quite well, efficiency in denying the free player further backwards, allows the forwards to block space more confidently
Heavily resonant with myself also, it’s one of the distinct differences between Iraola, Klopp, Howe vs Slot, Emery etc. When analysing Iraola’s formation set-up it isn’t too dissimilar to Slot’s, what is different though is the constant movement & interchanging of the defensive block to have access to the ball, to press. Rather it being because a formation that covered all bases, it was the continuous loop between M2M and zonal, achieved on a individual level by staying with your man & being ready to pass him off to another to monitor someone else.
When we talk about pressing, I feel like we always talk about intensity. But found this in article @spielvercom in 2017 about access which still resonates with me:
Ironically, access to the ball actually means you run less. The constant preparation of an action allows you to execute said action with more efficacy (closer + faster = less time spent doing said thing)
Only if you do not have access to the ball will you have to do more (cover more ground) to press.
This is why Slot, Emery’s out-of-possession model can sometimes look like it lacks intensity, the players are asked to stay fixed to zones with the emphasis being placed on the blocking of space, rather than access to the ball.
To have ‘intensity’ you need to have access.
@Jon_Mackenzie I'd looked into this a week or two back. My feeling after going through it is that we have less reliable indicators of team performance (possession, pass %, shots... big caveat, it's early) but errors (specifically, unsafe clearances + positional mistakes) are kind of holding up
Yes, it also feels apt to point out that tactical analysis as such falls flat when the distinction between a bad team and error prone team is made. It then becomes viable to simply say ‘they make too many errors’ and leave it there.
Just to be clear, this doesn’t mean analysis of how and why a team makes said errors take place, depending on the team you may be able to draw conclusions and connections, thus producing a tactical analysis of said errors
Something I've been thinking about today is how it's easy to conflate error-prone teams with bad teams.
Of course, it's fair to point out that, in the modern Premier League where game state is increasingly impactful, being error prone is what makes some teams bad.
A flimsy stat: In his last 10 games, Florian Wirtz has racked up 5 goals, 3 assists. Rounds at about 1 goal contribution game, mostly because he’s not played many full 90s. 673 minutes gets you about 7.48 full matches.
I’m not sure anyone has ever run the data because it would be a slog but I wonder if anyone’s ever compared similar teams’ 38 game season and established that one was actually easier than the other
For example, if Frank does a good job at Palace (which I expect), that’s now a tougher away game than it was for City & Liverpool when Palace had Sage
In the same way, Arsenal went to Villa before anyone had settled in and their squad was being pulled apart - easier than City’s trip a few weeks back
I wonder if it really just evens out ultimately or if a fixture list can go overwhelmingly in your favour
But then you have to factor injuries etc so again, probably a pointless exercise, but I’d love some kind of super computer answer
TACTICS DON'T EXIST.
“People talk about tactics, but when you look at it, tactics are just players. You change things so that the team can get the most out of the skills they have to offer.” - Pep Guardiola.
‘Players are the tactics’. Yet we do not know what the player will do or how they’ll execute in the exact to next moment cause this action simply does not exist yet. So then what are the tactics?
Rest in peace, Mahmoud Kamal Abdel-Malek. The Palestinian FA have announced the 20-year-old Gaza goalkeeper was killed by Israeli airstrike.
Just weeks ago, Abdel-Malek was in goal for his club in the Thousand Martyrs Cup, the first taste of organised football Palestine had seen in almost three years. He helped Gaza Sports Club to the final of the Gaza and North branch of the competition. This was a tournament created to honour more than 1,000 athletes killed since October 2023. Now this young keeper who played in it is one of the many names it mourns.
When football returned to Gaza as an act of remembrance and defiance, it did so on five-a-side artificial courts. Why? Because nine of the Strip’s ten stadiums have been damaged or destroyed. The same sport many of us rely on to be a safe space offers no such guarantee to the people of Gaza.
According to the Palestinian FA, 1,107 athletes have now been killed. Around 570 of them were footballers, more than 100 of them children.
And while this happens, winter is arriving in the region. The first storm of the season flooded the tents of around 26,000 households over the weekend, per the UN. At least five people were killed when an embankment collapsed onto shelters near Deir al-Balah. People who already lost their homes lost what little they had left.
Football loves to talk about family, community and togetherness. Here is a goalkeeper killed weeks after standing shoulder to shoulder with the sons, brothers and parents of those who have lost so much in the name of the beautiful game. The sport owes him and every Palestinian player more than its silence.
Our thoughts are with Mahmoud’s family, his teammates at Gaza Sports Club and everyone in Gaza facing this winter. Free Palestine.
Because even if you know what a team is trying to do, there will always be an opposite attacking reaction to any defensive reaction. Isolating Halaand may not be viable, what about the wingers? What if he drops deep instead?
The surprise element for me doesn’t necessarily mean you can always conjure up a tactic that the opposing team has never seen before, but rather can you make them do one thing before doing the other.
Tactics are meant to surprise & confuse your opponent, thus creating ease of access.
Access = space, time, territory, shots, chances, then finally goals.
Tactics have a contingent existence, meaning they only come to the fore depending on the intention, game-situation, quality of both teams (individual, group & collective level).