📢My first essay for @just_security is out!
CISA 2015, the backbone of U.S. cyber defense, expires Sept 30. Renewal isn’t housekeeping; it’s a strategic choice in an era of great-power competition & AI-driven cyber threats.
👉https://t.co/vhLZxO0GvI
📢My first essay for @just_security is out!
CISA 2015, the backbone of U.S. cyber defense, expires Sept 30. Renewal isn’t housekeeping; it’s a strategic choice in an era of great-power competition & AI-driven cyber threats.
👉https://t.co/vhLZxO0GvI
The piece draws on my doctoral research on the evolution of public-private partnerships in U.S. cybersecurity policy. I’ve interviewed officials and experts across industry to trace how fragile cooperation has hardened into joint cyber defense over the past decade.
4. Iran remains persistent though. Its determination to leverage any and all new tools to its strategic interests remains unchanged and warrants close watching.
3. Instead, Iran can attract attention to its message through flashy or high-impact incidents — website defacements, creating noise, or salacious hack-and-leaks. Basically going with what Iranian actors know best (hello, Charming Kitten & co).
2. Same goes to Iran’s seemingly AI-generated content with very little traffic.
Even if generative AI has made it substantially easier to create new content, esp for non-English speakers, it hasn’t made it easier yet to build an audience and create public controversy.
Key points:
1. Covert influence ops have a short shelf life after they are exposed and taken down.
This limits Iran’s willingness and resources to spend precious $$ (esp in current geopolitical climate) to create & amplify accounts that could disappear in a moments’ notice.
When you’re broke, at least be flashy ⚡️— My latest with @DFRLab on how Iran’s election interference playbook has, and hasn’t, changed. And what this all means for election security in the US and beyond.👇🏼
https://t.co/AmNsR0DIQ1
Periodic reminder that not all curious cyber attacks/info ops are the Russians.
Not only such takes are not interesting anymore (they never were to begin with), but also they neglect the agency and motives of bad actors of all types.
Yesterday, an indictment was unsealed charging two Sudanese nationals with operating Anonymous Sudan, an online group responsible for DDoS attacks against critical infrastructure and other targets worldwide. Click to learn about the #FBI’s investigation: https://t.co/Kl1pnAnDpl
What a nice and humbling surprise!
I'm thrilled to be a nominee for the #CyberScoop50 Awards this year, celebrating achievements in cybersecurity.
Check out the incredible professionals who inspire me everyday, and please take a moment to vote!
https://t.co/leKp8toei1
We're thrilled to announce the nominees for the 2024 #CyberScoop50 Awards! These cybersecurity trailblazers are not just combating today's threats but are also innovating to safeguard our future. Their dedication keeps our global networks secure and resilient. Show your support by voting for your top cybersecurity leader.
Cast your vote now: https://t.co/LdWmqmosJq
🚨New publication alert 🚨Forum on the practices and politics of cybersecurity expertise w. @HDiplo out now! It's been an honour to have served as editor w. wonderful @rebeccamSlayton for these fantastic set of authors and topics https://t.co/PIs8bxshaG [A thread]:
@CYBERWARCON@RidT Many thanks to @StephenMarrin and the anonymous reviewers at the Intelligence and National Security journal for their constructive feedback and support throughout the process. Highly recommend working with INS for a timely turnaround and rigorous yet smooth peer review process.
🧵Some background on the latest link btw Proud Boys and Yemen Cyber Army:
Earliest references go back to two 'whistleblower' groups claiming Eeleyanet Gostar behind Proud Boys & YCA immediately after FBI's attribution in 2020.
Roshangarane-asr: https://t.co/zamPNvW1RT
FBI connects the Iranian actors behind the 2020 elections Proud Boys incident - Emennet Pasargad (formerly known as Eeleyanet Gostar) - to the Yemen Cyber Army and espionage ops going back to 2018. They are IRGC contractors. 1/x https://t.co/7WkGpqEYd5
@CYBERWARCON Remember WikiSaudiLeaks? My latest paper, coauthored with @RidT, is out now in Intelligence and National Security.
We present lots of fresh evidence, break this mysterious event down to its component, and attribute at least one piece to the IRGC with high confidence.
New article published in Intelligence and National Security titled "Attributing Digital Covert Action: the curious case of WikiSaudileaks" by Simin Kargar & Thomas Rid at https://t.co/ZJOs6o0DOh
NEW: Authorities in #Iran are wielding high-tech weapons & brute force to quell demonstrations. But protesters in #Tehran tell us it won’t deter them. Plus, a look at the cyber attack that spurred Albania to cut off all diplomatic ties with Iran.
LISTEN: https://t.co/WAmN92P7eM
I wrote for @DFRLab on why Iranian protesters have embraced Anonymous this time around.
💡It’s about frustration with both IR gov and Big Tech.
#Mahsa_Amini#OpIran https://t.co/ZTdUSMzhyF
IR cuts protesters off from the internet, platforms silence them (inadvertently perhaps) w questionable content moderation practices at critical times.
Protesters have found an ally in Anonymous – with the same flat, leaderless structure as these protests.
NEW: Authorities in #Iran are wielding high-tech weapons & brute force to quell demonstrations. But protesters in #Tehran tell us it won’t deter them. Plus, a look at the cyber attack that spurred Albania to cut off all diplomatic ties with Iran.
LISTEN: https://t.co/WAmN92P7eM
@irani_mahan@msaremif موافقم با حرفتون. ولی تحولات حقوق بینالملل و بشر متاسفانه انقدر با سیاستهای کلان گره خورده که خیلی از مسایل اینترنتی واگذار شده به دولتها و بخش خصوصی.
توی امریکا مثلا از طریق فشار آوردن به شرکتهای بزرگ خیلی از اقدامات علیه راستهای افراطی انجام شده تا الان.
@irani_mahan@msaremif و میتونه از ادامه میزبانی خودداری کنه. ولی بیشتر وبسایتهای داخلی و امنیتی هاستینگ هم داخل ایران دارن و بعیده کاری بکنند.
قبلا در مورد خبرگزاری فارس دولت امریکا به خاطر تحریم سپاه دامنه com. رو ضبط کرد و اونا سریع رفتن روی ir.
@irani_mahan@msaremif تا جایی که میدونم این سایتها چون روی دامنههای کشوری ir. هستند اختیارشون با دولتهاست. نهادهای ناظر بر اینترنت حتی در سطح دامنههای بینالمللی مثل com. اختیار چندانی در این زمینه ندارن. در موردهای اینچنینی شرکتی که میزبانی وبسایت رو داره قدرتش از همه بیشتره (۲/۱)