Misinformation and scaremongering about energy supply do not equate to the real engineering and economic impacts. Some context for the UK and Ireland is important.👇
Recent headlines in the @guardian suggesting that Britain has “only two days of gas stored” are technically correct, but very misleading without context. The figure refers to the amount currently held in UK gas storage facilities, which is relatively small compared with continental Europe. The UK has historically relied less on large seasonal storage because its system is designed around continuous supply flows from multiple sources, including North Sea production, pipeline imports from Norway, LNG imports mainly from the United States and Qatar, and interconnections with Europe. Storage therefore acts primarily as a short-term flexibility buffer, not the main source of supply. Even when storage levels fall to the equivalent of a few days of demand, gas continues to flow into the system daily through these supply routes.
For the UK to face a genuine physical gas shortage, several unlikely events would need to occur simultaneously. These could include a major disruption to LNG shipping routes, such as conflict affecting the Strait of Hormuz, interruptions to Norwegian pipeline flows or North Sea production, and an extended period of very high winter demand across Europe that intensifies competition for global LNG cargoes. Only under such a combination of shocks would the UK gas system come under severe strain. Even then, the system response would prioritise households and critical services, with industrial gas demand curtailed first. The immediate impacts would therefore be industrial shutdowns and economic disruption rather than households suddenly losing heating. This is effectively a doomsday scenario and, in my view, highly unlikely.
Ireland (North and South) is structurally more exposed because its gas system is smaller and more concentrated. Ireland currently has no operational strategic gas storage and imports the majority of its gas through pipeline connections with GB, supplemented by declining domestic production from the Corrib gas field. Gas also plays a critical role in Ireland’s electricity system, providing roughly 40–50% of generation and most of the flexible capacity needed when wind output is low. As a result, Ireland’s energy security is closely linked to the resilience of the UK gas system and the stability of global LNG markets. In an extreme scenario where UK gas supplies were severely disrupted at the same time as low wind conditions, Ireland would likely have to curtail industrial demand and rely heavily on electricity imports and emergency generation to maintain grid stability.
Very roughly, the Republic of Ireland may have something like 200 GWh of gas physically in its high-pressure network at any given time, but that is linepack, not storage. In engineering terms, it is a short-term operating buffer, not a strategic reserve. That figure is my own estimate based on pipeline length, likely diameters and operating pressures. It is not an official Gas Networks Ireland stock figure. In practical terms, I estimate it is roughly around 1.3 days of average annual demand, and materially less during a cold, high-demand period. If I was giving advice, then I would make it very clear that 'because Bellanaboy feeds the national high-pressure transmission system, Corrib gas could in principle reach Ireland’s main gas-fired stations, but the limiting factor is volume, not direction. Corrib could support selected priority generation, not the full gas fleet. In a severe disruption the operator would likely concentrate limited gas on the most efficient combined-cycle plants such as Whitegate, Great Island and Dublin Bay Power.'
The electricity grid on the island of Ireland operates as a single system through the Single Electricity Market (SEM), with high-voltage transmission lines allowing power to flow between Northern Ireland and the Republic. However, the gas systems are different. Northern Ireland receives gas directly from Scotland through the Scotland–Northern Ireland Pipeline (SNIP), while the Republic relies mainly on pipelines from GB and the Corrib gas field. If GB gas supplies were disrupted to NI, electricity must flow from the Republic to Northern Ireland, so keeping the cross-border transmission lines fully operational and unconstrained is critical for energy security on this island.
The Irish gas and electricity system therefore operates largely as a just-in-time supply chain, albeit with a very strong onshore wind resource. If GB gas flows were interrupted at the same time as low wind conditions, electricity supply could come under severe pressure within days rather than weeks. The public assumption is often that energy shortages develop over weeks or months. In reality, Ireland’s gas-electricity system has very little buffer because it lacks strategic storage.
It is also worth acknowledging a structural issue that is sometimes discussed cautiously in policy circles. Ireland’s former gas storage facility at Kinsale ceased operations in 2017, and the country currently has no operational strategic gas storage. Work is underway on the proposed Strategic Gas Emergency Reserve, which would involve a state-led floating LNG facility, but that project is still under development. As a result, Ireland’s gas system presently relies heavily on continuous pipeline supply through GB alongside domestic production from Corrib.
I have researched this extensively since 2006. In my self-funded PhD, completed while working full-time, I concluded that “an unexpected result of this study was the impact of wind power intermittency on the gas network and the potential need for additional gas storage, which is another form of energy storage.” That was published in a Tier 1 internationally peer-reviewed journal in 2013.
Herein lies the real energy challenge for the island of Ireland, and we continue to skirt around the edges rather than make the hard policy calls on gas storage, repowering onshore wind, heating and cooling networks, biomethane, e-fuels, market restructuring, integrating transport and electricity, and water and land-use planning. Ireland, and the hardworking people on this island, deserve better. But people here, as in Great Britain, also need to realise that nimbyism will ultimately result in a higher-cost energy system. This unfortunate situation in the Middle East is once again a demonstration that national resilience and energy security have to take precedence over individual convenience.
However, the most realistic risk in such geopolitical situations is not that the UK or Ireland will physically run out of gas. Both systems are integrated into global energy markets and supplies will continue to flow as long as buyers can attract cargoes. The more immediate risk is that prices will react sharply if this continues.
The real impact of disruptions in the Middle East or other key supply regions is therefore price volatility and prolonged price increases, rather than immediate shortages, with spillovers across global supply chains and economies through the cost of living, interest rates, employment and even pension funds. If LNG shipments are diverted or supply tightens, European and other buyers must offer higher prices to secure cargoes. That feeds directly into gas and electricity prices across both the UK and Ireland. In practice, households and businesses feel the impact through higher energy bills and industrial costs long before any physical shortage becomes likely, and this is exactly what we are seeing now. Hauliers, farmers and commuters are already affected. Food, medicines and other products will follow.
Wind has a zero fuel cost, but market structure remains a major challenge. The UK Parliament, Government and Ofgem have all already recognised this and have been undertaking reviews even before this Gulf crisis. Renewables and a diverse energy mix are critical to our economies, but we also need to manage the intersection between a carbon-heavy economy today and the transition to a low-carbon society. We will rely on carbon fuels well beyond my lifetime, so they need to be managed strategically, pragmatically and carefully.
Next, oil, which is not really discussed in the article, presents a different risk profile. Oil is globally traded, widely stored and easier to transport than gas, but it remains central to transport, home heating, industry and petrochemicals in both the UK and Ireland.
Both countries remain heavily dependent on imported oil products. In Ireland, oil provides around half of total primary energy demand and dominates transport fuels such as petrol, diesel and jet fuel, as well as home heating oil, which remains common in rural areas. Oil is also the feedstock for petrochemicals used in plastics, pharmaceuticals, fertilisers, solvents and industrial materials, meaning disruptions affect not only energy prices but also manufacturing supply chains. The UK has a somewhat more diversified system because it still produces oil from the North Sea, but it also imports large volumes of crude and refined fuels and remains exposed to global oil markets.
Unlike gas, both the UK and Ireland participate in strategic petroleum reserve systems under International Energy Agency rules. Countries are required to hold emergency oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net oil imports. These reserves are held either by governments or obligated industry stocks and are designed specifically to manage supply disruptions. In Ireland, these stocks are managed through the National Oil Reserves Agency and stored both domestically and in other European locations.
Because oil is traded globally and stored in large volumes, the main risk during geopolitical crises is rarely that countries physically run out of fuel. Instead, the impact is typically rapid price escalation as markets react to perceived supply risks. Tensions affecting major shipping routes such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea can raise insurance costs, freight rates and crude prices long before any actual shortage occurs. Those price increases then feed quickly into petrol and diesel prices, heating oil costs and industrial input prices.
In a true worst-case disruption, such as a prolonged closure of a major oil shipping route combined with refinery outages or severe global supply shortages, governments could release strategic petroleum reserves to stabilise the market and ensure continued supply to critical sectors. Priority would typically be given to transport fuels, emergency services, food logistics and essential industrial operations. However, even in such scenarios, the most immediate effect would still be price shocks rather than physical shortages, because oil markets adjust through price signals long before supplies disappear. Physical shocks in my opinion, are doomsday, namely a full war event in Europe.
For the UK and Ireland, the practical vulnerability therefore lies less in the availability of oil itself and more in exposure to global price volatility. When geopolitical tensions affect major oil-producing regions or shipping corridors, fuel prices rise across the global market. That means households feel it at the petrol pump and in heating oil bills, while industries face higher costs for transport, manufacturing inputs and petrochemical feedstocks.
What this means in practice is that we need three things immediately.
First, effective measures for the next six months to manage price volatility, uncertainty, supply-chain pressures and energy affordability, and a clear message to the public not to panic-buy fuels or food.
Second, a pragmatic long-term strategy for energy security across these islands, grounded in engineering, infrastructure planning and economic resilience, not another cycle of policy reports aligned with shifting political priorities.
Third, we also need to remember that we may need to support Gulf states affected by this situation. Both the UK and Ireland have strong economic, diplomatic and humanitarian links with countries across the Gulf, and in a severe or prolonged disruption they may themselves require assistance in areas such as water security, food supply chains and access to critical medicines. This dimension is rarely discussed in public debate, which tends to focus only on the impact on European energy prices.
Yes, some of these are ultra-wealthy states with significant financial resources, but money does not automatically guarantee physical access to essential supplies if shipping routes are disrupted, infrastructure is damaged or regional conflict escalates. Many Gulf countries rely heavily on imports for food and on desalination systems for water, both of which depend on stable energy systems and functioning logistics networks. Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon, as well as Palestine already have political and economic challenges. In a protracted crisis affecting shipping routes such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea corridor, the challenge becomes one of physical supply chains of the products needed in the Middle East rather than oil and gas, and financial capacity.
The @FT breaking news article 'Donald Trump said the war against Iran was 'very complete, pretty much' as he declared there was 'nothing left in a military sense' in the country. Oil prices dropped sharply following the US president's comments.' All fine and dandy, but although Trump’s language may have knocked oil prices down for a trading session, but markets move faster than physical systems. If supply routes, terminals, shipping patterns or upstream operations have been disrupted, normal flows do not simply snap back on a presidential soundbite; they usually take several weeks to restore, and longer if there is physical damage or sustained insecurity. That is why I stress once again the UK and Ireland need to plan not for tomorrow morning’s market mood, but for months of elevated risk, volatile prices and knock-on effects across transport, food, medicines and industry. Plus the geopolitical fall out of this on the states in the Gulf, they will now realise that they need to mind themselves, coordinate and be prepared to mind their oil and gas reserves very prudently.
For the UK and Ireland, this means thinking not only about domestic energy resilience but also about the wider humanitarian and logistical implications of instability in the Gulf. We need to be peace brokers in the Middle East; that should not be left solely to the USA, EU leaders or other states. We should show leadership.
Our relationships with these countries extend beyond energy trade to include education, healthcare cooperation, aviation, finance and infrastructure partnerships. Supporting stability and maintaining functioning supply chains in the region is therefore not just an act of diplomacy or solidarity; it is also in our direct economic and strategic interest.
I am very much in banging heads together mode. Protests, panic-buying, exaggeration and poor framing can all create mistrust and unnecessary fear, just as headlines like the @guardian article can.
Apologies for any typos, but I felt this needed to be spelt out as a pragmatic engineer. In interviews and public statements I have tried to make this distinction very clear. And hopefully our diaspora, friends and family in the USA can raise their voices too.
https://t.co/5Zg0EXL8lS
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