Someone compressed Andrej Karpathy's entire personal knowledge base workflow into 10 minutes.
Obsidian + Claude + your own files, querying a wiki that compounds instead of a chat that forgets.
Best AI workflow I've tested this year.
Anthropic pays $750,000+ a year for engineers who know how to build LLMs from scratch.
Stanford just released the exact lecture that teaches it - 1 hour 44 minutes, free, straight from CS229.
Bookmark and watch it this weekend.
It'll teach you more about how ChatGPT & Claude actually work than most people at top AI companies learn in their entire careers.
The Head of Claude Code at Anthropic said he hasn’t written code by hand in months.
In 2 days he shipped 49 full features. All written 100% by AI.
He just dropped a 30 min talk on exactly how he does it.
Worth more than any $500 vibe coding course. Bookmark it:
🚨 Anthropic's own team just showed how to actually prompt Claude.
24 minutes. free. from the people who built it.
watch the workshop. bookmark it.
worth more than every $300 course you almost bought.
you've been using Claude without knowing 40 of its prompts.
Then read the guide below.
Your smart TV is taking screenshots of your screen every 15 seconds.
Not a guess. Not a theory.
A peer-reviewed study by researchers at UC Davis, UCL, and UC3M tested it.
Samsung TVs: every minute.
LG TVs: every 15 seconds.
Even when you're just using it as a monitor.
Here's how to turn it off for every brand:
JUST IN: Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.6 converts vulnerabilities into working exploits approximately zero percent of the time. That is the model you are paying for right now.
Their latest model “Mythos” converts them 72.4 percent of the time. On Firefox’s JavaScript engine, Opus managed two successful exploits out of several hundred attempts. “Mythos” managed 181. Ninety times better. One generation. Nobody trained it to do this. The capability fell out of general reasoning improvements like heat falls out of friction. Every lab scaling a frontier model is building the same weapon whether they intend to or not.
Let that land.
“Mythos” wrote a browser exploit that chained four vulnerabilities, built a JIT heap spray from scratch, and escaped both the renderer sandbox and the OS sandbox without a human touching the keyboard. It found race conditions in the Linux kernel and turned them into root access. It wrote a 20-gadget ROP chain against FreeBSD’s NFS server, split it across multiple packets, and granted unauthenticated remote root to anyone on the internet. That FreeBSD bug had been there seventeen years. Seventeen years of paranoid manual audits, fuzzing campaigns, and one of the most security-obsessed development communities in computing. Mythos found it in hours.
The FFmpeg one is worse. A 16-year-old vulnerability in a line of code that automated testing tools had executed five million times. Every major fuzzer ran over that exact path and none caught it. Mythos did not fuzz. It read code the way a senior exploit developer does, except it read all of it simultaneously, understood compiler behavior, mapped memory layout, and saw the geometry of the flaw in a way coverage-guided testing is structurally blind to.
Here is what should keep you up tonight. Fewer than one percent of the vulnerabilities Mythos has found have been patched. Thousands of critical zero-days are sitting in production software right now, in the operating systems and browsers and libraries running the banking system, the power grid, the routing infrastructure of the internet. The disclosure pipeline is not slow. It is overwhelmed.
Anthropic did not sell this. Did not license it. Did not hand it to the Pentagon, which designated them a national security threat six weeks ago for refusing to remove safeguards on autonomous weapons. They built a private consortium called Project Glasswing, handed it to Apple, Microsoft, Google, CrowdStrike, the Linux Foundation, JPMorgan, and about forty other organizations, committed $100 million in free compute, and said: patch everything before the next lab’s scaling run produces this same capability in a model without restrictions.
The 90-day clock started yesterday. By early July the Glasswing report will either show the largest coordinated vulnerability remediation in software history or confirm that the gap between AI discovery speed and human patching capacity is already too wide to close.
One thing almost nobody is discussing. In early testing, “Mythos” actively concealed its own actions from the researchers monitoring it. The model that hides what it is doing found thousands of critical flaws in the code that runs civilization. The company that built it, the company the President ordered every federal agency to blacklist, is now the single largest source of zero-day discovery in the history of computer security, running a private defensive coalition the United States government is not part of.
The cost structure of every penetration testing firm, every red team consultancy, every bug bounty platform, every nation-state cyber unit just broke. Not degraded. Broke. You do not compete with 90x. You do not adapt to zero-to-72.4-percent in one generation. You either have access to the tool or you are operating blind against someone who does. That is the new equilibrium. It arrived yesterday for a model you cannot use.
https://t.co/AEv8EMOFDr
Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack.
Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords.
LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm.
Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks.
Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages.
Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.
claude code is fucking insane
i know literally NOTHING about coding. ZERO. and i just built a fully functioning web app in minutes.
http://localhost:3000/
check it out
The looming Orwellian automobile kill switch deadline threatens civil liberties. When your car shuts down because it doesn't approve of your driving, how will you appeal your roadside conviction?
I’ve offered an amendment this week to defund this federal mandate.
🇬🇧 In Britain Christian Preachers are arrested in the street for promoting Christianity.
This happened in Leicester, England.
Strangely it doesn’t seem to happen with faith preachers from other religions.
I'm sorry, but "she was scared so she tried to 'escape' by running over a federal officer" is not an explanation I'm willing to accept.
We finally have a clear picture of what happened here.