Quick blog on how iSCSI initiators/targets work in AD domains. If you can guess the right IQN you've got access to the disk. Haven't done the attack in prod but see the SPN shared with things like Hyper-V, Failover Clusters, and DFS.
Without CHAP authentication, attackers can impersonate an authorized iSCSI initiator and access shared virtual disks, bypassing NTFS permissions.
@unsigned_sh0rt shows how the attack path works and what defenders can do: https://t.co/oVlRuhxrsu
@_EthicalChaos_@karollooool@msftsecresponse Absolutely wild to me. I know they're getting swarmed with reports but not a single human response since July is pretty unacceptable.
It would be really awesome if @msftsecresponse did a blog on what the workflow for a report looks like. What does each stage in the portal mean? When does the product team get involved? Who validates the issue? MSRC? Product? Both?
Transparency in the process would build a lot of trust and understanding.