Nils

[CircuitDigest @CircuitDigest]

Discover HydraLink: A simple USB tool for easy diagnostics and prototyping of automotive Ethernet systems
Click Here - https://t.co/Mp5eOeSpPr

@one4many @epozzobon

#USB #prototyping #automotive #ethernet #news #communitynews

[Nils @we155_n]

ScapyCon Keynote by Phillipe Biondi now on YouTube https://t.co/H6jn92ESXU

[Nils @we155_n]

@gzobraJn @cr0wtom Well it was a joke for the opening ;-)

Basically you create a packet that holds your picture and the content, hack a little bit around with the show function and then exchange the “slide” packets between a sender and receiver while the receiver is showing them

[cr0wtom @cr0wtom]

In #ScapyCon rn, with @we155_n presenting slides made in #scapy 😬😮

[Nils @we155_n]

@FlUxIuS @cr0wtom What about lifting parts of it even into scapy mainline? This would ensure nothing breaks between new releases of scapy and would also enforce some more code quality measures, such as typing and basic unit tests.

[Nils @we155_n]

@hextreeio @Raspberry_Pi If the only point of the challenge is secure boot, I agree with the concept.

[Nils @we155_n]

@hextreeio @Raspberry_Pi On the other hand, any real world scenario would either read the secret and do something with it, or handle input data. Therefore I’m wondering how comparable this challenge with real world device security is.

[Nils @we155_n]

@hextreeio @Raspberry_Pi Thanks for your reply. My point is just that the code in main.c isn’t doing any “usual” task, including reading the OTP secret from time to time or handling any external/user input. This rules out a significant number of FI attack surfaces.

[Nils @we155_n]

@hextreeio @Raspberry_Pi Also, any real world application would need to read the secret at some point. Or do I miss something here?

[Nils @we155_n]

@hextreeio @Raspberry_Pi One question. I expect that all code which is running on the device is described in the GitHub repo. The repo doesn’t contain any code running on a secure processor. I’m wondering how realistic this challenge is. If no core reads this memory, many attacks aren’t possible.

[Nils @we155_n]

Simulating ECUs and Security Functions for Fun and Profit with #Scapy

Check out our new knowledge base article to learn how to simulate ECUs and complex security functions.

Read it here: https://t.co/iz1Kqidskr

Many more topics will be presented at https://t.co/FolQorRkTM

[Nils @we155_n]

Deep dive into automotive or TLS hacking at our workshops at https://t.co/mx9pA7oQ29

[Nils @we155_n]

Scapy in Action at Pwn2Own Automotive: https://t.co/IU6WFxvCZP

[Nils @we155_n]

https://t.co/AuP7c1biRO

Deep dive into two days full of automotive networks, car hacking, hands on workshops and a lot of fun.

Reserve your seat at ScapyCon and shape together the future of automotive network penetration testing.

[Guillaume Valadon @guedou]

This is the first working PoC of a ~350 LoC pure Python eBPF loader that launches a pre-compiled eBPF program, retrieves per packet process information, and matches them with packets sniffed with Scapy 🤘

[Guillaume Valadon @guedou]

It’s always nice to see Scapy at work 🥰

[Nils @we155_n]

Hi automotive hackers and Scapy lovers,

We are doing a Scapy Con in September.

Please help us making this an unforgettable event. Submit a talk or join the conference!

https://t.co/Ge1LyHTuQh

[Pierre @pi3rre]

#Scapy a (plus de) 20 ans !

[TROOPERS Conference @WEareTROOPERS]

Hello people! 📢 As a teaser for the upcoming #TROOPERS24 we have some impressions from last year's TROOPERS: https://t.co/a0rK7MzX07 Have fun and see you in June! 🥳

[Nils @we155_n]

@PD0WM That’s a nice one.

I actually experienced the opposite problem, many ECUs I’ve analysed, didn’t like it when they got interrupted during the generation of their response. I even generated a dedicated wrapper to ensure this ;-) https://t.co/L2B6GkEDpg