@ezekgabrielse @keygen_sh Has this non-RSA cryptography stuff gone anywhere?
I don't seem to see anything in the documentation other than RSA with PKCS#1 v1.5.
(I also noticed you've removed the notice that you're hiring. I hope you found a good employee!)
@keygen_sh Out of curiosity: Is there any particular reason why you use RSA for the offline validation? ECC would give shorter signatures, which given offline contexts would probably be more convenient for manual human input.
(Also why is PKCS#1 v1.5 padding still not dead...)
@oconnor663 As far as I know, BLAKE3 has a trivial native MAC mode though and HopMAC for K12 specified in draft-irtf-cfrg-kangarootwelve-04 needs double invocation of K12. I'm not aware of there being an officially condoned, performant alternative to HopMAC.
I am very sad to learn that Harold (Ed) Edwards has died last Tuesday.
https://t.co/neTrYePHNd
Among other achievements in mathemaics, Ed discovered Edwards cuvers as a new normal form of elliptic curves.
These are _the_ Edwards curves behind Ed2215 & EdDSA.
NIST actually released NIST SP 800-208 "Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes".
Right after even the NSA told them that stateful hash-based signatures are a bad idea.
https://t.co/qc8cBkSl40
People who trust optimizing compilers to work correctly seem to be surprised by a 2020 gcc bug report https://t.co/QzvTYMG2M4 where the optimizer treats byte arrays as equal if they pass strcmp. For comparison, here's a gcc bug report I filed last century: https://t.co/o1DaHWYeGR
Fascinating: NSA made a public comment on QKD, quantum crypto (QC), and post quantum crypto.
Short version: They aren’t fans of QKD or QC, they like lattice-based crypto, they don’t like hash-based signatures.
https://t.co/wTwuCho1k7
A curiosity I learned about today: X-Face.
The X-Face e-mail header contained a 48x48 black-and-white picture with the idea of showing the author's face.
Anybody aware of this still being used for, well, anything?
https://t.co/PmvgBmOYw8
@dakoraa@veorq So does the list of safe examples. When's the last time the masses have used Poly1305 on its own (outside of a pre-specified AEAD) safely?
New paper "A discretization attack": https://t.co/lpmMYIZO7r Identifies another NSA-exploitable weakness in standardization processes. Includes a detailed case study of how #NISTPQC could hypothetically have been attacked, and evidence suggesting that it was in fact attacked.