@Raymartin55@noplaceforsheep@Raymartin55 and @leckie_cameron here is another case study of a large ADF supported NEO (circa 17 chattered 747s or similar aircraft) that did not use a significant SF force element. https://t.co/IKVt2qSc9d
@FMcL2020@RichardMarlesMP Great thought piece Mick. Your last paragraph reminds me of one of the greatest quotes applicable to FA49 practitioners:
“The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to
get an old one out.”
Liddell Hart
@TurnbullMalcolm@SamRoggeveen Thanks for the clarification. Pleased to hear military munitions and spare parts (thus I assume also fighter jet fuel, etc) are all stockpiled, in Australia at levels required for usage rates and duration of a conflict. Such systems are then indeed a sovereign capability.
@SamRoggeveen@TurnbullMalcolm ‘Operating’ weapon systems requires spare parts, ammunition, upgrades and at times bug fixes. If those technologies and components are not manufactured in Australia, then those weapon systems are also not a ‘sovereign’ capability, if using the same metric.
@SamRoggeveen@TurnbullMalcolm What is being missed here is that when using the same metric, few of Australia’s weapon systems are ‘sovereign’. We don’t even make in Australia all the components of the ammunition used to ‘operate’ the basic issue ADF rifle.
@FMcL2020@royalsocnsw Different outfits and different locations of previous story telling attempts during COVID border closures at https://t.co/AOZR8t7por 2/2
@FMcL2020@royalsocnsw Great opportunity for telling a story that speaks to the need for Australians to have a greater understanding of matters relating to Australian and international security. Credit to @royalsocnsw for taking on this subject in the spirit of growing through knowledge and inquiry.1/2
@WarintheFuture Until lessons are captured in Doctrine, where Doctrine provides institutional memory, and is the basis for training, equipping, provisioning & planning, such lessons remain as only ‘observations once noted’.
Do we have any insights into use/development of Doctrine in 2014-2022?
@WarintheFuture@FMcL2020@austdef Agree Mick, risk tolerance in acquisition has to change as strategic warning time reduces.
Much of the existing acquisition process is built on a risk tolerance applicable to a previous time.
@doctrinatrix_C2 Serious matter! When a CGSC student I asked my Indian Army fellow student, who had served in the Himalaya border region with China, whats the mobility platform used in the border conflicts? Much to my surprise he said the Chinese used Llama and Indian’s the Australian Grey Mule.
@doctrinatrix_C2@WarintheFuture as ‘corrosion’ being inflicted on Russia by Ukraine. Both have been effective components of Ukraine’s campaign design. My sense is there must be some great insights to be drawn from what we are seeing, that should be informing doctrine. End/
@doctrinatrix_C2@WarintheFuture combat operations.
However, I have been fascinated by the scale of battlefield salvage in Ukraine and the impact it is having and going to have on the endurance of Ukraine’s operations against Putin’s invasion. It is the opposite to what @warinthefuture has been describing 3/