Senior editor, Carnegie Middle East Center. Author of The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon's Life Struggle (Simon & Schuster 2010).
I've just interviewed @AkbarSAhmed for my Beirut Calling Substack, in which he discusses his new book on the Biden administration's behavior during the Gaza war. It could have stopped mass murder, but decided not to do so. Do subscribe, it's free: https://t.co/PClmCg2W0H
A recent dispute in Lebanon between a politician and the army commander over Hezbollah’s weapons has deeper roots.
@BeirutCalling writes.
https://t.co/PAsADFy4NF
Very interesting @AlexVatanka piece on Mohsen Rezaei. "The man who repeatedly failed to become Iran's elected president has gained influence through an institution where elections barely matter ... [H]e understood something essential about the Islamic Republic: presidents come and go, political fashions change, but revolutionary credentials and institutional relationships retain their value." https://t.co/DWtdfip4K6
🇱🇧 Michael Young: "The Israelis would welcome an internal Lebanese war that ensnares Hezbollah, while the Americans don’t much care about Lebanon one way or the other.”
👉https://t.co/p4Uge5AvGO via @BeirutCalling
“Haykal’s resistance to using military force against Hezbollah is not very different than Fouad Chehab’s refusal to follow the orders of Camille Chamoun, Lebanon’s president in 1958, to repress his political adversaries.
Haykal, like Chehab, understands that when the army gets caught up in domestic conflicts, there is a very high likelihood that it will break apart along sectarian lines.
He is also aware that it would be insane for the armed forces to launch a military operation against a political party that represents a major Lebanese sectarian community.
The effort to disarm Hezbollah could quickly morph into a conflict with a majority of Shiites, in which it would be impossible for the army to prevail militarily. Indeed, a military victory, assuming such an outcome is even remotely possible, would be a pyrrhic one, since it would alienate many Shiites, when the primary purpose of disarming Hezbollah is to bring Shiites into the full embrace of the state.
But there is also another dimension to Haykal’s defiance, and it is rooted in the traditional mistrust the military has of the political class.
The commander can sense a trap. If he were to launch an extensive military campaign to seize Hezbollah’s weapons and this quickly bogged down and became a stalemate, as is very likely, he knows the politicians would turn around and blame him and the army in order to protect themselves. Only a fool would forge ahead, Haykal surely must feel.
The commander’s belief, one has to assume, is that the politicians have no idea how to disarm Hezbollah, and prefer to put the onus on the army rather than admit to this. Haykal would be correct.
While many people, legitimately, want to see Hezbollah surrender its weapons and the army take over national defense, the party’s refusal to do so, and its backing by Iran, make it all but impossible.
Yet the political leadership came to power on a promise that it would confiscate Hezbollah’s weapons, so by admitting it has no clue about how to achieve this, it would only discredit itself.
However, it is better to be discredited than to plunge Lebanon into a destructive civil conflict, especially to satsify the demands of two countries that have pushed the hardest for Hezbollah’s disarmament—the United States and Israel.
The Israelis would welcome an internal Lebanese war that ensnares Hezbollah, while the Americans don’t much care about Lebanon one way or the other.
Israel’s security doctrine today is based much more on taking unilateral measures to protect its population, so Lebanon’s inability to disarm Hezbollah would reinforce that approach. As for the Americans, they don’t really have a Lebanon policy separate from Israel’s, so there is little to be expected on that front. Haykal knows all this.
The problem of Hezbollah is a significant one, but it won’t be resolved in Beirut. Iran most probably controls the party directly today, therefore the final decision on Hezbollah’s fate will be decided in Tehran, nowhere else.
The tensions between the army commander and Lebanese politicians who oppose Hezbollah is more a product of frustration than disagreement over desired ends. It is also being used by politicians to bolster their own popularity. Don’t expect Rudolph Haykal to lead his institution into a lethal quagmire for such a mediocre reason.”
Recently, LF leader Samir Geagea and armed forces commander Rudolph Haykal clashed publicly. I argue that, current disagreements aside, we must understand what happened in light of the antagonistic ties between the army and the political class, at Diwan: https://t.co/C0wLsOTmGk
A recent dispute in Lebanon between a politician and the army commander over Hezbollah’s weapons has deeper roots.
@BeirutCalling writes.
https://t.co/PAsADFyCDd
Recently, LF leader Samir Geagea and armed forces commander Rudolph Haykal clashed publicly. I argue that, current disagreements aside, we must understand what happened in light of the antagonistic ties between the army and the political class, at Diwan: https://t.co/C0wLsOTmGk
In the face of Israel’s preference to not conclude any agreement with Lebanon that could limit its latitude to unilaterally implement its security conditions in the country, some kind of US framework at least allowed for the limited containment of Israel.
Opinion | Michael Young @BeirutCalling via @TheNationalNews https://t.co/c0HeEo9GNt
French historian Rene Grousset wrote this about Pompey, “What was it his ambition to attain in the Republic? A sort of moral presidency to which, after the services he had rendered, he had some right? To rule, with or without a formal title? Especially to accumulate honors, many honors, which would have satisfied his vanity and his irresolution, but which his secret mediocrity would have prevented him from turning into something redoubtable?" This is the man Rubio is referring to?
I've just interviewed @AkbarSAhmed for my Beirut Calling Substack, in which he discusses his new book on the Biden administration's behavior during the Gaza war. It could have stopped mass murder, but decided not to do so. Do subscribe, it's free: https://t.co/PClmCg2W0H
@giorageorge@NegarMortazavi Not going to waste more time on this exchange. You accused me of antisemitism, which in my book is one of the most terrible of insults. Now stop bothering me.
@giorageorge@NegarMortazavi Not going to waste more time on this exchange. You accused me of antisemitism, which in my book is one of the most terrible of insults. Now stop bothering me.
Absolutely disgraceful from this utter embarrassment of a secretary of state, and in complete contradiction with known facts. When IDF spokesman Daniel Hagari stated “the emphasis [in Gaza’s bombardment] is on damage and not on accuracy,” did that not show an intention to harm?
I look back on a photo essay I did for Diwan with @MohanadHageAli, asking what remained of Kim Philby's Beirut. The reference is to the Soviet double agent who reached the highest levels of MI6, and who moved to Lebanon after being forced to resign. Here is the background to that story and what it led to. Do subscribe to my Substack, it's free: https://t.co/4ZNbGbiZ0v
@giorageorge@NegarMortazavi If you're happy missing the forest for the trees, fine, and your absurd antisemitism accusation only shows you have no argument. Insult is the last resort of scoundrels. By now, the lie that Israel intended no harm to Palestinian civilians, only Hamas, is laughed at globally.