Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

Middle East, National Security and intelligence
expert
خبير لشؤون الشرق الأوسط وإيران
Senior Fellow @inss_hebrew
Nonresident Fellow @AtlanticCouncil

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Who is Danny Citrinowicz?

👇
https://t.co/KExnC6Zbnd

[Atlantic Council @AtlanticCouncil]

“Khamenei’s death disrupted Iran’s evolution and provided the regime with an opportunity to consolidate.”

Read more from @ACMideast nonresident fellow @citrinowicz. ⤵️

[Aviad Houminer-Rosenblum @aviadho]

אתמול כתב כאן מישהו ש:"אנשים זזים שמאלה כשנמאס להם מהמציאות, וימינה כשנמאס להם מהפנטזיות".
העובדה שבסופו של דבר התברר שמי שצדק לאורך כל המערכה מול איראן היה סיטרינוביץ', שלמול מרבית הפוליטיקאים והמומחים בעיני עצמם (כולל אותו כותב), הדגיש את אי ההיתכנות לנפילת המשטר ואת חוסר התוחלת בהפעלת כוח שלא מתלווה לה אסטרטגיה מדינית ריאלית, מראה שההיפך הוא הנכו��.
הפנטזיה על פיה הפתרון הוא תמיד הפעלה של עוד יותר כוח ועוד יותר כוח, ילדותית ומסוכנת לא פחות (ונפוצה במחוזותינו הרבה הרבה יותר), מזו שמתנגדת באופן אוטומטית לכל הפעלת כוח.

[Mickey Gitzin @MickeyGitzin]

דני היה אחד האנשים היחידים שניתח נכון את המציאות למול איראן. במומחיות, ללא התלהמות, ותוך תשומת לב לפרטים. כאן הוא עושה בדיוק את אותו הדבר ביחס ללבנון, הלוואי ויהיו מנהיגים שיקשיבו לו, במקום לחבורות המתלהמים שהציגו ניתוחים כושלים פעם אחר פעם

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

The most realistic end state remains a comprehensive agreement under which the United States lifts economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for a robust and intrusive inspection regime over Iran’s nuclear facilities.

In many respects, this framework has long fallen within the boundaries of what Iranian decision-makers could accept. Even before the war, there were indications that Tehran was prepared to consider enhanced monitoring and verification measures, provided they were accompanied by meaningful sanctions relief and recognition of Iran’s core interests.

The challenge is timing and leverage. From Tehran’s perspective, the issue is not whether inspections can be accepted in principle, but under what conditions. Iran is unlikely to agree to far-reaching monitoring arrangements before a broader political understanding is reached because it views its remaining leverage as one of its most valuable negotiating assets.

In other words, Iranian leaders see concessions on transparency and nuclear oversight not as confidence-building measures to be offered upfront, but as bargaining chips to be exchanged at the negotiating table as part of a final settlement.

This is why expectations that Iran will first accept extensive restrictions and only later discuss sanctions relief misunderstand how Tehran approaches negotiations. The Iranian leadership has sought simultaneous, reciprocal steps in which each concession is matched by a corresponding benefit.

As a result, the path to a durable agreement is likely to require a broader political deal first, followed by the implementation of detailed nuclear commitments and verification mechanisms. Whether one agrees with Iran’s position or not, this logic has been a consistent feature of Tehran’s negotiating strategy for years.

The central question, therefore, is not whether inspections are possible. It is whether Washington and Tehran can reach a political understanding that makes those inspections worthwhile for both sides. Without such an understanding, neither side is likely to surrender its most important sources of leverage before the negotiations are complete.

#IranWar‌

[Barak Ravid @BarakRavid]

Trump on Truth Social: Despite their protestations and false statements to the contrary...Iran has fully and completely agreed to highest level Nuclear inspections long into the future (Infinity!!!). This will insure “Nuclear Honesty.” If they did not agree to this, there would be no further negotiations! Based on this and other major concessions being made by Iran, I have agreed to allow the Hormuz Strait to remain OPEN, with no further Naval Blockade. However, all ships are remaining in place should it be necessary to reinstitute the Blockade, which seems, at this point, highly unlikely. The Money and/or Sanctions that the U.S. Treasury is releasing goes into escrow, controlled by the U.S.A., and will be used for the purchase of food and medical supplies, exclusively from the United States, including Corn, Wheat, and Soybeans from our great American Farmers. These are things that are desperately needed by Iran. This is a humanitarian crisis, and I feel it is necessary to help, NOW, before it is too late. Talks are going well! Thank you for your attention to this matter

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

אין לנו להלין אלא על עצמנו. במקום להושיט יד לנשיא לבנון ג'וזף עאון מתוך הבנה שאין פתרון צבאי למצב בלבנון, ושישראל לא תפרק את חיזבאללה מנשקו באמצעות כוח בלבד, בחרנו להמתין. שוב העדפנו להישען על עוצמה צבאית במקום לתרגם הישגים צבאיים למהלך מדיני.

ההמתנה הזו עלולה להתברר כטעות אסטרטגית. ככל שגובר הרצון האמריקני להגיע להסכם רחב יותר עם איראן, כך גדל הסיכוי שלבנון תהפוך לחלק מאותו הסדר אזורי. במצב כזה ישראל עלולה למצוא את עצמה נגררת אחר המציאות במקום לעצב אותה.

ועדיין לא מאוחר. ישראל יכולה וצריכה ליזום מהלך מדיני משלה: לגבש תוכנית נסיגה הדרגתית ומתואמת מדרום לבנון, שתלווה בפריסת צבא לבנון ובהתחייבויות בינלאומיות ברורות לשמירה על הביטחון לאורך הגבול. מהלך כזה יחזק את המדינה הלבנונית, יחליש את ההצדקה להמשך קיומו של חיזבאללה כ"כוח מגן", וישמר את האינטרסים הביטחוניים של ישראל.

הבעיה היא שישראל ממשיכה להתנהל כאילו הזמן פועל לטובתה. בפועל, המציאות האזורית משתנה במהירות. אם לא ניקח יוזמה מדינית, נגיע למצב שבו לחצים בינלאומיים, הסדרים אזוריים והתפתחויות פנימיות בלבנון יכתיבו לנו את התנאים, במקום שאנחנו נעצב אותם.

הלקח של השנים האחרונות ברור: כוח צבאי הוא כלי חיוני, אך הוא אינו אסטרטגיה בפני עצמה. מטרתו של הכוח היא ליצור תנאים להסדר מדיני, לא להחליף אותו. מדינה שמסתמכת רק על כוח הזרוע עלולה למצוא את עצמה מנצחת בקרבות אך נכשלת בעיצוב המציאות.

ישראל זקוקה כיום לא רק לעוצמה צבאית אלא גם לאומץ מדיני. יוזמה מדינית אינה ביטוי לחולשה; היא הדרך היחידה להבטיח שההישגים שהושגו בשדה הקרב יתורגמו למציאות ביטחונית יציבה יותר לאורך זמן. אחרת, נמשיך לנצח בכל סבב וכמובן להתכונן לסבב הבא.

[Barak Ravid @BarakRavid]

https://t.co/3QcXgbC8fz

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

The conflict with Iran reinforces a lesson that has already emerged from Israel’s campaigns in Lebanon and Gaza: military power alone cannot solve Israel’s fundamental security challenges.

For years, many within Israel’s leadership operated under the assumption that problems left unresolved by force could be addressed through the application of even greater force. The events since October 7 have demonstrated both the strengths and the limitations of that approach. Military operations can degrade adversaries, restore deterrence, and create strategic opportunities, but they cannot by themselves produce lasting political outcomes.

Israel has achieved significant military successes since October 2023. However, those gains risk being eroded if they are not translated into a broader political strategy. The longer conflicts continue without a credible diplomatic framework, the greater the risk that military achievements will be offset by growing diplomatic isolation, mounting economic costs, and the persistence of the very security problems the operations were intended to address.

The central challenge is that military campaigns are not self-executing solutions. They create leverage, but leverage must eventually be converted into political arrangements.

Israel’s apparent belief that it can conclude major campaigns without pursuing meaningful political agreements risks leaving it trapped in a cycle of recurring conflicts. Without a diplomatic endgame, military victories can become temporary pauses between rounds of violence rather than foundations for long-term stability.

This is why diplomacy should not be viewed as an optional add-on to military success. It is a strategic necessity. Every military campaign ultimately requires a political framework capable of consolidating its achievements and preventing the conditions that produced the conflict from reemerging.

Ironically, even Iran appears to have recognized this reality. After demonstrating its willingness to absorb significant military costs, Tehran has nevertheless shown interest in negotiations as a means of protecting its core interests and securing the regime’s future. The lesson is not that military power is irrelevant, but that military power without a political strategy rarely delivers a durable outcome.

In the end, security is not achieved solely on the battlefield. It is secured when military leverage is translated into political arrangements that reduce the likelihood of future wars. Without that final diplomatic step, even the most impressive military accomplishments may prove temporary.

If Israel’s government fails to recognize this reality, it risks condemning its citizens to an endless cycle of war, a burden that Israeli society, its economy, and its international standing will find increasingly difficult to sustain over time.

#ira

[Robert Malley @Rob_Malley]

@stephenwertheim and my new piece in @nytimes :

"The unnecessary, unjustified and unlawful war convulsed the region, battered the global economy and exasperated the American public.

And yet it may bequeath an accidental gift: a lasting aversion to military conflict with Iran and a chance to replace decades of failed policy with serious diplomacy."

https://t.co/TDQFJx7saN

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

There is no such thing as “finishing the job” in Iran through military force alone. The problem is not merely the difficulty of achieving decisive victory militarily; it is also the lack of political willingness in Washington to commit the resources, time, and casualties that such an objective would require.

President Trump himself has repeatedly signaled that he has little interest in entangling the United States in another large-scale Middle Eastern conflict. That means there is limited appetite for the kind of sustained military campaign that would be necessary to strip Iran of all its leverage, whether in the Strait of Hormuz or in relation to its nuclear infrastructure.

Even if negotiations were to break down, recent events should have made one reality clear: there is no military operation currently available that can force Iran into unconditional surrender. Assassinations, airstrikes, and covert actions may impose costs and create temporary setbacks, but they are unlikely to produce regime collapse.

Overthrowing the Islamic Republic would require a level of military commitment that neither the American public nor U.S. policymakers appear willing to support. It would involve substantial risks, significant costs, and potentially large-scale casualties, precisely the kind of open-ended intervention that Washington has spent the last two decades trying to avoid.

This strategic reality helps explain why the Trump administration ultimately crossed the Rubicon toward a negotiated arrangement with Tehran. More importantly, it explains why there may be no viable alternative. Additional strikes could delay diplomacy, but they would not resolve the underlying conflict. Instead, they would likely push the United States toward increasingly coercive measures, such as maritime interdiction, expanded sanctions, or long-term containment, without producing a definitive outcome.

The belief that the United States can “finish the job” through military action alone rests on assumptions that have repeatedly failed the test of reality. It assumes that airpower can bring down the Iranian regime or fundamentally transform Iranian behavior at an acceptable cost. Neither proposition has been demonstrated.

If the objective is a durable resolution rather than an indefinite cycle of escalation, there is ultimately only one path forward: a comprehensive agreement that addresses the core interests of both sides. Every other option may manage the conflict, delay the problem, or raise the pressure, but none is likely to end it. In that sense, “finishing the job” does not mean defeating Iran militarily; it means reaching a political settlement that closes the conflict on terms both sides can live with.

#iran

[Yashar Ali 🐘 @yashar]

For the people who keep saying Trump should have “finished the job” in Iran:

To “finish the job,” as you suggest, would require an invasion and occupation of Iran, involving another round of massive, overwhelming strikes — munitions the U.S. does not have — and hundreds of thousands of U.S. ground troops.

And even that would lead hundreds of thousands of men in Iran who have weapons to splinter off and cause incredible death and destruction, not only to U.S. troops but also to Iranian civilians.

Is this what you want?

And don’t tell me it wouldn’t require that.

Your judgment and analysis frankly don’t mean much to me after so many of you argued that killing Khamenei and a few others would lead the regime to topple.

Those of us with half a brain who actually know a thing or two about the regime warned you that wouldn’t happen, and we were shouted down.

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Iran’s current conduct suggests that the pragmatism Ali Khamenei often demonstrated when the survival of the regime was at stake has been inherited by the next generation of leadership.

It is true that today’s leadership, shaped more heavily by the influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), appears more rigid in its commitment to preserving the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic and more willing to employ military force. The missile attacks against Israel following the strike in Beirut illustrate a level of risk-taking that Khamenei himself might have been reluctant to embrace.

Yet the reported willingness of senior Iranian officials to engage with the U.S. Vice President before Khamenei had even been formally buried indicates that, at a fundamental level, Tehran’s leadership remains interested in ending the war and focusing on rebuilding the country, provided that its core political and ideological interests are protected.

Contrary to the common perception in some Western circles, Iran’s leadership is not simply an irrational or isolated group driven solely by ideology. Rather, it has repeatedly demonstrated a capacity for ideological adaptation when necessary to secure the long-term survival of the Islamic Republic. The regime’s leaders are willing to adjust tactics, policies, and even aspects of their rhetoric when doing so serves the broader objective of preserving the revolution and ensuring its continuity.

In that sense, what we are witnessing is not ideological moderation, but strategic pragmatism: a leadership seeking to protect the system by adapting it to changing circumstances while safeguarding the principles it considers essential.

#iran

[Gregory Brew @gbrew24]

Qalibaf directly taking on ultra-hardliner critics of diplomacy.

Regime leadership not shying away from defending the policy of direct talks with the US--and right now, they can point to some real achievements (blockade over, oil sanctions waived) to quell criticism.

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Told @nytimes that [the result of the war is practically] a collapse of all the strategy that Israel had regarding Iran

@NeilMacFarquhar
https://t.co/GgqTGEAkNU

[Foreign Affairs @ForeignAffairs]

“Khamenei’s death disrupted Iran’s evolution and provided the regime with an opportunity to consolidate,” writes @citrinowicz. “Paradoxically, the external pressure meant to topple the Iranian regime has helped preserve it.”
https://t.co/LhKm2CtS3F

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

My Podcast @nationalpost regarding the Israeli - U.S relations
against the backdrop of the emerging agreement between Iran and the United States.

@EylonALevy
@brianlilley
https://t.co/1udG26HK85

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

My interview @cnni:

A. The negotiations were never expected to be easy. However, at a fundamental level, both sides have an interest in reaching some form of agreement. The mediators will have to work very hard to bridge the significant gaps that remain. Still, as President Trump himself acknowledged, diplomacy remains the best available option for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and addressing concerns regarding Iran's enriched uranium stockpile.

B. The Lebanese issue remains a major potential spoiler. Israel, which is not a party to any potential agreement, is not necessarily enthusiastic about a deal that could undermine its broader strategy of maintaining maximum pressure on Iran. While Israel continues to conduct operations in Lebanon to address legitimate security concerns, its long-term strategy is not entirely clear. From Israel's perspective, and with encouragement from Washington, the most constructive path forward would be to accelerate negotiations with the Lebanese government, withdraw where possible, and allow the Lebanese Armed Forces to assume control over the relevant areas in accordance with existing understandings.

C. Iran may be prepared to offer limited concessions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, particularly given the severe economic damage it has suffered following the war. However, if policymakers in Washington believe they can leverage Iran's economic weakness to secure major concessions on its regional power projection, support for proxy groups, or far-reaching additional nuclear restrictions, they are likely to be disappointed. These issues are deeply rooted in the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic and are viewed by the leadership as core national security interests rather than negotiable bargaining chips.

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

The administration needs to decide what it actually wants.

If President Trump genuinely does not want to return to war because of its potentially severe consequences for the American economy, and if his real objective is a negotiated agreement, then threats and demands such as ending Iran's support for Hezbollah are more likely to move him further away from that goal than closer to it.

In practice, such demands risk pushing Washington toward a dilemma Trump himself appears eager to avoid: either accept the status quo despite Iran's continued regional activities, or return to a military confrontation that he has repeatedly signaled he does not want.

Trump has already acknowledged the limitations of military force when it comes to issues such as reopening the Strait of Hormuz or physically removing Iran's enriched uranium stockpiles.

Those realities raise an obvious question: if the United States is unwilling to pursue those objectives through force, what is the purpose of repeatedly threatening war?

If Trump wants an agreement, he will have to adopt a more realistic approach. That means focusing on the nuclear issue, bringing the Lebanon front to a close, and avoiding constant threats against a country that was not particularly intimidated by American pressure before the war and appears even less intimidated after it.

If Trump is genuinely prepared to use force, that is a different strategy entirely. But if he is not, then alternating between pressure and diplomacy is unlikely to produce the desired outcome. Iran believes it emerged from the conflict in a stronger strategic position and is unlikely to make major concessions simply because Washington raises the volume of its rhetoric.

A deal between the United States and Iran remains possible. But it will require accepting the strategic realities that emerged after the war rather than insisting on demands that Tehran views as fundamentally unrealistic. Successful diplomacy begins not with maximalist objectives, but with a clear understanding of what can actually be achieved.

#IranWar‌

[ליאור בן ארי-ليؤور بن أري-Lior ben-ari @Liorbenari1]

תסנים מ'מקורב לצוות המשא ומתן': "צוות המשא ומתן האיראני עזב את אתר המשא ומתן במחאה על איומיו של טראמפ".

[Brett Erickson @BrettErickson28]

Few people have been able to analyze this conflict more accurately than @citrinowicz

[Alan Eyre @AlanEyre1]

Hey US negotiators! Heed @citrinowicz:

“The broader reality is that America's leverage over Iran was limited before the war and may be even more limited afterward. Any successful policy will have to start from that fact rather than from assumptions about what Washington can compel Tehran to do.”
#IranWar

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Demanding that Iran end its support for Hezbollah is effectively equivalent to demanding that it abandon one of the central pillars of its regional security strategy.

A country willing to launch direct attacks on Israel in response to events in Beirut is demonstrating that its relationship with Hezbollah is not a disposable bargaining chip but a long-term strategic commitment.

If President Trump makes these demands the centerpiece of negotiations, one of two things will happen: either he will be forced back into a conflict he does not want, or he will end up tolerating the very behavior he promised to stop as Iran continues supporting Hezbollah.

The credibility of threats to resume military action is also questionable. Trump himself has acknowledged the limits of what military force can achieve. If the United States is unwilling to commit the resources necessary to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by force or physically remove Iran's enriched uranium stockpiles, then what exactly would be the objective of another war?

The more Washington threatens action without following through, the more American deterrence risks eroding. That is particularly problematic given that Iran's perception of U.S. resolve appears to have weakened during the conflict itself.

Meanwhile, diplomatic contacts continue in Switzerland, and Tehran has little incentive to make major concessions. If Trump's goal is ultimately a negotiated agreement, repeated military threats may not bring him closer to that objective. They could instead lock him into commitments that are either politically or strategically impossible to fulfill.

The broader reality is that America's leverage over Iran was limited before the war and may be even more limited afterward. Any successful policy will have to start from that fact rather than from assumptions about what Washington can compel Tehran to do.

#iran

[Barak Ravid @BarakRavid]

🚨Trump on Truth Social: Iran must immediately stop their highly paid PROXIES in Lebanon from causing trouble. If they don’t, we’ll hit Iran very hard again, just like we did last week, only harder!!!

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

האירוע הלבנוני ממחיש עד כמה המדיניות מול איראן הייתה כושלת.

ברגע שהסוגיה הלבנונית נכנסה למזכר ההבנות בין איראן לארצות הברית, אין אפשרות לנתק בין הנושאים. כל ניסיון כזה מצד ישראל רק עלול להחמיר את מצבה מול וושינגטון.

אך כרגע השאלה הבסיסית היא מהי מטרת הפעולה בלבנון, והאם היא קשורה לניסיון נואש לתקוע מקלות בגלגלי העסקה המתגבשת בין ארצות הברית לאיראן. אם אכן כך הם פני הדברים, נדמה שיש כאן חוסר הבנה של העובדה שלטראמפ אין רצון להיגרר כעת למלחמה נוספת, וה��א יעשה כל שביכולתו כדי להבטיח הגעה להסכם סופי.

לאור זאת, מוטב שישראל תתמקד בסיוע לממשל האמריקאי במשא ומתן בסוגיית הגרעין, לפני שגם הזירה הזאת תצא משליטתה. המפגש בין קאליבאף לוואנס בשווייץ הוא עדות נוספת לחשיבות שמייחסות וושינגטון וטהראן לערוץ הדיפלומטי. במקום להיאבק במשא ומתן, ישראל צריכה לחתור להשפיע עליו מבפנים ולסייע לממשל האמריקאי, שכן כל מאבק גלוי נגד ההסכם עלול לפגוע ביכולתה להשפיע על הסוגיות החשובות באמת בתחום הגרעין.

ובאשר ללבנון – זה הזמן להאיץ את המגעים עם ממשלת לבנון לקראת נסיגה אפשרית בעתיד הקרוב. צה"ל לא יישאר לנצח בנקודות שבהן הוא מחזיק כי��ם, ולכן עדיף לפעול בתיאום ובשיתוף פעולה כבר עכשיו, מאשר למצוא את עצמנו בעתיד מול לחץ אמריקאי גובר ותנאים פחות נוחים. אין פתרון צבאי בלבד לבעיה בלבנון, ופתרון בר-קיימא מחייב גם מהלך מדיני.

[Ronen Bergman @ronenbergman]

הפעלת הכוח בלבנון אינה מתקיימת בחלל ריק. היא מתרחשת בזמן שישראל מתוסכלת מההסכם בין ארה"ב לאיראן, כשדוברים בולטים בערוץ של השליט קוראים לשבשו, וכשנתניהו מנסה לשדר התקפיות מול הבייס שמסרב לקבל את הרעיון ��וושינגטון סוגרת עסקה עם טהרן מעל ראשה של ירושלים.

מכאן נובעת סכנה חמורה: שפעולה צבאית שאינה רלוונטית באמת לאירוע בשטח תהפוך לכלי לפריקת תסכול מדיני.

@ynetalerts @YediotAhronot
https://t.co/TEXu431707

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

As I have argued repeatedly, the current situation in Lebanon is fundamentally incompatible with a sustainable U.S.-Iran agreement.

Once Lebanon became linked to the broader ceasefire framework, Tehran was never going to tolerate ongoing violations or a status quo that it viewed as undermining Hezbollah's position. From Iran's perspective, the Lebanese file is not a secondary issue; it is a core component of any regional understanding with Washington.

As long as Israeli forces remain inside Lebanese territory, friction is inevitable. And where there is constant friction, escalation becomes a matter of time rather than possibility. That reality makes it extraordinarily difficult to preserve a broader diplomatic arrangement between the United States and Iran.

This places the burden squarely on Washington. If President Trump is determined to secure and preserve an agreement with Tehran, he may ultimately face a difficult choice: either exert meaningful pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu to withdraw from Lebanon or accept the growing risk that the entire diplomatic framework could unravel.

Netanyahu's decision to continue military operations in Lebanon, despite concerns within the administration that such actions could jeopardize nuclear diplomacy, was a calculated gamble. It may ultimately succeed in limiting the impact of the Lebanese issue on U.S.-Iran negotiations. But it could also provoke a sharp response from a White House that has invested significant political capital in making an agreement work.

The coming hours and days will be critical. One point, however, appears increasingly clear: Iran has shown no indication that it is prepared to compromise on the Lebanese component of the negotiations. In Tehran's view, that issue is not negotiable—it is integral to the deal itself.

Continued Israeli military activity in Lebanon is unlikely to remain a localized issue. If the current trajectory continues, the risk is not only of a stronger Iranian response but also of renewed escalation from the Houthis in Yemen.

#IranWar‌

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

The principal spoiler of any broader understanding with Iran remains Lebanon.

Tehran is unlikely to accept a situation in which it commits to a comprehensive ceasefire while Israel retains the right to conduct military operations in Lebanon under the broad definition of "removing threats." From the Iranian and Hezbollah perspective, such an arrangement would create a loophole large enough to undermine the agreement itself.

Israel, however, views the issue very differently. Israeli policymakers are unlikely to accept a ceasefire that does not preserve some capacity to act against emerging threats, weapons transfers, or efforts by Hezbollah to rebuild its military infrastructure. In Israeli eyes, a ceasefire that prevents preemptive action risks recreating the conditions that led to previous rounds of conflict.

This leaves a dangerous gray zone between the two positions. Activities that one side considers legitimate self-defense may be interpreted by the other as clear violations of the agreement. Intelligence operations, arms smuggling, force deployments, or limited military strikes could quickly become sources of dispute.

As a result, accusations of non-compliance are likely to emerge almost immediately. The challenge is not necessarily reaching an agreement on paper; it is maintaining one when inevitable incidents occur on the ground.

Ultimately, the issue returns to Washington. The central question is how far the United States is prepared to go in enforcing a ceasefire that both sides interpret differently. If the administration seeks to preserve a broader understanding with Iran, it may face increasing pressure to restrain Israeli military actions in Lebanon. If it chooses not to do so, it risks allowing the Lebanese arena to become the trigger for a wider breakdown in the arrangement.

For that reason, Lebanon remains the most fragile component of any prospective agreement. Even if progress is achieved on the Iranian file, the durability of the broader framework may ultimately depend on whether the competing Israeli and Iranian interpretations of security and deterrence can be managed on the ground.

The Israeli prime minister's decision to continue military operations in Lebanon risks putting his government on a direct collision course with the President of the United States. If Washington's priority is preserving a broader regional understanding with Iran and preventing renewed escalation, continued Israeli strikes could increasingly be viewed not as a contribution to regional stability but as a challenge to American policy.
This dynamic is particularly significant because the current administration has demonstrated a strong preference for maintaining direct control over the diplomatic and strategic framework it is constructing. Any perception that Israel is acting unilaterally in ways that jeopardize that framework could generate considerable friction between Jerusalem and Washington.

The risk for Israel is therefore not limited to renewed fighting in Lebanon. It is the possibility of transforming a dispute over military operations into a broader confrontation with the White House itself. Should Washington come to view Israeli actions as threatening a major American diplomatic achievement, the administration's response could be far less forgiving than many in Jerusalem expect.

#IranWar‌

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

כצפוי, מבחינת איראן הסוגיה הלבנונית נמצאת בלב המשא ומתן מול ארצות הברית. טהראן לא תסכים להסדר שאינו כולל הפסקת אש מלאה ונסיגה ישראלית מלבנון, נוכח המחויבות האסטרטגית והאידיאולוגית שלה לחיזבאללה.

הכדור נמצא כעת בוושינגטון. דונלד טראמפ יצטרך להחליט האם הוא מוכן להפעיל לחץ אמיתי על ישראל כדי להביא לנסיגה מדרום לבנון, כולל איום בצעדים משמעותיים במקרה של סירוב, או שהוא מוכן לראות את ההבנות עם איראן קורסות.

כל עוד צה"ל נותר בשטח לבנון, החיכוך נמשך. וכל עוד החיכוך נמשך, כ�� הפסקת אש נותרת שברירית. לכן היה ברור מראש שהמצב הנוכחי יקשה מאוד, ואולי אף ימנע, את קיומו של הסכם יציב בין איראן לארצות הברית.

בסופו של דבר, השאלה אינה מה איראן מוכנה לתת, אלא מה וושינגטון מוכנה לדרוש מישראל כדי לאפשר להסכם כזה להתקיים. כעת טראמפ יצטרך להחליט מה חשוב לו יותר כי המשך המצב הנוכחי לא יאפשר לו להתקדם להסכם עם טהראן.

[ליאור בן ארי-ليؤور بن أري-Lior ben-ari @Liorbenari1]

משמרות המהפכה:
"לאור כישלון יישום הפסקה הראשונה של הסכם סיום המלחמה, ובתגובה להפרה המתמשכת והבלתי פוסקת של הפסקת האש בדרום לבנון על ידי ישראל וההרג האכזרי, מוכרז כי מצר הורמוז ייסגר לתנועת כלי שיט"
"צעד ראשון זה הוא תגובה להפרת ההבטחה של האויב ואם התוקפנות תימשך, יתוכננו ויינקטו צעדים נוספים כדי לגרום לאויב לעמוד ביישום התחייבויותיו".

[Borzou Daragahi 🖊🗒 @borzou]

This is some very smart analysis