Robert Malley

Author w/Hussein Agha, TOMORROW IS YESTERDAY: LIFE, DEATH, & THE PURSUIT OF PEACE IN ISRAEL-PALESTINE. Pdt Emeritus & Mideast Pg Dir @CrisisGroup. Yale Lecturer

[Robert Malley @Rob_Malley]

Appreciated the warm welcome and candid discussion with Prime Minister @AliFalihAlzaidy on the range of issues facing Iraq.

[المكتب الإعلامي لرئيس الوزراء 🇮🇶 @IraqiPMO]

Prime Minister @AliFalihAlzaidy received Robert Malley, Honorary President of the @CrisisGroup (ICG) and Director of its Middle East Program, accompanied by a delegation that included the Deputy Program Director and the Director of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Project.

The Prime Minister affirmed that the significant challenges facing countries across the region require mobilizing efforts and intensifying joint action to develop solutions that help resolve economic and development crises and achieve stability. He noted that the repercussions of these challenges have extended to the global economy as a whole and adversely affected supply chains.

The Prime Minister called on the International Crisis Group to leverage its expertise and capabilities and present its insights and plans to help address existing crises and assist decision-makers and international stakeholders. He stressed the importance of creating more opportunities for dialogue and expanding its scope to identify common ground among the parties concerned, noting that Iraq has made and continues to make significant efforts in this direction.

The meeting also addressed the various issues and crises facing the region and explored possible solutions amid the instability and conflicts affecting the Middle East.

For his part, Mr. Malley expressed the International Crisis Group’s readiness to leverage its capabilities and expertise to support the Iraqi government’s efforts and initiatives aimed at resolving crises, strengthening regional stability, and bridging differences in perspectives.

[Ali Vaez @AliVaez]

Read this insightful piece by my colleague @HamidRezaAz on how Iran is adapting its relationships with partners whose diminished military utility has not necessarily reduced its commitment to their protection.

[Amjad Iraqi @aj_iraqi]

Read @CrisisGroup’s Q&A about Israel’s elections, by @maxrodenbeck, @MairavZ, and myself.

https://t.co/D2aVHO2ozk

[Max Milo Éditions @MaxMiloEditions]

Israël-Palestine : 30 ans dans les coulisses du "processus de paix" @Rob_Malley co-auteur avec Hussein Agha, de “Demain c’est hier” revient sur le désastre américain et israëlien en Palestine. https://t.co/65BqzKF0Vt via @YouTube

[Ahmed Nagi @AhmedNagiYE]

Yemen’s war is entering a dangerous phase. The Saudi-led coalition and Houthis are betting on outlasting each other, risking a war of attrition. In this Q&A, I examine conflict’s trajectory, Saudi and Iranian calculations, and prospects for de-escalation
https://t.co/epC12z0af8

[Equator @Equatormag]

We’re excited to be at Jewish Currents Live on Sunday 11 October in Brooklyn, NY. We’ll be hosting a panel on impunity and accountability with Aslı Bâli, Varsha Gandikota-Nellutla, Rob Malley, and Omar Shakir. Check out the programme and get your tickets here: https://t.co/HKn03IsG4R

[Robert Malley @Rob_Malley]

👇

[Phil Gordon @PhilGordonDC]

Netanyahu supporters seem to be taking advantage of @Brett_McGurk’s book and interviews to claim vindication for Netanyahu’s conduct of the war in Gaza. But while Brett’s front-row account is valuable, that doesn’t mean it is definitive or its perspectives widely shared—including among former members of the Biden administration.

I would say most of my former colleagues think that President Biden should have put more pressure on Israel to conduct the war differently and end it sooner, and few think that the biggest mistake Biden made was to show daylight with Israel. And even Brett’s account makes clear that hostages were not the top priority for Netanyahu and that when U.S. pressure actually was applied—as after the World Central Kitchen strike—it worked.

Brett tells the story of the Biden phone call after that tragedy, but not the story of how Biden called Netanyahu on July 4, 2024 to press him to conclude the hostage deal after Hamas had finally accepted the basic framework, dropping its demand that Israel commit to a permanent ceasefire before any hostages were released. Netanyahu instead added so many of his own conditions—against the advice of his own security chiefs—that the deal became impossible for another six months, during which nearly 9,000 more Palestinians were killed and more Israeli hostages died, including the six that Hamas executed in August. The Israeli changes included a demand that Israel retain forces along Gaza’s entire border with Egypt, which the IDF had seized only after the original proposal, and a new enforcement mechanism to screen Gazans who were returning home to the north which would have required Israeli troops to remain in central Gaza. Both of those new conditions were dropped in the deal ultimately concluded in January 2025.

Nothing in the book or elsewhere changes the reality that October 7 happened on Netanyahu’s watch; that he prioritized “total victory” and the maintenance of his coalition over a hostage deal or an end of the war; that his conduct of the war and management of its humanitarian consequences catastrophic; that it has left Israel more isolated and insecure; and that it has deeply damaged, perhaps irreparably, Israel’s relationship with the United States—which should have done more to change Israel’s conduct rather than enable it. There was never an easy way forward in Gaza, but no version of the story vindicates Netanyahu.

[Robert Malley @Rob_Malley]

Stated differently:

Why it doesn’t matter: Trump has been saying everything and its opposite for months on end.

[Barak Ravid @BarakRavid]

🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷President Trump claimed Thursday the U.S. will not attack Iran ahead of the Nov. 3 midterm elections
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷Why it matters: Trump had been considering for several days resuming the strike against Iran ahead of the midterms
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷My report on @axios👇
https://t.co/RTvO8pKjEw

[Gregory Brew @gbrew24]

-Brent spikes above $105

-Trump says no strikes before midterms, lots of oil getting through the strait, and "productive discussions" are happening with Iran.

The two don't seem totally unrelated.

[Gregory Brew @gbrew24]

It's a standoff for two reasons:

1) US success in the strait means Trump admin sees less reason to make concessions to reach a deal.

2) Iran's resistance to US econ/military pressure and continued ability to keep prices/costs high means Tehran similarly sees little reason to relax negotiating position.

[Rory Johnston @Rory_Johnston]

Preparing potential strikes on Iran for before the midterms… to “HIGHLIGHT THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS TO BRING DOWN GAS PRICES”

[Robert Malley @Rob_Malley]

Merci à @MaxMiloEditions pour cet entretien au sujet du livre coecrit avec Hussein Agha, Demain C’est Hier: Vie, Mort, et Quête de la Paix en Israël/Palestine

[Robert Malley @Rob_Malley]

Read this @CrisisGroup Commentary to understand how shuttle runs through the Strait of Hormuz may be diminishing Iran’s leverage - but why they are unlikely to reduce US economic pain👇

https://t.co/M3LMw1N6w8

[Robert Malley @Rob_Malley]

Grand merci à @PascalBoniface pour m’avoir invité pour discuter de mon livre, co écrit avec Hussein Agha: Demain C’est Hier: Vie, Mort et Quête de la Paix en Israël/Palestine.

[Pascal Boniface @PascalBoniface]

🎙Comment l’histoire du conflit israélo-palestinien éclaire-t-elle la situation actuelle ? Quelles leçons peut-on tirer des précédentes tentatives de règlement du conflit ? La solution à deux États est-elle la seule option réaliste ?

Je reçois @Rob_Malley, enseignant à l’université de Yale et ancien conseiller des présidents Bill Clinton et Barack Obama sur le Proche-Orient⤵️
https://t.co/cL6ewOB5iY

[Crisis Group @CrisisGroup]

✍️ NEW OP-ED | The New Forever War. Why America and Iran Fight On Without Victory

Both have emerged weaker. Neither can win. But they fight on regardless, because they find the alternatives to be completely unpalatable. @AliVaez in @ForeignAffairs.

https://t.co/NSyEUhBOtg

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

America’s Hormuz Success Has Yet to Become a Strategic Victory

The fact that Iran is losing some of its ability to control and disrupt the Strait of Hormuz does not mean that the United States has established full control over the waterway.

Ultimately, oil is a physical commodity: either enough of it reaches the global market or it does not. The fact that oil prices remain so high suggests that Washington’s significant operational achievements in the Strait have not yet translated into the strategic and economic outcome it needs.

There are simply too many additional variables. Insurance premiums remain extremely high, tanker availability is constrained, commercial shipping continues to face substantial risks, and maintaining the American military presence required to keep significant volumes of oil moving through the Strait comes at an enormous financial and operational cost.

This raises an equally important question of sustainability. The United States may be able to maintain this level of military protection today, but for how long, and at what cost? That question becomes even more important as Tehran once again intensifies its efforts to disrupt traffic through the Strait.

So there should be no minimizing the American operational achievement. Iran’s strategy in Hormuz has been significantly weakened, and Tehran’s ability to use the Strait as leverage has clearly been challenged. But operational success should not be confused with strategic victory.

The real test is whether Washington can turn its military advantage into a durable situation in which oil flows normally, insurance and transportation costs decline, the extraordinary U.S. military deployment can be reduced, and Iran effectively loses Hormuz as a tool of strategic coercion. We are not there yet.

For now, neither side has full control of the Strait. Iran’s leverage has been substantially weakened, but Washington has not eliminated it. And a strategy that depends indefinitely on an extraordinarily expensive American military presence in the Gulf is not, by itself, a sustainable long-term solution.

#iran

[Gregory Brew @gbrew24]

The US sees volumes increasing and feels that time is on its side.

Iran sees high global prices, drained inventories, mounting political opposition, and costly military deployments to keep volumes moving and feels that time is on its side.

Ingredients for a continued standoff, with resolution nowhere in sight.

[laurence norman @laurnorman]

I mean this has always been the deal. It’s literally how the U.S. sold the MoU in June.

[Robert Malley @Rob_Malley]

This is key: « Naval and air blockades that weaken Iran's economy and SoH flows that erode its leverage mean the initial MoU tradeoff of easing dueling blockades does not hold the same incentive it had in June for the U.S. (and be met with mixed reviews from U.S. allies). »

The result: transit through the Strait remains severely impeded, at enormous cost to countries worldwide, but the cost to the US itself has at least for now been blunted, giving Trump room to wait and push for a tougher bargain.

That leaves Iran with a difficult set of choices: hold firm, and endure open-ended economic pain; offer a concession on the nuclear file that it appears determined to avoid; or escalate against its neighbors’ energy infrastructure to try to deepen the economic crisis, risking massive counter-escalation and further antagonizing those neighbors…

[Ali Vaez @AliVaez]

Over the past week at UNGA I've been speaking to Iranian, GCC and Western officials. The upside is that Tehran and Washington have been talking. The downside is that they've largely talking past each other. 1/