Davide Ghermandi

Naval Officer - PhDone @UNIBO - Opinions are my own #Seapower #MaritimeStrategy

[Elio Calcagno @eliocalcagno]

Delighted to share this piece I wrote for The Broadside (@ConGeostrategy) and inspired by discussions I had on the sidelines of this year’s Kiel International Seapower Symposium (#kiss2025).

[Elio Calcagno @eliocalcagno]

Happy to share my recent piece on Italy for @FESonline's 2025 study on the future of NATO. The focus was not so much on 🇮🇹 itself but on the experts debate here and how it ties into our local narratives.
https://t.co/V5KMilrz6S

[Navy Lookout @NavyLookout]

🇷🇺Russia’s limited options for naval basing in the Mediterranean if🇸🇾 Tartus becomes untenable.

Via @RUSI_org

https://t.co/Lp3S5vtKE2

[Andrew Erickson 艾立信 @AndrewSErickson]

Samuel B. Griffith Foundation Names “Chinese Amphibious Warfare” 2025 Publication of the Year!

Full text @ChinaMaritime/@NavalWarCollege: https://t.co/MYpHn05yOE

Background: https://t.co/dJlksMsAwz

2025 Samuel B. Griffith Foundation Reading List

Purpose. To establish a list of recommended readings related to the legacy and scholarship of Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith II, USMC (ret). This list will be reviewed by the Foundation annually and amended as needed to include key books, publications, and other media associated with Samuel Griffith’s life and studies.

Publication of the Year. For 2025, the Samuel B. Griffith Foundation has selected Study No. 8, #Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-Strait Invasion, edited by Dr. Andrew S. Erickson, Conor M. Kennedy, and Ryan D. Martinson (2024). This conference volume draws on insights from leading experts to examine Beijing’s pursuit of its ultimate strategic prize: #Taiwan. Incisive, informative, and prescient, this publication examines the PLA’s progress toward #Xi Jinping’s Taiwan-focused “Centennial Military Building Goal” for 2027, evaluates its prospects for success in a cross-Strait invasion, and outlines the steps Taiwan—with American support—must take to strengthen deterrence during this decade of maximum danger.

[Sal Mercogliano (WGOW Shipping) 🚢⚓🐪🚒🏴‍☠️ @mercoglianos]

A Timeline of Suspected Baltic Sea Sabotage Incidents

https://t.co/FMnFIkpQD6

[Alessio Patalano @alessionaval]

Russia trained officers for attacks on Japan and South Korea - Happy New Year X/Twitter. As first thread for 2025 I want to focus on ‘adversarial alignment’ - a theme I believe will be crucial to address in months to come. A thread linked to this FT piece: https://t.co/YfnVZElqsL

[Harvard Business Review @HarvardBiz]

Meetings are broken. How can we make them helpful again? https://t.co/HBMd0tfKF7

[Kevin Rowlands @c21st_sailor]

Thread

[RUSI @RUSI_org]

Our new paper seeks to outline the likely scope of a potential presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in and around the Euro-Atlantic in the next 15 years and the nature of the foreign policy it will support.
https://t.co/FP1IGdMvZq

[Kevin Rowlands @c21st_sailor]

Great article on an important, often overlooked topic. Charlotte Kleberg is @RoyalNavy Strategic Studies Centre Associate Fellow as well. Well worth a read.

[CSIS @CSIS]

On Wednesday at 2:30 pm ET, @csis_ai welcomes the Hon. @WILLROP3R, former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, to discuss what AI and autonomous technology mean for the future of defense.

Register: https://t.co/vXnbXTAujL

[Harvard Business Review @HarvardBiz]

High-performing teams are comfortable sharing negative emotions with each other in addition to the positive ones. https://t.co/JcGawWE5UH

[Fabrizio Coticchia @FCoticchia]

I doc dell Difesa (Atto Indirizzo,DPP) evidenziano come🇮🇹debba "andare oltre la gestione delle crisi", e prepararsi "anche a un conflitto ad alta intensità".Un cambio di paradigma?Qual i meccanismi che consentono a un paradigma di difesa di consolidarsi? 👇https://t.co/4Kb2YfEc7b

[Davide Ghermandi @GhermaD]

@w_d_james @RSIS_NTU @NTUsg Good luck William for this new adventure! And, as we say, fair winds and following seas! 😉

[Gabriele Natalizia @g_natalizia]

🇮🇹Rome would be served well by sharpening its strategic objectives and understanding the limits of its cababilities
🖊️@LorenzoTerm & I wrote an op-ed for @TheNatlInterest during our stay in DC at@ACEurope @AtlanticCouncil @SapienzaRoma @Geopoliticainfo
▶️https://t.co/DRxvVNzqSV

[Fabrizio Coticchia @FCoticchia]

Sarebbe importante che in futuro anche la Difesa 🇮🇹 realizzasse format analoghi (al di là del giudizio specifico sui contenuti, in ogni caso degni di attenzione). E qui parliamo di un contesto culturalmente simile (non identico). Credo che,per es,CASD abbia potenziale per farlo

[Alessio Patalano @alessionaval]

Good evening Twitter. Yours truly again - this time on a less usual subject. This summer there’s a European carrier strike group sailing through the Indo-Pacific. That’s not unheard of. What’s remarkable is that the CSG is centred on the Italian carrier Cavour: A thread -

[Davide Ghermandi @GhermaD]

https://t.co/IVrfwjgu3Z

[RAND @RANDCorporation]

The historic 75th-anniversary #NATOSummit begins on Tuesday.

As leaders from 32 countries converge on Washington, catch up on insights from RAND experts on several key strategic questions facing the alliance.

Here are some highlights... 🧵 https://t.co/roQWaWWfk8

[Beefeater @Beefeater_Fella]

European Union Critical Infrastructure (#CI) law for Dummies - an easy to understand guide on key EU Directives.

Context:

The West’s Undersea #Critical #Infrastructures (CI’s) s are a new frontier of warfare.

Critical infrastructure is an attractive target both for Ukraine in its fight against an invading aggressor, and by Russia who tries by all unorthodox means to disrupt energy and communication infrastructure across the globe.

Given the difficulty of attributing such attacks and the lack of immediate fatalities, which reduces the likelihood of escalation or retaliation. It includes energy assets, onshore and offshore, plus transport and data systems.

Europe’s and the world’s dependence on a limited number of fibre-optic cables that form the global internet network and links the continents worldwide and islands, has become a rising security concern in the light of new geopolitical conflicts.

At present, 95 percent of international internet traffic is transmitted by around 200 major #undersea #cables – each cable capable of data transfer at about 200 terabyte per second – supplemented by another 340. These cables carry an estimated US$10tn worth of financial transactions every day. They are interconnected at just 10 international, but vulnerable chokepoints. Following the sabotage of the Nord Stream Pipeline around September 26, 2022 - the EU responded to the event as a wake-up call.

The EU quickly recognised it is facing increased threats towards its CIs amid the war in Ukraine and has heightened attention to new hybrid security risks as well as infrastructural resilience in particular.

Both the European Parliament and the European Council had already agreed prior to the pipeline assault to deepen the legislative framework to strengthen the resilience of entities operating CIs.

97% of global communications and $10 trillion in daily financial transactions are transmitted not by satellites in the skies, but by cables lying deep beneath the ocean. Undersea cables are the indispensable infrastructure of our time, essential to our modern life and digital economy, yet they are inadequately protected and highly vulnerable to attack at sea and on land, from both hostile states and terrorists.

US intelligence officials have spoken of Russian submarines “aggressively operating” near Atlantic cables as part of its broader interest in unconventional methods of #warfare. When Russia annexed Crimea, one of its first moves was to sever the main cable connection to the outside world.

Undersea cables come ashore in just a few remote, coastal locations. These landing sites are critical national infrastructure but often have minimal protection, making them vulnerable to terrorism. A foiled Al-Qaeda plot to destroy a key London internet exchange in 2007 illustrates the credibility of the threat.

Since the first trans-Atlantic cable laid in 1858, cables have mainly been installed and owned by private companies. Although positive for taxpayers, this has meant undersea cables do not get the attention from governments they deserve.

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