@AmitSegal What are the odds that the big ask from Trump in order to allow this is that Turkey looks the other way when the Kurds move forces into Iran to draw the IRGC out so they can be decimated by US air strikes?
Out of necessity and ambition, Netanyahu hitched his cart to Trump’s—and now, with Trump driving headlong toward the cliff, he has to figure out how to unhitch before they both go over.
This is a radical departure from even a few weeks ago. The assumption then was that Trump would be a decisive factor in Netanyahu’s election prospects: there was talk of Trump receiving the Israel Prize, of a pre-election visit—a victory lap on Gaza and Iran, capped with a glowing endorsement. Suffice it to say that now looks doubtful, though Trump is still promising to be a decisive factor, just not in the way Netanyahu hoped. There is also the matter of the pardon, and the support Trump threw behind Netanyahu. The total effect is unclear, but it will undoubtedly weigh on President Isaac Herzog’s decision-making.
Netanyahu is facing the biggest challenge of his 30 years of dealing with U.S. presidents. He cannot repeat his 2015 gambit—going to the House under Obama’s nose to torpedo his nuclear deal. Partly that’s because Trump would likely be far more vindictive than Obama, but this is a Republican House in a time in which Republicans are not willing to dissent from the leader. Even if it weren’t a Republican House, Hakeem Jeffries is not about to reprise John Boehner’s invitation. Given the Democratic Party’s current feelings toward the prime minister, they might sooner invite Mojtaba Khamenei. With Obama, Clinton or Biden, Netanyahu always had Capitol Hill to retreat to when the White House turned cold. Now he is trapped in the Oval Office with “Israel’s best friend.”
Netanyahu’s real problem is less a bad ceasefire in Iran than the continued fire from Lebanon. As a senior cabinet minister put it to me: Iran is Trump’s problem, and it is his right to go there and make a deal—but Lebanon is ours.
Yesterday morning, Hezbollah brazenly broke last week’s ceasefire, firing on the north; Israel responded in kind, striking a headquarters in the group’s Dahieh stronghold. That prompted a “what the f— are you doing?” from Trump for the second week running, with the added complaint that Bibi possesses “no discretion at all.” Ironic.
But focusing on the reaction ignores the motivation for the act itself. There are two possibilities. Either Hezbollah turned on its patron, declaring that “this deal isn’t good for me, I want to blow it up,” which is highly unlikely, or the Iranians are after something. That something is to force Israel into a corner where it has to hit the Dahieh. If Israel doesn’t strike, the equation is cemented: Hezbollah can attack and Beirut stays untouched. If Israel does strike, Trump turns on Israel—which is exactly what happened. It is an Iranian attempt—with American backing—to write a return to the October 6 lines into the agreement, and so far it seems to be succeeding. It remains unclear exactly what the agreement demands in Lebanon. It could be a simple ceasefire—one that easily regresses into the status quo, tit-for-tat exchanges—or it could mean a full withdrawal of IDF forces from Lebanese territory. The former leaves the door open for Iran to drag its feet in negotiations, pointing the finger at Israel and trying to shove it under the wheels of Trump’s diplomacy. Israel, for its part, has already made its position on the latter prospect clear: Defense Minister Israel Katz declared that “the IDF will remain in the security zones in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza—without a time limit.”
If this is the moment of truth, there is only one correct answer to the prime minister’s test: stand up to Trump. As the senior cabinet minister put it, “This is our war, forced upon us, and we must not accept the Iranian equation”—even at the cost of a “sharp confrontation with the president of the United States.” Quite simply, Israel cannot allow its security to be dictated from Washington, and the prime minister who allows that to happen will not be prime minister for long.
If anything, that offers Netanyahu a glimmer of hope: perhaps he can pull off an unprecedented political about-face, rebranding from expert handler of the American ally—Trump’s best friend—into his most intractable opponent. Suddenly, Gadi Eisenkot’s shaky English might be less of a liability—when the topics are this unappealing to discuss, who needs a silver tongue?
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‘Israel has a full range of options regarding Lebanon, until the Iran can come back with something satisfactory on the nuclear issue and the other issues’
Fmr. Amb. John Bolton (@AmbJohnBolton) joins @benitalevin on #TheRundown
Catch the full interview https://t.co/d4DJKJJAeG
@IsraelexLive People don’t seem to know the difference between peaceful protesting and civil disobedience. The latter being illegal. If you block public roads you are breaking the law and I will have no pity for you when the police crack you over the head and throw you in the patty wagon.
Trump is in a real bind now with Iran because he is correctly trying to tie the GCC under the Abraham accords as part of the Iran negotiations, as it will enable the US to leave the middle east and retain hegemony over the region.
However because of the ceasefire and lack of commitment to destroying the Iranian regime, the Arab world sees that as weakness and so they are hedging. Trump is trying to strongarm them into joining the coalition, however he is doing so from a position of weakness in their eyes. Ceasefires in the middle east are not a thing, they don't understand the concept and just see it as weakness.
The Arab countries see their core infrastructure, like water and oil production being vulnerable to Iranian attack, while they see Israel and the US not hurting the regime properly. They see how they have conducted the war as weakness, by not killing the families, not hitting infrastructure and the core regime targets. Because of this they don't believe the coalition is going to end Iran, and so instead they're forced to plan for if the regime survives, so they're hedging now.
They hate Iran and want the regime gone, they are the most vulnerable to their predatory actions and they are most at risk. But they cannot take no oil exports forever, they're willing to take pain but not indefinitely and they'll make a deal with Iran before this. They are not in the business of jeopardising their own power domestically.
Because of this, Trump is struggling to strong arm them under the US block because they aren't convinced the US will remove Iran. Remember they have paid huge money to the US and Trump in order for this to occur and the protection of the US empire. If the regime survives and the US fails to remove them, they will punish the US by ending or not following through with the trillions they have been forced to pay for this operation. Don't listen to the isolationists, the US is benefiting huge from this war. But Trump can't negotiate with the Arabs from his current position during a ceasefire, because they see this as weakness and they don't believe in signing onto weakness. This is the middle east and weakness is immediately punished.
They're very upset because they're now forced to hedge with Iran, and no amount of strong arming is going to make them join unless they believe Trump is going to finish the operation, which they now dont believe will occur.
The only way out of the bind is to continue the kinetic operation, but they don't want this because they don't think the US/Israel coalition is going to hurt the Iranians enough, and they fear retaliation on their critical infrastructure which is getting more difficult to defend.
Which is why the negotiations seem difficult and are being dragged out, because Trump and the gulf are now in a difficult bind.