Michael Lokesson

🗞️ Hack turned hack 🎥 Navy vet. Former NatSec Reporter. Russianista. Climber of vertical things. Bylines @ NatGeo / NYT / Other disreputables.

[Michael Lokesson @MichaelLokesson]

Trump forcing Ukraine into negotiations will be like a guy trying to sell his sister-in-law's car with a bad transmission. A metaphorical 🧵

[Michael Lokesson @MichaelLokesson]

@justincbzz Coming from you, that’s very much a badge of honor. Thorkill, @DelwinStrategy, and our compatriots in realism will continue to do our work.

[Michael Lokesson @MichaelLokesson]

@justincbzz @Thorkill65 Not surprising that you’d attack someone who actually does good work. Your account for years has been nothing but a flag waving stream of propaganda. A few instances rowing against the tide doesn’t refute that. But keep calling us all vatniks.

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

The Additional €70 Billion Military Aid Package and the Confirmation of Ukraine’s Financing Challenges.
We are witnessing the large-scale reveal I referred to in my previous articles: the distortion of the battlefield picture as part of a communication campaign conducted since February, aimed at securing additional bilateral aid to cover the widening funding gap behind Ukraine’s war effort.

According to the proposal reported by Politico’s article “NATO allies weigh new €70B military aid pledge for Ukraine”, €30 billion would come from the EU’s already agreed €90 billion two-year loan to Ukraine, while an additional €40 billion would be drawn from bilateral commitments. The conclusion underlines the severity of Ukraine’s financial position if the war effort is to be sustained:
“Adding the bilateral support on top of that loan is absolutely crucial.”

In practical terms, the €90 billion EU loan would subsequently shift to cover more state expenditure, far from the initial assumption that roughly two-thirds of the envelope would be directed toward defense. Without additional layers of support, Ukraine risks running out of funds somewhere around mid-2027 at the current pace.

If this package materializes, total Western support for 2026–2027, once EU funds, bilateral aid, IMF-related support and other financing lines are included, could move into the €160+ billion range. This confirms that Ukraine is operating inside a structural dependency model in which military capability, state continuity and Western political messaging have become inseparable.

Needless to say, if Europe has stepped up in 2025, there remains growing uncertainties about long term support amounts, which averaged €75 Billion/year since 2022.

The financial dimension has a direct operational consequence. Such an envelope is likely to support not only conventional ammunition flows and force regeneration, but also the continued expansion of Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign. This matters because long-range strike has become one of Kyiv’s few remaining ways to impose costs on Russia beyond the immediate line of contact, particularly at a time when manpower, air defense, artillery stocks and mobilization capacity remain under severe pressure.

More importantly, the residual gap of roughly €40 billion that this program would cover corresponds almost exactly to the 2026 funding shortfall I identified in my previous analysis in La Vigie, "Ukraine: le piège du choix rationnel", where I argued that the war has become, perversely, the mechanism through which the Ukrainian state remains financially solvent in the medium term.

This is a crucial point, because it rationalizes the ongoing narrative push to frame the battlefield situation as if Ukraine had reversed the strategic tide more decisively than it actually has. Since the Dnipropetrovsk counterattacks in February, the picture has been heavily distorted, as I outlined in my previous analysis below: https://t.co/4btToc8yP8

This communication architecture culminated this week with President Zelensky’s open letter calling for a ceasefire on the current lines, which Moscow rejected. In an obvious manner, the letter was primarily aimed at Ukraine’s supporters. It was deliberately provocative, directly threatening, and marked by a form of somehow overstated bravado that can serve only one objective: to reassure potential partners that their investment is less risky than it actually is. It read, in that sense, like a well-written start-up plan aimed at investors, and not at a diplomatic effort to initiate peace talks.

This posture is easy to understand, and largely rational, when placed against the bleaker operational situation on the battlefield compared with what is often described.

In the current context, this entire apparatus is perfectly justified as part of a strategy to continue waging the war. It can even be argued that Ukraine still clearly has the upper hand on the communication front. Nevertheless, this should not obscure the fact that every passing month further deteriorates the economic and social front, while rendering post-war options increasingly opaque.

Quoted articles in reply 👇

#UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy #Warfare

https://t.co/tW5x8RPx7u

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

A good read, more nuanced than what is being released recently.

One note: Russian forces do not need to capture #Sloviansk and #Kramatorsk, only to establish siege lines around front and flanks by year end. The next logistics hubs such as Barinkove are ~40km away, thus a siege would be extremely unfavourable to defenders due to the size of the urban area to cover, requiring significant supplies. Additionally, the 2 cities are on low ground and would be overlooked by the besieging force, which could deploy artillery.

In a way, an «Anchorage» deal in this situation could be acceptable to the Ukrainian leadership. Surrendering the cities if no counteroffensive to break the siege is on the table due to lack of offensive potential (which is the case and was the first objective of the Russian attritional doctrine) would not have the same implications as last winter during the negotiations.

Needless to say that a ceasefire on a line that sees 2 large cities besieged makes little sense. You could not really garrison those or let civilians return.

This is the reason the AFU is spending disproportionately resources to prevent a direct siege situation.

[3BM15 @3_bm15]

If there's one thing that's constant in this war it's that appetites exceed capabilities.

I would not be surprised if the Ukrainian leadership entertained these same thoughts.

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

As I have been saying, the share of total oil and mineral resources export revenue from refined products, the only decreasing production from strikes on refineries, is limited.

The 10% decline in April versus the past 5-year average is not only anecdotal but completely offset by rising prices, even with the strong ruble. Crude oil, the main revenue source, are up YoY.

The deep strike campaign against Russia’s oil infrastructure is impressive but shows very underwhelming results with regard to its objective, which is to threaten Russia’s ability to self-fund the war, Moscow’s main strategic center of gravity.

[BenAris @bneeditor]

Russia is spending a lot of money on its war.

That is normal. Painful, but normal.

Reminder that when the USA entered the second world war its budget deficit jumped to 22% of GDP and stayed there for the next three years.

Today Russia’s budget deficit is officially 2.5%. That doesn’t even breech the EU excess deficit threshold. France for example has a deficit twice higher.

In reality Russia’s budget deficit is probably over 3% and is on course for somewhere around 4% this year but even that still is less than most of the leading EU powers.

So the spending is a problem, but not a crisis. Moscow keep funding this war for another several years without breaking a sweat.

[Oliver Carroll @olliecarroll]

Putin has been in worse positions before (2011 etc). Today he starts with many more tools of repression, a cushion of fear, and "dissenting elites" too timid to even blame him publicly. Yes, note his falling popularity—but let's not pretend it'll change anything soon.

[Michael Lokesson @MichaelLokesson]

@Camp4 If you're performing better at 55 than in your 20s then... you weren't performing in your 20s.

[3BM15 @3_bm15]

The duality of the current front line:

Everywhere is a kill zone, but sometimes you can just walk forward.

[Michael Lokesson @MichaelLokesson]

@DelwinStrategy @egea_blog Top tier stuff as always.

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

My latest article « The trap of rational ruin » published in La Vigie.
Many thanks to @egea_blog.

In depth analysis of Ukraine’s economic prospects post-war and why can the continuation of war remain rational without offering any real strategic outcome?

#Strategy #UkraineRussiaWar #Economy

#Ukraine : Le piège du choix rationnel (Delwin) https://t.co/bfvvHD8n71

[Michael Lokesson @MichaelLokesson]

@ted_ryce @dennis_geelen And knee rehab, as I'm currently finding out.

[Balazs Jarabik @BalazsJarabik]

10/ Base forecast scenario: the internal conditions of the war are becoming more important without ceasing to be military. Battlefield dynamics matter, but elite fragmentation, energy vulnerability and diplomacy increasingly shape the trajectory. Talks should resume by summer.

[Michael Lokesson @MichaelLokesson]

@3_bm15 She's followed the classic arc of tempered skepticism to fullblown grifting opportunist. This war is breeding ground for these on both sides. See Michael Weiss for opposite side of the coin; a sterling career thrown away in service of propaganda.

[Michael Lokesson @MichaelLokesson]

@Realtime1980 @atShruti Who on earth needs to pay 30-100k on “camps/extracurriculars”??

[Konrad Muzyka - Rochan Consulting @konrad_muzyka]

Przełomu nie ma. Pomimo kilku udanych ukraińskich kontrataków Rosjanie nadal utrzymują inicjatywę na większości odcinków frontu. Natomiast jest kilka powodów do optymizmu. Ukraińskie działania na Zaporożu z początku roku wyraźnie pokrzyżowały rosyjskie plany, co nadal wpływa na przebieg obecnej "ofensywy".

Do tego dochodzą ukraińskie uderzenia dronowe (średni zasięg) na rosyjską logistykę i OPL . Wiele wskazuje na to, że będzie ich o wiele więcej. Ukraińskie siły lądowe przestały się kurczyć, co może świadczyć o poprawie sytuacji mobilizacyjnej.

Największa poprawa nastąpiła jednak w organizacji pola walki i zaplecza logistycznego Ukrainy, co przekłada się na bardziej stabilną sytuację na froncie.

Nie zmienia to faktu, że rosyjskim celem na wiosnę i lato pozostaje podejście pod aglomerację Kramatorsk–Słowiańsk. Na tym kierunku Rosjanie nadal powoli, ale jednak posuwają się do przodu.

[Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy]

This is worse than I thought. <25m population.
13m entitled to social benefits, I assume pensions of some sort. This means the fiscal base post war would be extremely reduced.
Without a decade long, multi-billion aid treaty, and full European integration, Ukraine would likely default on its debt.

#Economy #Strategy #UkraineRussiaWar

[Oliver Carroll @olliecarroll]

The key question people have to address is what is the mechanism of change inside Russia. People / oligarchs / one tower of the Kremlin being frustrated with a man they usually don't even dare name isn't enough. The repressive dial has a long way to go.

[Michael Lokesson @MichaelLokesson]

@DKThomp @CarterD Keep punching left. They deserve it.