There’s an entire genre of tweets that have become popular on this site that are some variation of “now that I have a child I’m ok with killing everything” and it’s incredibly bizarre.
Please read Rawls. The Veil of Ignorance is an ILLUSTRATION meant to reflect the fact that justice has to be reasoned about in abstraction from your particular conditions. It’s not a metaphysical thesis about persons being separable from their circumstances or whatever.
@woarna_is_right@MartinTweats Indeed there are only some theories in FOL which are both syntactically and semantically complete. Although I doubt the quoted commenter knows all that much about metalogic this is true. In any case there are several logics which are syntactically *and* semantically complete
Ibn Sina was actually a generational genius Metaphysician. Apparently, 10 centuries ago he proposed a principle on the interaction between quantification and possibility that was independently rederived by modal metaphysicians and logicians during the 20th century.
At a glance, this argument will need a lot of motivation since it rests on many premises that aren't self-evident and quite controversial, to list, why should we accept a distinction between "essence" and "existence" (
assuming there is an essense), I have various gripes with act-potency but the next natural question is why we should accept such a heavyweight metaphysics. In any case, going from “no infinite regress in per se causal series” to “a first uncaused cause that is the theistic God” relies on assumptions about causality and per se series that are-- in my perspective-- far from demonstrative once you press them logically
I think it would be fair to start with those before we even begin to scrutinize the premises
> I also struggle to see naturalism in general as a coherent idea independently of physicalism - after all, if God/angels exist then in what sense are they "unnatural" unless we're defining natural to be the same as physical? And idealism opens the door to causal closure being broken, and I would think naturalism would require causal closure?
Naturalism doesn't entail physicalism, some versions may be incredibly close to it though, naturalism is more inclusive. Naturalism itself leaves conceptual room for non-physical entities—as long as they’re still “natural” in some broader sense e.g. everything could be fundamentally mental so the natural world is fundamentally mental and then you would have to cut up some demarcation for what supernatural would be. As far as angels and God goes I think it would also depend on how the naturalist is characterizing supernatural (assuming it is in an informative way) I also don't think naturalism requires causal closure
But the idealism part was moreso about what atheists could be simpliciter since the presupp is not just arguing against naturalists but non-theists broadly
> I was specifically referring to our "truthsensing" faculty, which I liken to like one of our physical senses. In the same way that I can tell the leaf is green and the sky blue through immediate apprehension, I can immediately apprehend that 2 + 2 = 4 or that killing children for fun is morally wrong.
Got it, I do think intuitions and other epistemic faculties are fine if epistemic circularity is valid or invalid, in the case of the latter I think the discussion would revolve around reliability and what justifies these epistemic faculties, it would be laborous to get into any one specific view but I think the library of views there is rich enough to substantially provide the atheists with options contrary to the presupp's claim that it is impossible
Although, I will say-- which I am sure you would disagree with-- I think atheists and everyone else are better off becoming relativists about anything anyways but that is only a tangential point