@bkiepuszewski 'Strength' sounds like a measure of how coordinated the power bases are (devs, stakers, NOs etc.) to enact a hard fork, assuming no contention.
More relevant is how economically costly a contentious fork (with ghost assets) would be to the side that is seen as most legitimate.
@toghrulmaharram@toly Profit from corruption is not the only factor in economic security. It's the scale of capital / coordination necessary to mount a liveness attack that makes it harder to obscure and plausibly deny.
It makes the attacker easier to identify as a legitimate target for UASF.
@toly@toghrulmaharram This solves some problems but doesn't this remove any discipline stakers (or delegators) have in selecting honest/reputable validators.
Perhaps an extended re-delegation lock-out period?
@colludingnode@lex_node@thetemerian You canโt fork the factory in crypto either. The economic activity is overwhelmingly reliant on the liquidity provided by dollar coins which cannot be forked.
Underplaying the challenges the minority chain faces just to keep the threat credible is not going to work out well.
@colludingnode@lex_node@thetemerian Your opponents will not simply gift you the narrative framing you are relying on here.
You just described a cabal of devs and select validators arbitrarily attempting to dish out economic ruin.
Dynamics around pricing after a fork will not be limited to cypherpunk values.
@macrocephalopod@aronchick@TheStalwart Because in crypto it makes any punishment for validator misbehavior less effective:
1. LST validators' skin in the game is their 'reputation' and future commissions not the stake itself
2. The direct responsibility to hold delegated validators to task is now pooled and abdicated
@DominikHell6@dankrad@sreeramkannan For coordination of a fork, is it the $ of stake that matters? Or the number of individual entities/DVT that run the validator/non-staking node set?
@drumm_colin The FX consideration makes sense. I was thinking of a regular coin holder confined to the domestic economy who may or may not be ignorant of FX and inadvertently exercises the put option every time he engages in commerce.
@drumm_colin Why is the call embodied? The state writes the strike price for the put and the call on the coin, arenโt they both encoded? Or does it relate to the way the call is exercised ie. melting the coin
@ryanberckmans@tbr90 @sachayve On 2)
Does a distribution of multiple jurisdictions for stablecoins and RWA really insulate against their joint influence on fork choice?
Why assume that they will decide on forks independently? Seems especially tenuous for dollar stablecoins and US-originated RWA
@superphiz@MattKunke Do key shares imply social m of n coordination between operators is required to act during a contentious fork?
Can this be structured differently in anticipation of a CF?
@drumm_colin @AskTh3Professor Does that myth then extend to solving the double coincidence of wants as an origin for โmoneyโ as separate from credit?