Super Testnet

Open source bitcoin dev |

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@_BitcoinCapital @mattkratter @LukeDashjr @GrassFedBitcoin @cguida6 That is genuinely one of the coolest things though. I was talking to a merchant at a conference today who said lightning invoices are the only thing he displays for crypto payments, because all of the apps crypto people use know how to convert to bitcoin and pay an LN invoice

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@nikunjgala @KainerWeissmann @1440000bytes @Yashraj__ @cakewallet "some random dishonest node"

Any node a user is connected to can perform this theft. Saying "a node would only steal my money if they were dishonest, so the vulnerability is limited" is maximum cope. Especially if nodes are selected at random from electrum's p2p network.

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@PortlandHODL Bitcoin has native support for bip157 filters as a config option. Can you manage wallets easily using that instead of electrum?

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@roasbeef @dstadulis @ambosstech > main vector is prob if someone is connecting to a remote full node

When someone *is* connected to a remote full node, could a man-in-the-middle impersonate the full node and fool LND into thinking the blockchain is stalled? For LND, does that produce a risk of fund loss?

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@callebtc 1. Multisigs and key deletion already enables genuine covenants on bitcoin (ie real-world restrictions on the outputs that appear in future transactions)

2. The various covenant proposals out there are good ideas too (especially when some users don't have a key or aren't online)

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@lightcoin @ThisDayInMETAL Sounds like you want him to stop spouting his opinion about something and just play music

Ironic

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@ricardoXMR @notgrubles No one I know of claims lightning is completely untraceable. But it is proving harder to trace than monero or zcash, as the thread you linked to demonstrates.

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@ThrillerX_ @1440000bytes @grok Yes, hopefully they catch him. But whether they do or not, it's interesting for privacy focused people, because here's a person who desperately seeks privacy, is using lightning as one of his tools, and we're witnessing a mixed bag of partial successes and partial failures

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

This is really exciting. This is the first time I've heard of a thief moving funds over lightning to obfuscate his trail, and the first time I've seen someone try to trace the flow of funds over lightning and claim they know where it now sits: https://t.co/DAgPkRnPYT

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@ThrillerX_ @1440000bytes @grok Think of it like watching a nerdy episode of Cops. The criminal is dodging and weaving, going under tunnels, and trying to lose his pursuers. And if you know how to read the data, you can see parts of it. It's interesting to see his escape attempts and evasive maneuvers.

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@uncleJim21 ...that received the money can't look at the blockchain to see if the sender's node pubkey is in the tx, so there's a piece of data monero provides that LN does not.

In this case, though, they do think they know some of the perp's L1 addresses, so they might get him that way.

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@uncleJim21 ...identity, along with a matching pubkey in the ring signature. Since he seems to be using lightning, that attack won't work: they cannot dust his ln node because he already closed its channels, and even if they could, and he sent the dust amount to an exchange, the exchange...

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@uncleJim21 ...nature of lightning's privacy pros and cons. The cons are, you can get *some* info from routing nodes and by being the sender. But just as notably, there's a lot they *don't* know, enough that this guy may well lose his pursuers. Time will tell.

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@uncleJim21 First, of anyone said light inf is "untraceable," I would disagree with them. "Harder to trace than monero" does not equal "untraceable."

Second, I think, so far, the partial, guesswork-based trace by Blink -- which has not yet nabbed the criminal -- helps demonstrate the...

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@bitcoinbazar21 @1440000bytes He made some initial mistakes like reusing the same address for multiple parts of his theft preparation. But it now looks like he is doing things more craftily. He put a small amount into a fedimint recently and I suspect the trail for that amount will run cold there.

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@qubitcoin_ You can spend your bitcoins entirely on lightning so that when the channel finally closes, there's nothing in it on your side. That erases the L1 trail

[BitVault - Be Your Own Vault @BitvaultApp]

Bitcoin needs places where people can test ideas, learn and challenge assumptions.

At Securing Bitcoin, @SuperTestnet will share lessons from running Bitdevs in Guadalajara and San Juan, and why local technical communities matter.
22 Oct · Lugano
https://t.co/lHYhkigtaZ

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@DavidLaiKinChu1 It depends on how you use it. Most wallets are very leaky because devs can provide better UX by making privacy tradeoffs. If your LN wallet has "default" channel counterparties and you've never picked someone other than the defaults, your payments are probably not very private.

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@robin_linus @stutxo I think it seems less onerous because, in actual real world usage, channel counterparties pretty much never actually trigger the countdown, so users don't notice it. I think Ark can be handled the same way.

[Super Testnet @SuperTestnet]

@robin_linus @stutxo Yes, hence the line "unless you count lightning as requiring that too." An LN counterparty can trigger a countdown where you lose sats unless you go online in time for a justice tx. For some reason, this reactive model seems less onerous to people than Ark's prescheduled timeouts