@GeorgeOhWell10@erlichya And ZIP (technically, DEFLATE) used only *parts* of LZ77 along with Huffman encoding. ZIP was entirely Katz and Conway, not LZ, and isn't itself spec'd to any compression whatsoever- just provides hooks/allowances for it.
@MrKevHunter@CompuConnexions@BrandonLive@robertgraham Theoretically assuming the attack was silent enough, not even 1Password would know.
Pragmatically, last I looked into it they didn't limit or restrict failed login attempts so a bruteforce *may* be feasible (con't)
@Paul__Walsh@evacide@kvakes Anything beyond is a fundamental misunderstanding of the right to privacy.
The consumer/user has no direct and enforceable guarantee that the privacy of their real-life identity is respected *except for never requiring it in the first place*.
@Paul__Walsh@evacide@kvakes My entire argument is this API call, in mention, is now pointless. There is no purpose to verifying "identity" (as you've taken upon yourself to claim context) unless it's something tied *to servicing* that identity.
@Paul__Walsh@evacide@kvakes well, no- there *is* PII. a specific *value* be ephemeral, but it's still required. further, tokenizing to a specific entity is, itself, still PII.
Personal - yep, entity is an individual, a person
Identity -ah, yep, there is indeed a set of data and history tied to this entity
@bastianpurrer@Leomoss@PrivSecurity@evacide might want to rethink that for #2, becsuse the posturing for "hacking back" as part of nationstate cyberwarfare is literally what directly led to WannaCry.
@chakkerz @gamozolabs Oh word; here's some recommended reaources to get you started when you have the time! (Hit the first link las6; the upstream docs are a bit dry)
https://t.co/tr3TyNy5BQ
https://t.co/f4lqtMvEQz
https://t.co/XTBvCEUvBy
https://t.co/aNt17qvj4y