Announcing my rejected talk for @bsidespyongyang:
Is that "web3 enthusiast" follower with the anime PFP acting suspicious?
Find out if you have confirmed North Korean followers at https://t.co/sR2776PBF2.
Love the concept of the noble gases thing but in practice I have no idea which is which
Hydrogen - everyday?
Argon - specialized, Fable-like?
Carbon - Fable 5.2 equiv??
Neon - Flash replacement ??
Turn a rough sketch into a working custom font in minutes with Gemini 4 Hydrogen.
Using Google @Antigravity in the Gemini app for Mac, Hydrogen handles the technical heavy lifting so you can build custom typefaces and interactive design tools from scratch.
The vulnpocalypse is caused by security vendors.
Their inability to convey risk accurately, due to either incompetence or ignorance, causes tremendous damage and stress on responding teams.
There is a lot of weight associated with vulnerability announcements. We can no longer trust many security vendors’ blog posts, since their purpose is marketing & fanfare, not accuracy.
Exploitability needs to be demonstrated, in realistic environments, and its likelihood accurately conveyed. So that responders can make informed decisions on what to prioritize. But instead we are seeing fake PoC videos set in contrived & controlled lab environments, that give an illusion of exploitability when it’s unrealistic in any real-world scenario.
And vendors now try to show off who found it first, rush to send you marketing emails and call you without your consent; to sell you snake oil they pulled out of their ass two hours earlier, with no intention on actually making anyone safer, only to meet their quarterly sales quotas.
The core responsibility of a security professional is to accurately communicate risk, and let people make informed decisions. Too many vendors are failing at this, that I cannot consider them security vendors, only snake oil salesmen taking advantage of people in vulnerable positions due to their lies.
Security Notice: Reminder Regarding Etherscan Support Communications
Earlier today, we detected attempts to gain unauthorized access to our customer support and ticketing system (Freshworks).
We are currently investigating the situation and taking precautionary measures.
In the meantime, we would like to remind all users to exercise caution when communicating with anyone claiming to represent Etherscan Support.
- Never share your private keys, seed phrases, passwords, or other sensitive information.
- Be cautious of unexpected links, attachments, or requests for sensitive information, even if they appear to come from our official support channels.
As a general reminder, Etherscan Support will never ask for your private keys or recovery phrases.
We are taking this matter seriously and will provide further updates if necessary.
Thank you for your understanding and continued trust.
@anogis1@benowhere_@binance If there is a path for a single person, it's an architectural weakness. Doesn't matter how many hops.
In banking you need a minimum of 2 people to be able to send money.
In normie world, PCI made even the most Mom and Pop store put their card readers on a separate domain and segmented network with a two factor auth stripped down jump box full of telemetry logging just to interact with a reader that uses point to point encryption, otherwise Visa would turbonuke your right to process credit cards.
But for access to 5 unrecoverable billion dollars, I guess direct container SSH is fine too
@benowhere_@binance You are 100% right
If a lone person can access a container that can withdrawal 5 billion, they actually are really lucky he didn't do this when he was having a bad day
Or maybe it did require dual approval and someone blind approved
Either way, should never happen
Anecdotally I noticed that one of my agents tried to resolve crates through https://t.co/p2lWTsHsph which seemed extremely sketchy but is apparently legitimate.
I have .ru and .cn blanket blocked just in case.
While evaluating Qwen3.8-Flash-Next in a controlled sandbox environment, Cohere's research team observed something unexpected.
Asked to generate a defensive cybersecurity detection rule, the model instead inventoried aspects of the machine it was running on and attempted to upload a probe file to an Alibaba Cloud storage bucket in Beijing. Notably, the model's reasoning trace stated that it would not invoke any tools before taking these actions.
Cohere's sandbox blocked the attempt, and no external communication succeeded. We have not determined the root cause, and we are not asserting malicious intent.
But the incident raises important questions for organizations deploying agentic AI systems: Can models take actions that differ from their stated reasoning, and how should security teams evaluate trust, provenance, and behavior in open-weight models?
We are publishing our findings because organizations making model adoption decisions deserve as much information as possible. We hope this contributes to greater transparency, stronger security practices, and continued collaboration across the AI ecosystem.
Read the full report: https://t.co/TZSugXi2ZE