Alexandre Adomnicăi

[Alexandre Adomnicăi @aadomn]

@jedisct1 **BUFFER OVERFLOW OCCURS** :')

[KORBEN @korben_rss]

La vérif d'âge de l'Europe ridiculisée par une extension Chrome https://t.co/BKvOT9w6XP

[Frank @jedisct1]

European digital ID wallets rely on Google and Apple https://t.co/7giVg0huiU

[Alexandre Adomnicăi @aadomn]

@OisinKyne @SuccinctLabs looks like a big step forward indeed! thanks for sharing :) gonna give it a read 👀

[Mate Soos @SoosMate]

Wow, 17 years on, CryptoMiniSat is still relevant at cryptography. I'm surprised and delighted.

"Finding Collisions against 4-round SHA3-384
in Practical Time", PDF: https://t.co/Ns2MUcyihb

[Alexandre Adomnicăi @aadomn]

Based on the barrel-shiftrows AES representation :)

[Frank @jedisct1]

New version of the pure JS implementation of the AEGIS cipher suites released https://t.co/iOOQZ2NkLy - Fully bitsliced AEGIS-128L beats AES-GCM and even ChaChaPoly for all input sizes.

[Frank @jedisct1]

Critical Hugging Face Transformers flaw ran attacker code on a routine model load https://t.co/KTo1Boyu16

[Wei Dai @_weidai]

The Zcash Orchard zk circuit bug, as reported by @DefuseSec.

The bug looks obvious in retrospect, but unfortunately, it was missed by perhaps the most diligent protocol designers, cryptographers, and auditors.

It may get worse before it gets better, unfortunately.

Expanding coverage of formal verification is probably the only long-term solution we have.

[Frank @jedisct1]

Threshold Signatures in the Head https://t.co/xpmPzL2wVs

[Craig Gidney @CraigGidney]

Blog post: "The French have the Quantum Circuits" https://t.co/cP5hbTWl2B

André Schrottenloher just published a preprint showing how to construct quantum ECDLP circuits with costs similar to the ones in our zero knowledge proofs.

[zkSecurity @zksecurityXYZ]

Today we're launching https://t.co/25RLaELMX4, a collaborative catalog of common pitfalls in MPC implementations and the cryptographic primitives they rely on.
Built with contributors from zkSecurity, Trail of Bits, Partisia, and Zama.

[mjos\dwez @mjos_crypto]

Nine 3rd round On-Ramp signatures announced by NIST, along with eval report IR 8610:
{ FAEST, HAWK, MAYO, MQOM, QR-UOV, SDitH, SNOVA, SQIsign, UOV }
https://t.co/kGOjvRQZsn
https://t.co/w4d1I9wmhU

[Mikerah @badcryptobitch]

Beaver triples are a foundational technique for enabling efficient MPC protocols
However, most explanations make beaver triples feel like magic 🤯

With Stoffel 🦡 💨 , that is no longer the case

Read our newest article to understand Beaver Triples from scratch 👇️

[Alexandre Adomnicăi @aadomn]

"The [QDay Prize] competition failed in the way it was predictably going to fail. Save what credibility you have left and call a duck a duck."
https://t.co/lmLnZDp5Dc

[Alexandre Adomnicăi @aadomn]

@SuccinctLabs ZCAM

[Paul Moore - Security Consultant  @Paul_Reviews]

Hacking the #EU #AgeVerification app in under 2 minutes.

During setup, the app asks you to create a PIN. After entry, the app *encrypts* it and saves it in the shared_prefs directory.

1. It shouldn't be encrypted at all - that's a really poor design.
2. It's not cryptographically tied to the vault which contains the identity data.

So, an attacker can simply remove the PinEnc/PinIV values from the shared_prefs file and restart the app.

After choosing a different PIN, the app presents credentials created under the old profile and let's the attacker present them as valid.

Other issues:
1. Rate limiting is an incrementing number in the same config file. Just reset it to 0 and keep trying.
2. "UseBiometricAuth" is a boolean, also in the same file. Set it to false and it just skips that step.

Seriously @vonderleyen - this product will be the catalyst for an enormous breach at some point. It's just a matter of time.

[Alexandre Adomnicăi @aadomn]

"[...] you still need a human who can think. My student is one of those humans. $3,000 poorer, I appreciate that more than ever."
https://t.co/d75nDhqtS0

[FFmpeg @FFmpeg]

FFmpeg is moving to Rust 🦀

Our use of C and Assembly in FFmpeg has been an unacceptable violation of safety.

FFmpeg will be running 10x slower - but we're doing it for your safety.

All your videos will appear green - safety first, working software later.

[Justin Drake @drakefjustin]

Today is a monumentous day for quantum computing and cryptography. Two breakthrough papers just landed (links in next tweet). Both papers improve Shor's algorithm, infamous for cracking RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. The two results compound, optimising separate layers of the quantum stack. The results are shocking. I expect a narrative shift and a further R&D boost toward post-quantum cryptography.

The first paper is by Google Quantum AI. They tackle the (logical) Shor algorithm, tailoring it to crack Bitcoin and Ethereum signatures. The algorithm runs on ~1K logical qubits for the 256-bit elliptic curve secp256k1. Due to the low circuit depth, a fast superconducting computer would recover private keys in minutes. I'm grateful to have joined as a late paper co-author, in large part for the chance to interact with experts and the alpha gleaned from internal discussions.

The second paper is by a stealthy startup called Oratomic, with ex-Google and prominent Caltech faculty. Their starting point is Google's improvements to the logical quantum circuit. They then apply improvements at the physical layer, with tricks specific to neutral atom quantum computers. The result estimates that 26,000 atomic qubits are sufficient to break 256-bit elliptic curve signatures. This would be roughly a 40x improvement in physical qubit count over previous state-of-the-art. On the flip side, a single Shor run would take ~10 days due to the relatively slow speed of neutral atoms.

Below are my key takeaways. As a disclaimer, I am not a quantum expert. Time is needed for the results to be properly vetted. Based on my interactions with the team, I have faith the Google Quantum AI results are conservative. The Oratomic paper is much harder for me to assess, especially because of the use of more exotic qLDPC codes. I will take it with a grain of salt until the dust settles.

→ q-day: My confidence in q-day by 2032 has shot up significantly. IMO there's at least a 10% chance that by 2032 a quantum computer recovers a secp256k1 ECDSA private key from an exposed public key. While a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC) before 2030 still feels unlikely, now is undoubtedly the time to start preparing.
→ censorship: The Google paper uses a zero-knowledge (ZK) proof to demonstrate the algorithm's existence without leaking actual optimisations. From now on, assume state-of-the-art algorithms will be censored. There may be self-censorship for moral or commercial reasons, or because of government pressure. A blackout in academic publications would be a tell-tale sign.
→ cracking time: A superconducting quantum computer, the type Google is building, could crack keys in minutes. This is because the optimised quantum circuit is just 100M Toffoli gates, which is surprisingly shallow. (Toffoli gates are hard because they require production of so-called "magic states".) Toffoli gates would consume ~10 microseconds on a superconducting platform, totalling ~1,000 sec of Shor runtime.
→ latency optimisations: Two latency optimisations bring key cracking time to single-digit minutes. The first parallelises computation across quantum devices. The second involves feeding the pubkey to the quantum computer mid-flight, after a generic setup phase.
→ fast- and slow-clock: At first approximation there are two families of quantum computers. The fast-clock flavour, which includes superconducting and photonic architectures, runs at roughly 100 kHz. The slow-clock flavour, which includes trapped ion and neutral atom architectures, runs roughly 1,000x slower (~100 Hz, or ~1 week to crack a single key).
→ qubit count: The size-optimised variant of the algorithm runs on 1,200 logical qubits. On a superconducting computer with surface code error correction that's roughly 500K physical qubits, a 400:1 physical-to-logical ratio. The surface code is conservative, assuming only four-way nearest-neighbour grid connectivity. It was demonstrated last year by Google on a real quantum computer.
→ future gains: Low-hanging fruit is still being picked, with at least one of the Google optimisations resulting from a surprisingly simple observation. Interestingly, AI was not (yet!) tasked to find optimisations. This was also the first time authors such as Craig Gidney attacked elliptic curves (as opposed to RSA). Shor logical qubit count could plausibly go under 1K soonish.
→ error correction: The physical-to-logical ratio for superconducting computers could go under 100:1. For superconducting computers that would be mean ~100K physical qubits for a CRQC, two orders of magnitude away from state of the art. Neutral atoms quantum computers are amenable to error correcting codes other than the surface code. While much slower to run, they can bring down the physical to logical qubit ratio closer to 10:1.
→ Bitcoin PoW: Commercially-viable Bitcoin PoW via Grover's algorithm is not happening any time soon. We're talking decades, possibly centuries away. This observation should help focus the discussion on ECDSA and Schnorr. (Side note: as unofficial Bitcoin security researcher, I still believe Bitcoin PoW is cooked due to the dwindling security budget.)
→ team quality: The folks at Google Quantum AI are the real deal. Craig Gidney (@CraigGidney) is arguably the world's top quantum circuit optimisooor. Just last year he squeezed 10x out of Shor for RSA, bringing the physical qubit count down from 10M to 1M. Special thanks to the Google team for patiently answering all my newb questions with detailed, fact-based answers. I was expecting some hype, but found none.

[Matthew Green @matthew_d_green]

Here’s a good article about Meta’s very frustrating decision to pull encryption out of Instagram. https://t.co/ajH18YCDZK