﷽
Since the online commotion around istighatha has somewhat subsided, I wanted to shed light on this post for the unbiased reader. Most of what was written on this topic was weak, but this was probably the best-written Salafi position of all I read on my timeline, so it deserves a response. Let’s break it down.
First, let’s remember how the fuqahaʾ derived general fiqhī principles (قواعد كلية). They examined individual legal cases (جزئيات فقهية), and from there, they derived the general principles from these particulars. To determine the validity of these general principles, they tested them through application to determine if they really are consistent and applicable. If a general principle yields incorrect results, it is disregarded and revised.
I also want to state that I will examine this post not from the lens of an Ashʿari but using basic logical and legal reasoning that everyone should agree with. I also do not intend to prove istighatha is permissible. I only want to examine whether the conditions in the OP yield the intended results on a consistent basis.
With this short introduction, let’s examine Abdulrahman’s (AR) post:
“The Salafi position is that it is 𝐧𝐨𝐭 shirk to seek help from creatures under the following conditions:”
He is going to lay out 3 conditions. From this, we understand that seeking help should only be acceptable if all three 3 conditions are met. If one condition is not met, the ruling of shirk stands. Similar to when we say, the conditions of salah are intention, facing the qibla, cleanliness, etc. If any one of the conditions is absent, the salah is invalid.
“1) The one being called upon must be 𝐩𝐡𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐲 𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐭.”
To properly understand this, we need to know what physically present means.
If I call 911 and seek assistance from an agent who is not physically with me, does that consequent shirk? That is obviously not true. I don’t think he means this.
So physically present is not to be used as when someone says, “I attended the meeting physically, while Zayed attended virtually.”
What if we say the condition of the one being called for assistance being physically present refers to someone I can establish a sensory connection with, regardless of where they are in the universe? Whether they are in a spaceship or a different continent or three feet away? It is acceptable if I can establish a connection through my senses with them (e.g., I can see them or hear them somehow), but if I cannot establish a connection, it is not.
Ok, what about if someone is on a ship in the middle of a thunderstorm and the ship is sinking? That person then calls on the radio, “Mayday,!!” but no one responds back. He isn’t even sure if anyone can hear him but just acting on the possibility and hope that his signal will go through. Has this person committed shirk, and if he dies, he dies a kafir?
I don’t believe so, and I don’t think Salafies would, either. So maybe they would revise the definition of “physically present” to mean someone with whom it is ordinarily possible (ممكن عادي) to establish a sensory connection with.
But a few issues will now arise. If we use “ordinarily possible,” then this leaves no room for miracles (karamāt). Take, for example, the famous story of Sayyidunā ʿUmar when he called "O Sāriyah, the mountain!" This is not ordinarily possible and, therefore, would be in violation of the “physically present” condition.
If you say but Sayyidunā ʿUmar was not seeking help, he was giving help. I would say it proves the same thing, calling to people without establishing an ordinarily possible sensory connection. Furthermore, if Sayyidunā ʿUmar can offer help through non-physical means, why wouldn’t I be able to request help through non-physical means?
If this last response does not convince you, consider what AR said later in his post in reference to the issue of Imam Ahmad calling on angels, “2) The hadith indicated that the angels were both 𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐭 and 𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 to assist in such situations.”
From the indication of AR’s context and reasoning, which will be examined later, we can infer that AR believes angels can qualify the condition of “physically present.” Since sensory communication with angels is not ordinarily possible, then understanding “physically present” to mean someone with whom it is ordinarily possible to establish a sensory connection with is no longer valid.
If you say, but the belief that angels were present was established through the hadīth, and the hadīth is weak? I would say the hadīth only stated, “For indeed, Allah has servants whom we do not see,” and did not establish a possible sensory connection.
Therefore, “physically present” must be revised to mean someone with whom a sensory connection is generally possible, whether ordinarily or not.
When considering condition (1) on its own, this understanding would entail that calling upon angels or the spirits of the righteous, or even an alive distant shaykh, would fulfill the condition. Therefore, the act would not be qualified as shirk and this is not the intended result of the author.
So AR would have to either accept that calling on these entities fulfills his condition of “physically present,” or provide a new definition that I haven’t mentioned above, or prove my reasoning to be faulty.
“2) They must be 𝐜𝐚𝐩𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 of fulfilling the request.”
This is an interesting condition. The reason is all groups believe that it would be nonsense to seek aid from the incapable. The sufī that calls upon the spirits of the righteous believes that these spirits are in a way capable (please note the Ashʿari understanding of capable is significantly different from the Salafi understanding)and believes that Allah has made them an ordinary means for achieving some requests.
Therefore, the point of dispute is not the belief of capability but whether the called-upon entity is actually capable or not. But things get a little muddy now, and two new questions must be addressed.
(a) What if someone mistakenly believes an entity is capable when it is actually not?
(b) How do we determine whether or not an entity is capable?
Let’s start with (a)
We should all agree that if someone with an advanced disease asks a world-renowned physician, “Please cure me,” he would not be committing shirk. He is someone who is following the ordinary means of cure and medicine.
But what if someone mistakenly asks a hospital administrator the same question, believing he or she is a doctor? I don’t think any sane person would say they committed shirk. They would say the person made a mistake based on a false belief.
What if someone goes to a regular physician who does not have the necessary tools from a medical standpoint, but the sick person believes that this physician is skilled and can cure him and asks that question? He continues to call for his help despite being told by others that this doctor is incapable of helping you. Is he now a kafir?
In all of these situations, being mistaken in the belief of “capability” is not enough to take the person out of the fold of Islam and call him a mushrik.
Now, let’s discuss point (b). How do we determine capability?
Salafies usually say that believing in something to be a cause while it is not a cause is a form of shirk (this shirk can be akbar or asghar; however, we are only concerned with shirk akbar in this discussion).
Salafies also say causes are either a:
Sharʿi cause (sabab sharʿī): refers to a cause established by religious texts, such as prayer (duʿāʾ) or charity (ṣadaqa) leading to divine blessings.
Qadari cause (sabab qadari): refers to a natural or ordinary cause based on the laws of the universe, such as medicine leading to healing or fire causing burning.
So now, consider a person that goes to his alive sufī shaykh and says, “Please cure me!” based on his particular belief that his shaykh has a special connection with Allah and his shaykh’s duʿāʾs are answered. Would this be an acceptable form of shariʿi capability, then?
Wasn’t it narrated in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, "There may be a disheveled, dusty servant who, if he swears by Allah, He will fulfill it."
What if someone, through a combination of sharʿī supportive evidence and qadari experiences, believes in the agency of righteous spirits?
Take Ibn al-Qayyim’s words, for example, in Kitāb al-Rūḥ:
“A soul that is liberated from the captivity of the body, its attachments, and its impediments enjoys a degree of agency, strength, penetration, aspiration, swift ascent toward God, and attachment to Him that a base, imprisoned soul—bound by the body’s attachments and hindrances—cannot attain. If this is the case while the soul remains confined within its body, how much more so when it becomes disembodied, separates from it, and its faculties are fully united? If, in its original essence, it is a noble, pure, great soul endowed with lofty aspiration, then, after departing from the body, it assumes a different status and manifests a distinct agency.
Indeed, visions reported across various classes of humanity have consistently attested to the actions of souls after death, performing feats they could not accomplish while still connected to the body. These include the defeat of vast armies by a single soul, or two, or a small number, and similar occurrences. How often has it been seen in dreams that the Prophet, accompanied by Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, through their souls, vanquished the forces of disbelief and oppression? Consequently, the armies of the latter were overcome and broken, despite their numerical superiority and strength, in contrast to the weakness and scarcity of the believers.”
" فللروح الْمُطلقَة من أسر الْبدن وعلائقه وعوائقه من التَّصَرُّف وَالْقُوَّة والنفاذ والهمة وَسُرْعَة الصعُود إِلَى الله والتعلق بِاللَّه مَا لَيْسَ للروح المهينة المحبوسة فِي علائق الْبدن وعوائقه فَذا كَانَ هَذَا وَهِي محبوسة فِي بدنهَا فَكيف إِذا تجردت وفارقته وَاجْتمعت فِيهَا قواها وَكَانَت فِي أصل شَأْنهَا روحا علية زكيه كَبِيرَة ذَات همة عالية فَهَذِهِ لَهَا بعد مُفَارقَة الْبدن شَأْن آخر وَفعل آخروَقد تَوَاتَرَتْ الرُّؤْيَا فِي أَصْنَاف بنى آدم على فعل الْأَرْوَاح بعد مَوتهَا مَا لَا تقدر على مثله حَال اتصالها بِالْبدنِ من هزيمَة الجيوش الْكَثِيرَة بِالْوَاحِدِ والاثنين وَالْعدَد الْقَلِيل وَنَحْو ذَلِك وَكم قد رئى النَّبِي وَمَعَهُ أَبُو بكر وَعمر فِي النّوم قد هزمت أَرْوَاحهم عَسَاكِر الْكفْر وَالظُّلم فَإِذا بجيوشهم مغلوبة مَكْسُورَة مَعَ كَثْرَة عَددهمْ وعددهم وَضعف الْمُؤمنِين"
If you say well, Ibn al-Qayyim is a great scholar, but he is mistaken, I would say fine, but wasn’t it just shown that being mistaken in a belief of agency, potency, and capability does not qualify for shirk?
“3) When it comes to 𝐮𝐧𝐬𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐛𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐬 like angels, we cannot just assume their presence—there must be specific 𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐫𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 affirming their presence in that particular situation in a way that makes them capable of responding.”
I just showed how the first two conditions are invalid and do not yield the author’s intended result. This third condition, in a way, is closely associated with the first one. AR states that we cannot assume the presence of unseen beings without particular textual evidence. He uses this to absolve himself of the obligation to affirm shirk to Imam Ahmad.
This is interesting because it appears that AR used the following thought process:
- Calling upon the unseen is an act of worship
- Since the default rule regarding acts of worship is to refrain and restrict unless the text proves otherwise
- Therefore, we can only call on the unseen if textual proof is available
This would be true if the result of the act in the absence of textual proof is haram.
This can be generalized as: A haram act would be permissible if evidence from revelation is provided.
There is nothing wrong with this statement, we all would agree to it.
But AR is saying that it is shirk, not haram. This is akin to him saying:
Shirk would be permissible if evidence from revelation is provided.
Which is an absolutely absurd statement that has no equivalent in Islam. Matters of halal and harm can hinge on textual evidence, but matters of shirk and iman absolutely cannot!
Imagine saying that associating buddha with God would be fine and acceptable if there was evidence from revelation!! How can a particular piece of evidence from revelation undermine the most basic foundations of faith?!
Another issue here is what about the lay person? Since AR believes shirk or iman can hinge on the authenticity of a hadīth, and it has been established by consensus that doing taqleed of Imam Ahmad on matters of fiqh and hadīth is acceptable. Then, if a person cannot independently examine this hadīth’s chain of narrators and is to choose, for example, to do taqleed of either Imam Ahmad or Sh. Ibn Bin Baz, chooses to do taqleed of Imam Ahmad; would that make him a mushrik? Or is it not shirk for him to call on angels but shirk for the one following Ibn Baz? So if this person does it, he is in Jannah, and if the other person does the same thing, he is in hell?
Again, this would be absurd on so many levels.
What if one is to consider another hadīth, say that of Mālik al-Dār as narrated in Fatḥ al-Barī where Ibn Hajar said:
“Ibn Abī Shayba narrated with a sound chain of transmission (isnād ṣaḥīḥ), from the narration of Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Sammān, from Mālik al-Dārī—who was ʿUmar’s treasurer—who said: “A drought afflicted the people during the time of ʿUmar. A man came to the grave of the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, and said, ‘O Messenger of God, seek rain for your community, for they are perishing.’ Subsequently, the man was approached in a dream and told, ‘Go to ʿUmar…’”
Would a lay person, who is incapable of examining chains of transmission, be a mushrik if he decided to do taqleed of Ibn Hajar instead of al-Albani (who weakness the hadīth) and act upon it?! Or would it not be shirk for him and shirk for the followers of al-Albani?
Yes, disagreement can exist over what constitutes shirk and what does not, but one cannot simultaneously maintain contradictory stances. AR’s position implies that he must affirm that invoking angels or the Prophet, peace be upon him, is not shirk but rather a Sunnah and a righteous practice of the Salaf if performed by followers of Imam Ahmad and Ibn Hajar. Yet, he simultaneously holds that the same act, when performed by followers of Ibn Baz and al-Albani, constitutes shirk and is deserving punishment. Even if AR were to argue that laypeople are prohibited from following Imam Ahmad or Ibn Hajar on this issue, this wouldn’t work. To be consistent, he must declare it shirk to adopt Imam Ahmad’s view on the authenticity of the hadīth, branding anyone who does so a mushrik, while simultaneously exempting Imam Ahmad himself. Such a position is very difficult to reconcile while being unbiased and consistent in one’s approach. It is also unprecedented in Islamic tradition that a person can be declared a mushrik if he accepts a qualified scholar’s judgment on the authenticity of a hadīth.
AR also assumes that Imam Ahmad only acted on the hadīth because he believed in its authenticity. However, this is an unsubstantiated claim. It is possible that Imam Ahmad acted on this hadīth because (1) he considered it from the virtues of deeds (فضائل الأعمال) and (2) he didn’t see it to contradict the basic foundations of faith. This latter point is something that Salafies would have trouble accepting but still remains a valid possibility that they haven’t proven to be wrong.
Ibn Abī Yaʿlā narrated from Imam Ahmad that he said, “When we narrate from the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, concerning the lawful and the forbidden, we are strict with the chains of transmission; but when we narrate from the Prophet, peace be upon him, regarding the virtues of deeds and matters that neither establish nor abrogate a legal ruling, we are lenient with the chains of transmission.”
In conclusion, I have shown that these conditions can yield absurd claims that I don’t believe the author or competent reader would hold. Absurd consequences only reflect on their premises, revealing the inherent flaws undermining their validity. As such, I feel that Salafies that want to hold that istighatha is shirk need to go back to the drawing board and work on a valid and consistent set of conditions that would not entail such problems.
والله من وراء القصد وهو الهادي إلى سواء السبيل
People tend to believe that Maturidis are better suited to provide a theodicy, but I think Asharism has a theodicy already built in that is vastly under-appreciated - there's a deeper metaphysical picture that is missed. /1
The Reasons Behind God’s Actions and Wisdom According to Ibn Ḥazm:
“Abū Muḥammad said: They said: ‘The wise person among us only acts for a sound reason (ʿillah), whereas the foolish person acts without any reason.’ Thus they analogized their Lord, Exalted is He, to themselves, and said: ‘Indeed, Allah does not do anything except for the interests of His servants…’
Abū Muḥammad said: This corrupt proposition nearly becomes a foundational principle for every form of disbelief on earth.”
See: Al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām (6/227).
Copied from Sh. Sami al-Sumayrī
@AndaluciMaliki1@hashimiyy_ Yeah that’s not what he said and I don’t know of any Hanafi who understood his words to mean what you are taking it to mean.
To each his own.
@hashimiyy_ Thanks akhi, I’m not interested in pursuing this discussion further because it is clear to me that Al Jassas is simply talking from a purely technical standpoint and in no way does he hold ill beliefs towards the companions.
For many people, this issue becomes much clearer when you point that it also means Allah ﷻ cannot stop creating. Meaning, Allah cannot will to annihilate everyone and everything at any given time, except that at the same time He creates something else. According to this view, stopping to create is just as impossible as a square triangle.
IT states that whoever is creating in actuality is more perfect than who can create by potential. However, it is hard to picture the inability to stop creating as a perfection.
What started off, according to IT, as a “perfection” ends as a clear “inability” or “deficiency.”
A.Dawa brings a good point. IT's position of perpetual creation entails that God's perfection is contingent on Him continuously creating. So God is in need of the creation. The Sunnis held 'God always had the ability to create', not that he's always -
https://t.co/mE6irzLxU3
My spine shuddered at this nightmare of an explanation.
1) He attributed movement to the Creator of movement. Imām al-Ṭabarī says movement is negated for Allāh by consensus of Ahl al-Qiblah, and he even uses this as a refutation of the Muʿtazilah when they claim the Qurʾān is created. Imām Junayd al-Baghdādī said that knowing Allāh creates the movements and stillness of creatures is fundamental to tawḥīd.
2) His analogy was disastrous and resulted in a contradiction within his own creed. It resembles the analogy of water, ice, and vapor used to convey the Trinity, which results in heresy: modalism.
The very same issue occurs here. His analogy results in the “heresy” of taʾwīl. He used his intellect to negate the impossibility of entering creation and said the descent was merely his God’s body coming closer to creation. The second aspect he interpreted away is that only an attribute, or worse, a portion of Allāh moves downward. How can one critique the muʾawwil who says one of His actions, mercy, descends while holding such a position?
3) His moving downward to analogize the attributes of Allāh is even worse than when a man gestured with his own hands to discuss Allāh’s Hands. Imām Mālik ordered the amputation of this man’s hand. One can only wonder what this esteemed Imām of the Salaf would say regarding him.
“In summary: Any attempt by the admirers of Ibn Taymiyyah to undermine the Ash‘ari school by claiming it lacks authenticity through historical deconstruction ultimately collapses when faced with the enduring presence of the Maturidi school and the Tahawiyyah Creed of the Hanafi tradition. This is because the Ash‘ari school aligns with both, indicating a shared foundational origin and proving that the creed of Ahl al-Sunnah is inherited and existed prior to all these scholars.”
The Approach of Using Historical Deconstruction to Undermine the Ash‘ari School
By Shaykh Ahmad al-Damanhuri
[1]
Attempts to dismantle the Ash‘ari school by claiming it is an innovated or foreign doctrine — while asserting that the so-called "Madhhab of Ahl al-Hadith," exclusively as defined by Ibn Taymiyyah, is the authentic one — falls apart when confronted with the Maturidi school.
The Maturidi school aligns with the Ash‘ari creed without being influenced by figures like ‘Jahm ibn Safwan’, ‘al-Ja‘d ibn Dirham,’ nor did they know ‘Ibn Kullab.’ It definitely did not adopt ideas from the Ash‘ari school itself, nor did its early scholars know of Ash‘ari scholars at all. Moreover, the Maturidi school was not known to be influenced by Greek philosophy; in fact, its scholars, such as al-Maturidi himself, explicitly prohibited studying philosophical texts, as stated in his book Ta'wilat al-Qur'an.
In other words, the rational arguments within this school are fundamentally rooted in the Qur'an — a Qur'an that is understood through the insights of scholars, not through the interpretations of the common folk. The scholars who possess the intellectual tools required to uncover meanings that ordinary people cannot grasp without proper training.
Al-Maturidi emerged as a defender of the Ahl al-Sunnah creed approximately half a century before al-Ash‘ari. Due to his long life, al-Maturidi later became a contemporary of al-Ash‘ari. Additionally, Imam Abu Ja‘far al-Tahawi of Egypt was also their contemporary. Al-Maturidi passed away in 333 AH, while al-Ash‘ari passed away in 324 AH, and Abu Ja‘far al-Tahawi in 321 AH.
These three are among the prominent figures of authentic Sunni belief, a creed that was universally accepted and embraced. They never sat together in the same gathering, nor were they known to have studied under the same teacher.
One of them appeared in Iraq, the second in Egypt, and the third in Samarkand. Yet despite this geographical and educational separation, their views were in agreement — indicating that they were merely inheritors of the beliefs of the Companions.
They refined, preserved, and defended these inherited beliefs, and it was through their efforts that the title "Ahl al-Sunnah" became associated with them.
[2]
The creed of Ahl al-Sunnah was inherited from the Companions, may Allah be pleased with them. This creed comprises two key elements: affirmation and refutation.
Affirmation (Taqreer): This involves deducing the obligatory beliefs from the Qur'an and Sunnah, identifying them, articulating them clearly, and explaining their meanings.
Refutation (Daf‘): This includes presenting these beliefs through rational argumentation, refuting the doubts raised by opponents, and correcting the misunderstandings of those who fail to grasp the correct meanings. This method was an essential practice among the companions themselves, may Allah be pleased with them.
Al-Baghdadi states:
"The first mutakallim among the Companions was ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib — may Allah honor his face — who debated the Khawarij regarding issues of divine promise and warning, and debated the Qadariyyah regarding matters of divine will, ability, and decree. Then, ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar, may Allah be pleased with them both, disassociated himself from Ma‘bad al-Juhani for his denial of qadar (divine decree)."
Al-Baghdadi continues by mentioning prominent scholars from the early generations who defended true belief, including: ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, Zayd ibn ‘Ali, Al-Sha‘bi, Al-Zuhri, Ja‘far ibn Muhammad al-Sadiq.
He then adds:
"The first of the mutakallimīn among the jurists and scholars of the madhhabs were Abu Hanifah and al-Shafi‘i... and the most skilled among them in these sciences was Abu al-‘Abbas ibn Surayj. After them came Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘ari, who became a thorn in the throats of the Qadariyyah."
Al-Baghdadi further mentions al-Ash‘ari’s students and the prominent scholars of various disciplines from this Ummah who accepted his methodology, affirming that his approach was consistent with what the earlier generations held before him.
From this, it becomes clear that criticizing these scholars by claiming that some early salaf opposed ‘ilm al-kalam (theological discourse) is baseless.
First: The criticism of ‘ilm al-kalam was directed at versions that included innovations, not the legitimate use of rational argumentation to defend true beliefs.
Second: The opposition to ‘ilm al-kalam was the opinion of some, not all. The claim that the early generations held a unified stance in rejecting ‘ilm al-kalam is a misconception that persists among many researchers.
[3]
The Maturidi school prevailed in the eastern regions of the Muslim world, with the scholars of Bukhara and Samarkand adhering to it from the early centuries up to the present day. This continuity persisted without alteration or development, without being subjected to the claims directed at the Ash‘ari school regarding its alleged interaction with philosophy in its later stages or claims that it evolved or underwent differences in interpretation. Claims that are used to deconstruct the Ash‘ari school! As if differences in branches (furu‘) nullify agreement on fundamentals (usul)!
The Ash‘ari school, on the other hand, emerged in Baghdad and did not spread beyond it until approximately the year 380 AH, around fifty years after al-Ash‘ari’s passing. Its initial spread was to Greater Syria (al-Sham), not to the eastern regions.
Meanwhile, the Maturidis in the eastern regions and the Hanafis in Egypt refuted the views of Ibn Kullab and some Ash‘ari positions that had reached them. In fact, they were initially unaware of the true nature of the Ash‘ari school, and some even regarded it as an innovative doctrine until they realized that it was actually an extension of the beliefs held by the Companions, just as they believed.
Thus, when the early Maturidi scholars used the term "Ahl al-Sunnah", they were referring specifically to the Hanafi-Maturidi tradition. Over time, however, their understanding merged with that of the Ash‘ari school in agreement.
Many of the deconstructionist claims also collapse before the solid rock of the Tahawi creed, whose meanings they insist on distorting. This creed which is an agreed-upon Sunni doctrine by consensus and widely accepted by the Muslim ummah. Its author, Abu Ja‘far al-Tahawi, was a Hanafi, and all its commentators — except Ibn Abi al-‘Izz — were Hanafi-Maturidi scholars.
[4]
Some of those engaged in scholarship have not rid themselves of ideological bias, no matter how much they claim otherwise. This is simply because they are ready to draw from the philosophers of the East and West, and even from Orientalists, due to their aversion toward the immense heritage written by the Ash‘aris and Maturidis. They find solace in the writings of Orientalists, which place them above this heritage because, in truth, they do not belong to it. Affiliation with Ibn Taymiyyah alone necessarily entails an aversion to the majority of the ummah’s scholars, both before and after him.
These individuals simply wish to portray the Ash‘ari school as alien to Islamic culture and the Islamic spirit, so they search for every stray detail and argument to confirm these fantasies.
The undeniable truth is that the People of the Sunnah existed before al-Ash‘ari, and al-Ash‘ari was merely a codifier of their doctrine. Thus, the spread or lack thereof of the Ash‘ari school does not harm it. Even if God had not created al-Ash‘ari or al-Maturidi, these doctrines would remain as they are today. The ummah was Ash‘ari before al-Ash‘ari and Maturidi before al-Maturidi in this sense. Affiliation with these two imams is akin to affiliation with Hafs in Qur’anic recitation: the Qur’an was recited in this manner before him. All that happened was that he popularized it, devoted attention to it, and as a result, people became affiliated with him!
From this, one can see the naivety of the claim that the Companions were neither Ash‘aris nor Maturidis. Indeed, they were neither Hanbalis nor Shafi‘is in jurisprudence, nor did they follow Hafs or Warsh in recitation!
They were not Hanafis, yet they were Hanafis in their methodologies, modes of reasoning, and juristic preferences. They were neither Ash‘aris nor Maturidis, yet they were Ash‘aris and Maturidis in their approaches, understanding, and methods of reasoning.
These critics consistently overlook a historical reality: the Salaf were not of a single opinion or a single trend. Just as there were the Ahl al-Hadith, who disapproved of delving into matters of creed using reason, there was an opposing group that saw it as commendable to engage in such discussions to defend the religion from distortion. Both were from the Salaf. Thus, attempting to confine the Salaf to a single direction is a mistake and an ignorance of reality and history.
[5]
No researcher in Islamic studies can be considered fair if they confine themselves to the ideological framework of Ibn Taymiyyah or anyone else. Nor can they be deemed impartial if they believe that all truth lies exclusively within one particular school of thought. Similarly, they cannot be just if they assess opposing views through a narrow sectarian lens.
Islamic heritage is far broader than such limited perceptions, and truth cannot be confined to a single individual who appeared in the eighth Hijri century.
In truth, I feel sympathy for these people who tirelessly seek to validate their preconceived notions by every means except submitting to the demands of honest academic research.
I ask Allah to guide them and correct their missteps.
In summary: Any attempt by the admirers of Ibn Taymiyyah to undermine the Ash‘ari school by claiming it lacks authenticity through historical deconstruction ultimately collapses when faced with the enduring presence of the Maturidi school and the Tahawiyyah Hanafi Creed. This is because Ash‘ari school aligns with both, indicating a shared foundational origin and proving that the creed of Ahl al-Sunnah is inherited and existed prior to all these scholars.
From this, we can understand the reason behind the persistent criticism specifically directed at the Hanafis, both directly and indirectly, as well as the unfounded attacks on their Imam — accusations often made by those described as possessing foolish minds. Or at the very least, some others have shown discomfort or unease toward him, may Allah have mercy on him. Simply because they can find no viable means to criticize him except through defamation — whether in matters of precise jurisprudential reasoning or in the purely inherited creed that remains untainted by any flaw.
Abdul Rahman says “there's no such thing as "prior capacity" in the standard Ash'ari view.”
I’m not sure where he gets this but here is al-Amir al-Kabeer in his amazing work Maṭlaʿ al-Nayyirayn. Similar statements with more detailed explanations can be easily found elsewhere.
@Bilaali1876@ZouhairsMurid I think they can and they do. This isn’t meant to be conclusive proof but rather to keep showing and proving they have to reinterpret many verses and ahadeeth, away from what is generally understood of them, to fit their framework.
“Ashʿaris deny that God acts with purpose”
REALLY?!
So, I’ve seen this statement made many times. Do the Ashʿaris really believe that God’s acts are purposeless?
Let’s talk about it. 🧵
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Abdul Rahman here is not being entirely forthcoming and honest with this response. He is framing IT’s opinion as based in scripture and transmission as if IT is simply trying to reconcile between what he sees as contradictory statements in the Quran and Hadeeth. Abdul Rahman sees this as acceptable ijtihad even if it leads to an unacceptable result. He then contrasts this with other methodologies such as using philosophy or logic to reinterpret the transmitted texts.
The problem is this is incorrect, and maybe dishonest. IT’s position here is actually almost entirely driven by philosophy. IT accepts the annihilation of hell because he is not able to reconcile eternal hell with his position of good and evil being rooted in reason (al-ḥusn wa-al-qubḥ al-ʿaqlī). IT here takes on a philosophical position, attacks Asharies because they believe in good and evil being rooted in revelation not reason, then found the belief of eternal hell to pose a severe thelological dilemma that is difficult for him to escape, thus compelling him to adopt the view of the annilation of hell.
This is what serious salafi scholars, such as Sami al-Samiri, understand:
"However, what many Salafī researchers bypass in this issue is the truly difficult question that Ibn al-Qayyim himself grappled with, used by those who denied rational moral goodness and evil (al-taḥsīn wa-al-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqliyyān) against those that affirm rational moral goodness and evil and the rational causation/wisdom behind God’s acts. The question is:
What is the wisdom that returns either to God or to the inhabitants of Hell from eternity? And does everlasting punishment accord with divine justice, mercy, wisdom, and beneficence?"
Agree with IT or not, but this is the true representation of IT's belief and the reasoning behind it. Just another philosopher using philosophy and kalam to try and understand revelation. Just like many of the scholars IT attacked.
May Allah have mercy on them all.
Professor Abdulfadel al-Qusi states what I mentioned above in his amazing work Notes on al-Iqtisad:
"Then see Ibn Taymiyyah’s detailed critique of al-Rāzī’s argument in Darʾ Taʿāruḍ (210/2). Also see Ibn al-Qayyim’s detailed critique of these arguments as well in Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl p. 417 and what follows thereafter, in support of divine causality/purpose (taʿlīl). They carried the [belief and support of divine causality/purpose] to its furthest extent until it ultimately led them to the view of the annihilation of Hellfire. See Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl p. 492 and what follows thereafter. And to Allah belongs the command before and after.”
Professor Abdulfadel al-Qusi states what I mentioned above in his amazing work Notes on al-Iqtisad:
"Then see Ibn Taymiyyah’s detailed critique of al-Rāzī’s argument in Darʾ Taʿāruḍ (210/2). Also see Ibn al-Qayyim’s detailed critique of these arguments as well in Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl p. 417 and what follows thereafter, in support of divine causality/purpose (taʿlīl). They carried the [belief and support of divine causality/purpose] to its furthest extent until it ultimately led them to the view of the annihilation of Hellfire. See Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl p. 492 and what follows thereafter. And to Allah belongs the command before and after.”
The difference between a mutakalim and a philosopher is that the mutakalim’s framework is derived from the shariah and the success of the framework depends on how well the framework fits with transmitted reports. So IT here is just another mutakalim practicing kalam just like the other mutakalimun. My issue is trying to portray IT’s position as an isolated tafseer issue using only athar and not a kalam issue.
@BelalHaowshar I don’t care that you don’t care. I’m just exposing your groups’ attempt to soften the heretical position of IT on this issue as a pure textual ijtihad when it is backed on complex philosophical assumptions.