@BowTiedYanqui@twtayaan What do you mean you canโt? Get an OWC docking station and connect a TB 4/5 cable. Single cable to charge and use two external monitors
@mattpocockuk I use Freestyle on GitHub with no issues. Using Parakeet and OSS for cleanup. Hosted via OpenRouter and Groq. Cost me less than 3 cents a month
@claudeai@trq212 Yeah, first cut your usage in half from what was promised, and then extended last minute when everybody already ran out. Great customer service.
@Spotify@PopBase Make it lighter and keep it. Enough of morning static and flat logos. The world has gone mad from nba teams, to iPhone apps. Everything is so boring these days. This is 10x better
@ErRahul337 Must be blind then? Best thing Spotify done in a while since releasing HiFi. The flat static logos and minimalisms needs to go. Logos used to be fun
@progressive 8 weeks. Dozens of calls. Reached my adjuster twice. She doesn't answer her phone or emails. Support just transfers me back to her voicemail.
Uninsured motorist hit my car in Dallas while I reside out of state. Check was sent to the wrong address twice โ second time I got an empty envelope.
I fly to Dallas Tuesday. No car, no check, no repair shop lined up because I can't get anyone on the phone. My time in Dallas is limited. I am there for business for a few weeks. My Dallas vehicle is inoperable and no one at your company can help.
Claim #26-838810914 - Can someone please escalate this?
Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack.
Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords.
LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm.
Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks.
Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages.
Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.