New blog post and tooling: Introducing Striker and the Payload Automation Libraries.
https://t.co/UhbY3veJ95
A set of Python libraries to interact with Cobalt Strike to help script and automate custom payload generation.
This is a good example of large scale security issues companies can face with AI adoption. Enterprises have years of baked in assumptions that work because people following processes do not necessarily understand the capabilities those assumptions imply. Now, potentially any user
We’re proud to introduce the Offensive AI Con 2026 Review Board.
This year, we’ve brought together 12 of the most respected minds across offensive security, AI research, and real-world adversarial operations to help shape the direction of OAIC. The CFP opens June 1st!
Think about the red teams you respect most. Now think about how they actually breach mature environments with strong stacks and strong defenders. It's almost never a memory corruption 0day. It's abuse of functionality.
If you use a personal phone/laptop for your work, pay very close attention to this little detail.
Iran attackers wipe 200k devices at a company called Stryker. Within those devices appears to be employees PERSONAL devices.
The attackers used the company’s MDM software, which is basically IT management software running on everything. It’s an incredibly attractive backdoor to an attacker. I successfully targeted MDM software for several Red Team engagements. It’s… lots of fun :)
Anyway, a lot of companies require you to install their MDM software on your personal devices before you can access resources like Corp email. It’s used to keep devices updated, lock things down if they get stolen, etc. The company often promises that they won’t access personal data, erase any personal data, etc. But this is often ONLY POLICY. If a bad actor gains access to the MDM tool, as was the case here, then anything can happen.
People should be aware of these risks. I refused to run MDM software on any of my personal devices. The company needs to provide me with hardware if they want that. I personally isolate all corp devices to their own network too. If an adversary can get into the corp laptop, then can then get inside my network… there have been cases of it happening in the past.
Companies be wildin yo. Just sat an interview where the candidate said “I don’t have a ton of experience with Cobalt Strike, but another company I interviewed with yesterday gave me one of their license keys so I could get it and do a CTF they set up”.
I've been researching the Microsoft cloud for almost 7 years now. A few months ago that research resulted in the most impactful vulnerability I will probably ever find: a token validation flaw allowing me to get Global Admin in any Entra ID tenant. Blog: https://t.co/jD6EaGtsn3
I'm SO hyped to finally make MSSQLHound public! It's a new BloodHound collector that adds 37 new edges and 7 new nodes for MSSQL attack paths using the new OpenGraph feature for 8.0!. Let me know what you find with it!
- https://t.co/Hh089SaVOS
- https://t.co/geO0HXTykf
Azure Arc is Microsoft's solution for managing on-premises systems in hybrid environments. My new blog covers how it can it be identified in an enterprise and misconfigurations that could allow it to be used for out-of-band execution and persistence. https://t.co/CI6U1M9Mbn
You can find my slide deck for @TheOffensiveX on GitHub. I also included a minimalist extension that you can build on and will load in any of the VSCode forks on any platform 👨💻⚔️
I'm happy to announce that my BOF Development and Tradecraft course on Zero Point Security is now part of their Purcharsing Parity Program (PPP). This means you can purchase the course at a potentially reduced price based on the country that you live in! https://t.co/E1wNDiLdZI
🚨 New blog post alert!
@_xpn_ drops knowledge on LLM security w/ his latest post showing how attackers can by pass LLM WAFs by confusing the tokenization process to smuggle tokens to back-end LLMs. https://t.co/NYxzwaRm5U
Okay so this is HUGE - our amazing AI red team have open sourced their AI red team labs so you can set up your own training!
https://t.co/brvdq6roHp
@ram_ssk
Back in 2023, the assessment of the pre-authentication vulnerability in SSH was that it wasn't exploitable on Linux.
For my OffensiveCon 2025 keynote, I wrote enough of an exploit to show, with the right heap groom and stabilization, it's likely exploitable. Then I tried to have AI do it.
Up to @taviso whether that merits switching to Windows 98 :)
https://t.co/KfqmJqvlJu
Me and the homies are dropping browser exploits on the red team engagement 😎. Find out how to bypass WDAC + execute native shellcode using this one weird trick -- exploiting the V8 engine of a vulnerable trusted application.
https://t.co/ykJv0sePN9