Dirk Sledgehammer

Appalachian Veteran

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

Nothing wrong with a fourth Joint Communique with authorities in Beijing. But should be subsequent to some equivalent comprehensive joint statement with the ROC (Taiwan). Such a joint statement with Taiwan should frontload reference to a US One China Policy, eg “the US agrees to (fill in the blank), in a manner consistent with the US One China Policy.” In essence, negotiating a new Joint Communique and an equivalent joint statement with Taiwan, emphasizing a US One China policy in both, constitutes a US One China, Two Governments Policy. This has a long history.

Would a Joint Statement with Taiwan support or encourage Taiwan independence? Answer is no. In fact, it makes changing the ROC Constitution very difficult. That’s why so many on the deep Green side on Taiwan are so reticent about this solution. One prominent DPP representative referred to this US One China Two Governments approach, institutionalized via a Joint Statement, as a “deal with the devil.”

How would Beijing respond to such an initiative? Yes, authorities would strongly protest. They would argue a US- ROC Joint Statement would constitute a US Two China policy. And reflect an official relationship. Truth is, it would not. US would take no position on sovereignty. It’s about relations with governments, not states. It’s about legitimacy, not sovereignty. And there are two equally legitimate governments on both sides of the TW Strait. It’s about a more accurate US representation of the status quo in the TW Strait. Ultimately, Beijing would see a US One China Two Governments policy as a true compromise solution.

A US One China, Two Governments Policy, implemented via bilateral joint statements, may place cross-Strait relations on a more stable footing. Both DPP and CCP would have to compromise. For DPP, they’d have to agree to enshrine *a* One China policy in a guiding document with the US.

Assuming their true concern is heading off Taiwan’s permanent separation from China, Beijing would at least have to tacitly accept the long overdue reset in US relations with the ROC. Most importantly, a US One China Two Governments Policy has the potential to create an environment for the two sides to restart cross-Strait dialogue and perhaps even a sustainable modus vivendi.

@stephenwertheim

[Stephen Wertheim @stephenwertheim]

When Trump and Xi meet on Thursday, they should take bold action to the reduce the risk of war over Taiwan.

My proposal in @ForeignAffairs (gift link below):

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

It’s been a couple of years since I’ve been in Taiwan. But one issue I had been monitoring over the last decade or so was what seemed like waning pro-American attitudes within Taiwan’s citizenry. This includes within the ROC armed forces, despite the uptick in bilateral military exchanges. Inconsistencies in US arms sales policy toward Taiwan was one of the many grievances. Postings by @AngelicaOung and other writers in part seem to reflect some of the underlying discontent.

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

You say this is “nothing but a disgusting network of arms dealers pulling the strings.” Yes, arms dealers are an important part of the network. But the network is much more complex.

First, need to define “arms dealers.” At the core are US defense companies, such as Lockheed, Raytheon, NG, etc. US companies usually — not always — contract with sales representatives based on Taiwan for marketing purposes. They are paid through commissions, also known as success or contingent fees. The third layer are the acquisition authorities within DoD, specifically DSCA and counterparts in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. They all get a certain percentage of sales to cover costs. These are the three levels of “arms dealers.”

But the network is much broader than this. Demand has to exist. Taiwan’s Army, Navy, and Air Force, through MND, have to formally request a defense article in the form of a letter submitted to DoD and State Department. Sales representatives often help in developing these requirements.

US defense companies are known to fund think tanks for studies and conferences that can shape the policy environment. They also sometimes hire consultants, who often moonlight while working daytime jobs in think tanks.

But it’s not all about chasing money. In the marketplace of ideas, opinions regarding Taiwan’s defense requirements has become a currency by itself. These days, there’s a general consensus in Washington DC that Taiwan needs to spend a higher percentage of taxpayer dollars on acquiring more weapons. The buzzwords include “asymmetric,” “Porcupine,” “Hellscape,” and so forth. These have become premised on the assumption that an amphibious invasion is the PLA’s course of action is the scenario to plan for. Actually, it’s only one point on a much broader spectrum of possible violence.

Think tank pundits tend to use Taiwan’s defense budget as the primary metric to judge its commitment to its own defense. The implication is “why should we sacrifice our sailors, soldiers, and airmen to defend Taiwan if it doesn’t take its own defense seriously?” This sort of perspective has a long history, dating back to US involvement in South Vietnam in the 1960s.

The problem here is that we, as Americans, can not control Taiwan. We can only control ourselves. No one knows how the US would respond to PLA use of force against Taiwan. Or what form a US intervention could take. There is no defense alliance or legal obligation to defend Taiwan. The TRA only calls for “maintaining the capacity” to respond. It’s always worth noting that PLA nuclear capabilities will almost certainly limit the scope of any US intervention.

As a final note, US focus should be on ensuring we have the military capacity to force a cessation of hostilities should conflict break out. We should make the assumption that Taiwan is incapacitated and we’re on our own. Whatever Taiwan can bring to the table, great. But whatever we do, it’s in our interests. Not Taiwan’s. We’re not sacrificing for Taiwan. It’s for ourselves.
Pushing too hard on the budget issue risks pushing taxpayers on Taiwan to see their future align more with China. We lose hearts and minds.

As a result, we should not be so concerned about how Taiwan’s taxpayers invest their money. And maybe we should even say thank you to Taiwan for buying American.

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

This quote from Steve Bannon, made in the context of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan contingency, is significant: “ppl have got to rethink what we’re doing in the Western Pacific.” Sounds like a good issue for think tanks to chew on a bit.

[Grace Chong, MBI @gc22gc]

BANNON: Can the American Navy and military defend Taiwan from a takeover by the CCP?

THAYER: We can defend Taiwan when we wed that to our nuclear deterrent.

BANNON: You’re saying the way we defend it was nuclear weapons? I find it quite hard to believe we would go up the escalatory ladder to nuclear weapons. If that’s the defense, ppl have got to rethink what we’re doing in the Western Pacific.

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

@nataliegwinters Old news:

https://t.co/1iOmz122hu

https://t.co/FYpVMgfiOr

https://t.co/1jK7ftQYW0

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

Good analysis by Bonny Lin. However, she understates the challenge posed by Chinese military coercion, or so called “gray zone tactics.” With so much attention given to an unlikely annihilation scenario these days, in the form of invasion, it’s no wonder the US is unprepared for coercive courses of action. This annihilation vs coercion debate in US planning circles goes back 25 years.

[Foreign Affairs @ForeignAffairs]

“If the United States wants to defend Taiwan, it cannot overlook the possibility that China could use gray-zone tactics to win without fighting,” writes Bonny Lin.
https://t.co/PG65RPNRmC

[Bill Bishop @niubi]

If you are a think tank or academic institution and are not willing to disclose your funding sources you do not deserve the benefit of the doubt. Why are you afraid of transparency?

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

Why would a think tank or academic institution be afraid of transparency? Several possible reasons:

1. Donor privacy. Many donors may desire anonymity to avoid criticism, unwanted attention, or political backlash. Some grant agreements include a non-disclosure agreement;

2. Competitive considerations. Think tanks may view funding sources as a trade secret. Some don’t want to have to compete for those contributions;

3. Perceptions of influence. Some organizations may believe that publicizing certain donors — including foreign governments and defense industry — could lead people to assume their research is biased, even if the donors do not influence the organization’s work;

4. FARA. Any think tank or academic institution that receives foreign government funding has to be careful to avoid even the perception of acting on behalf of a foreign principal. Public disclosure may raise questions about whether its activities are independent or whether FARA registration might be required. Beyond this, if a particular government constitutes a disproportionate share of a think tank’s overall annual income (grants and contributions), let’s say 30%, the IRS could revoke a 501C3 tax-exempt status.

The solution is for Congress to pressure the IRS to include Schedule Bs in published Form 990s, the report that 501c3 tax exempt organizations file annually. The IRS omits the Schedule B from Form 990s when they publish them (eg., listing of donors and amounts of funding).

@joshrogin

[Lyle Morris @LyleJMorris]

Excited to share this @WarOnTheRocks piece I've been contemplating and working on for a while now: "The Blind Spots in Chinese Military Studies."

My contention is the authoritative textbooks and sources published by the PLA are dwindling or becoming outdated in the face of organizational reforms and data restrictions.

The result is a community that is increasingly speculating or inferring Chinese military strategy from woefully outdated doctrinal texts, despite valiant efforts to stitch together incomplete pictures from a paucity of sources. This leads to the current challenge facing PLA watchers: deducing how the PLA will bridge the divide between military strategy and campaign-level and tactical-level operations based on outdated texts. Western analysts resort to using partial sources on particular issues to interpret the PLA's collective, authoritative guidance on the key principles of strategy and operational warfighting. This is a demanding task with a high degree of difficulty, and reasonable Western analysts can come to different conclusions. Less capable analysts are likely to mirror-image or get it wrong.

I advocate restoring the Open Source Enterprise — formally called the Foreign Broadcast Information Service — back into the public domain. This can be done by empowering existing U.S. government platforms with the capability and experience to support a reconstituted FBIS — such as the Library of Congress — to revive taxpayer-funded open-source intelligence-gathering of translations of foreign military and political news, articles, and textbooks, in particular related to the PLA. This of course will not fundamentally solve the problem, but it will help.

Thanks to David M. Finkelstein, @jwuthnow, Lonnie Henley, Dennis Blasko, Phil Saunders, Ken Allen, Chad Sbragia, Joshua Arostegui, and @NathanMBM for their helpful comments on previous drafts.

https://t.co/cPu60nylnN

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

How many retired GO/FOs take lucrative positions with businesses to top off their six figure pensions? In years past, many supported companies doing business in China and ingratiated themselves with authorities in Beijing by promoting the military-to-military relationship. George Marshall would turning over in his grave.

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

@shetlerjones @PaulJHeer How do you account for the “Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area?”

https://t.co/HerRJiWM37

[cainevares @cainevares]

Nobody gives a fuck that you are in recovery.

Nobody really gives a fuck that you are going to Alcoholics or Narcotics Anonymous.

Not your friends outside recovery.

(They don’t even understand why you go there).

Not your friends inside recovery.

(Leave the rooms and you’ll see they will forget you in a day).

Not even your family.

(Your mom, dad, brother’s or sister’s? They probably think those meetings are wierd).

What’s actually important is that you are doing this only and exclusively for yourself.

Stop searching for anyone’s validation.

Start focusing on what your real needs are in the process of recovery.

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

Su Chi says Taiwan, US should define Taiwan Strait status quo. I’d argue the US should define the status quo as the existence of two equally legitimate governments on both sides of the Strait. So why don’t we extend equal political legitimacy to both?

https://t.co/82UTMwoWXL

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

@JustinTLogan @ewong Fascinating. Thanks for posting.

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

@jekavanagh @AsiaLens

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

@elyratner @ForeignAffairs

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

@FDD @MarkCMontgomery @eyckfreymann The salt of the earth in Appalachian America most certainly can’t answer why Taiwan matters.

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

@AngelicaOung @AsiaSociety @orvilleschell @dannyrrussel Here’s a quote from former KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou from 2010, in response to a question from CNN:

“Well the Republic of China on Taiwan has been independent sovereign state for 99 years. There is no reason to declare independence twice.”

https://t.co/D8APfVlUnk?

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

Sensible analysis by Jessica Liao and COL Kyle Marcrum on Taiwan’s special budget wrangling.

https://t.co/TMXKI0Ke7w

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

@PLMattis @KuangshunYang Agreed. Plus, symbolism is substance when it comes to Taiwan and US policy.

[Dirk Sledgehammer @BuzzKillian88]

@michaelturton Based on my experience, I think you’re right. I spent a lot of time with Taishang communities in the Kunshan and Jiashan areas, some with deep Blue affiliations. There was a distinct divide between them and the locals. The most common theme was “looking down” on each other.

[PowerWVNow @PowerWVNow]

"National security doesn’t begin at the Pentagon. It begins at the factories and power lines that keep America’s defense industry running. It begins right here in West Virginia."