Mykhailo Fedorov reiterated in a statement to journalists this afternoon that he will accept no other role than defense minister after Zelenskyy fired him and offered him numerous other positions.
“Today there are only three positions in the country that, alongside the troops on the battlefield, actually shape the course of the war: the President of Ukraine, the Minister of Defense, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” Fedorov said.
“That is why I will not accept any position other than Minister of Defense. No other role carries the actual authority to combat procurement corruption, complete the army's transformation, plan and execute asymmetric operations against the enemy, root out a culture of lies and unaccountability within the system, or finish the initiatives our team has already started at the defense ministry.”
Thought De Larrea was the best passer I saw at Summer League. Think the open space in the NBA really helped him find angles that weren’t always there in the slower, tighter FIBA game.
Zaccharie Risacher is joining one of the roughest developmental environments for his play-finisher skillset in the NBA
Dallas is one of just 2 teams with a bottom 10 rank in AST% (60.6), Moreyball% (65.2), Spot-Up Frequency (21.9%) & Spot-Up PPP (1.01) in the last 2 years!
The Dallas Mavericks have matched the New York Knicks' two-year, $4.7 million offer sheet on restricted free agent Moussa Cisse, Yann Balikouzou and Kevin Bradbury of LIFT Sports Management tell ESPN. The 6-foot-11 center signed the Knicks sheet earlier Saturday but Dallas matches well before 48-hour Monday deadline.
A “compromise position” for Fedorov is unlikely to work. The defense minister’s authority is defined by law, and any alternative or newly created role would be largely honorary.
Only the defense minister has the legal authority to implement regulatory and procurement reforms.
So much domestic political turmoil in Kyiv this week that we all nearly forgot that Russian air attacks on the Ukrainian capital were still a threat. But tonight Russian ballistic missiles are targeting the city and the roar of explosions has jolted people from their beds. Kyiv is under attack once again. The difference from previous weeks is that Patriot interceptors can be heard after a new delivery arrived recently.
Yesterday and today have been filled with consultations. Of course, I hear what people are saying. Today, I spoke at length with Mykhailo Fedorov. I also spoke with Oleksandr Syrskyi today. Decisions regarding the army will be worked out.
Thank you to everyone who cares about Ukraine. Thank you to everyone defending our positions on the front line and to those doing their best to bring the war back home – to Russia, where it came from. Glory to Ukraine!
Change is inevitable.
You thanked me for Mriya and Diia. In return, I thank you for giving me hope.
I’ve never felt a responsibility this great — not even while serving in government.
Thank you to our veterans and service members for holding the line and upholding our honor.
The dialogue is happening. I believe we will succeed.
The Moussa Cisse offer sheet from Knicks starts at veterans minimum of $2.5M, per league source. If Mavs don’t match offer sheet by 11:59 pm on Monday, Knicks would land young center to bolster depth after Mitchell Robinson & Ariel Hukporti signed elsewhere. If Mavs don’t match, Knicks would lose the ability to sign their draft picks to contracts via the second round minimum while also staying under 2nd apron. So Tyler Nickel and Jack Ayil would need to agree to two-way deals to play with Knicks in ‘26-‘27. ESPN reports that Cisse offer sheet is half guaranteed in Year One and nonguaranteed in Year 2. @JakeLFischer first reported agreement.
Fedorov said he identified 11 major problems after his first month as minister of defense:
"1. Ukraine's Armed Forces are fighting at the tactical level, although increasingly at the operational level too. Still, fundamentally, "we are still fighting tactically".
2. The corps system has not yet fully taken shape. "We have corps that are successful, that advance every month and do not lose territory. And we have corps where the commander is replaced every month. There are corps that have developed their own school of thought and philosophy, and there are corps where we do not even know how many brigades they have or what is happening inside them. Everything depends on organization, but there are corps that do not distribute all their resources internally," Fedorov said.
3. Brigades and corps have been fragmented. "There are brigades that cannot even determine how many battalions they have. A battalion is pulled out of one brigade and thrown into another. It is impossible to build a management system under conditions like these," the defense minister said.
4. No one is held accountable for anything. "Responsibility is always pushed down the chain. Someone else is always made to carry the blame, there is always talk of an investigation and of 'finding out who is guilty'," Fedorov said.
5. Supplies are not routed through the corps. Fedorov said the supply problem is "fundamental": "Over the past five months, we have bought more drones than in the whole of last year, but most units have not felt the impact, because everything is distributed manually: if you are loyal, you get something, if you are not, you don't... That is why we launched this system. It was four months of hell, because it took us four months to agree on a simple project for baseline drone provision to brigades."
6. Constant replacement of commanders.
7. Isolation and toxic treatment of those who deliver results. "If you succeed, you become a star, and then you hit a dead end. [General Mykhailo] Drapatyi received his third reprimand, goodbye. Sorry, Drapatyi, I think after this speech there will be a fourth reprimand for you. I wouldn't want that to happen, but we have no choice left but to talk about it," Fedorov said.
8. It is impossible to carry out any systemic project. "Because you constantly run into the same questions: 'But why?' and 'But how?'" the acting defense minister explained.
9. Human capital is being worn down without proper analysis. Fedorov said they had carried out "a great deal of work", including analyzing losses. "But decisions about who should be supported, who should not, who should be reinforced and who should not are not based on data. They are based on loyalty," he said.
10. The blocking of initiatives and the "bureaucratic crossfire". "In six months at the Defense Ministry, we have not been able to change the organizational structure because the General Staff refuses to approve it: the name is supposedly wrong, something else is not right, or there is allegedly no need to bring in new people," Fedorov explained.
11. Constant dishonesty. "This applies to me too: claims that I ordered the investigation into Skelia, that I launched a media campaign, that I did this or that," the acting defense minister said. [The Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation is conducting a criminal probe into the Skelia unit – 425th Separate Assault Regiment – following reports of at least 26 noncombat deaths, physical abuse, and inadequate medical care for recruits. The unit's commander was suspended, and authorities are currently investigating allegations of systemic abuse – ed.]
He added that he had proposed changes on all points.
"What solutions were proposed at the time? Radical personnel decisions. That meant changing both the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff… It meant creating an environment where strong leaders could develop instead of being held back or constantly reprimanded. It meant working with IT specialists and smart people. It meant a different management approach. It meant appointing strong corps commanders. Drone-assault units are a fundamental change in the way we think about deploying infantry: technology must be at the forefront of combat. We should lose drones, not people, and only then should infantry move in," Fedorov said.
He also proposed "levelling out" the front line and implementing a doctrine based on the principle of "not losing personnel where it can be avoided", while taking the terrain and the situation into account.
"The allocation of all resources through corps – that means personnel, drones, artillery, training… Because there are situations where, ultimately, no one is responsible for a section of the front line," said the acting minister.
He also said he had proposed establishing an Academy of Modern Warfare to train new leaders capable of commanding headquarters and units, creating a consortium of Ballistics and Anti-Ballistics units, closing the skies, achieving victory in the economic war and, more broadly, transforming the defence forces and rooting out corruption in procurement.
https://t.co/fk3wrPHY6U
I've been watching Fedorov's live press conference, where he is openly discussing both the problems and the conflict. To summarize it briefly, he confirmed that there is a disagreement with Syrskyi, as they hold different views on certain reforms and changes:
На вечір люди знову зібралися на мітинги проти відставки Михайла Федорова.
Протести проходять у Києві, Львові, Франківську, Луцьку, Харкові, Полтаві, Чернігові, Одесі.
Українці скандують «Сирського геть».
Ветеран Дмитро Козятинський написав, що не можна лишати Сирського та закликав усіх завтра відкласти справи та о 20:00 вийти по максимуму.
SCOOP: Top Treausry tax official and acting IRS chief counsel Ken Kies was ousted from his job after he warned that the White House was at risk of violating a federal law prohibiting senior officials’ involvement in IRS audits.
Story w/ @RichardRubinDC and @jdawsey1
https://t.co/r8Mwdso4kP
Mykhailo Fedorov said Zelensky offered him an adviser role, but he declined. He said Ukraine needs changes in its military leadership to win with fewer losses, calling for the replacement of Oleksandr Syrskyi and the chief of the General Staff. According to Fedorov, Zelensky said he does not plan to dismiss Syrskyi.
Fedorov argued that recruitment centers report to the General Staff rather than the Defense Ministry and said mobilization problems cannot be resolved without Syrskyi’s removal. He added that Ukraine cannot match Russia’s mobilization pace and must instead prioritize drones and modern technology. Fedorov also said he spoke with the president by phone today and that they still need to discuss several issues. #Ukraine
“Fedorov repeatedly blocked attempts to steer lucrative procurement contracts to favoured companies, which put him at odds with powerful figures inside Ukraine’s political and defence establishment, said people familiar with the situation.”
https://t.co/P9S9vMH84Z
A few more expanded thoughts on the current situation. I'll start from a distance and gradually move toward the center of the issue.
We live in an era where the battlefield evolves so rapidly that if you fall out of the information cycle for even 6–12 months, you'll be shocked by how much has changed. New technologies emerge, geopolitical balances shift, financial situation changes, producing a completely different battlefield dynamics. In such an environment, you need people who can not only adapt quickly, but also systematize those changes and, far more importantly, implement them.
Mykhailo Fedorov was one such minister. Within months, he helped introduce several adaptations that had a tangible impact on the battlefield. Unfortunately, this kind of talent is rare. Yet perhaps even more important than the practical results was the hope he brought to the troops. Hope that things could improve. Hope that change was possible. Hope that someone at the top understood that yesterday's solutions would not solve tomorrow's problems.
This hope was not baseless. It was actively helping shape the conditions for victory.
Now let's zoom out from the Ministry of Defense and look at the broader picture.
Since 2023, I have consistently argued against promoting General Syrskyi to the position of Commander-in-Chief. Even back then, as commander of the Ground Forces and the Khortytsia operational grouping, he was displaying three major flaws that, in my view, outweighed his strengths.
The first was an unwavering top-down approach to command. In this system, even sergeants are not treated as independent tactical decision-makers but as instruments for enforcing the will of higher command. It is a model commonly associated with the worst traditions of the Russian military. Such systems tend to produce higher losses, lower morale, and an environment that can only be sustained through coercion and, in some cases, physical abuse. A brigade commander who refuses to impose such practices is seen as weak and is eventually replaced by someone more willing to enforce "iron discipline," regardless of the human cost.
The second was the systematic construction of a network of loyal officers throughout the Armed Forces. Like many senior figures in politics or military institutions, Syrskyi built a power base. However, in this case, it reached unusually high levels. Officers whose loyalty was unquestioned advanced through the system, while individuals perceived as potential rivals or threats were marginalized. The story surrounding General Drapatyi is one example. Cases involving units such as Skelya, the 155th Brigade, and the Assault Troops under Man'ko further illustrate the consequences of such a system. When loyalty becomes the primary criterion, even poor decisions can be executed without meaningful opposition. And when problems emerge at lower levels, the mechanisms described in the first point ensure they rarely travel upward.
The third was a strong resistance to systemic change. This is largely an extension of the previous two points. Individuals who proposed new approaches, new structures, or new ways to break the operational deadlock were often viewed not as assets but as threats. A loyal network of officers can then create an environment where reformers are either pushed out, sidelined, or forced to leave on their own.
Unfortunately, it appears that Fedorov managed to irritate many entrenched interests. This likely included individuals within the Ministry of Defense involved in procurement, traditionally one of the most corruption-prone areas of government, as well as figures within the military command structure itself. After all, from their perspective, who is this civilian in his thirties to interfere in matters they consider exclusively military?
This brings us to the core issue.
General Syrskyi does not possess the formal authority to appoint or dismiss ministers. However, because of his loyalty to the Presidential Office, his extensive network of loyal officers, and his willingness to execute virtually any task assigned to him, his opinion carries significant weight. Apparently, together with other influential figures who are deeply uncomfortable with change, that weight proved greater than the benefits Fedorov had brought.
Ultimately, however, the decision belongs to the President. Whether to remove Fedorov, whether to retain Syrskyi, whether to continue along the current path, those are presidential decisions. Responsibility therefore rests with him.
And that brings us to a more uncomfortable point.
Despite the concentration of power created by wartime conditions, President Zelensky has often shown an ability to hear public opinion. He reacted to public pressure over NABU. He has, on multiple occasions, adjusted course when political pressure became too great to ignore.
Yet power has a tendency to influence even the most disciplined individuals. No one is entirely immune to it. Years of authority, especially authority exercised under extraordinary circumstances, can slowly distort one's judgment and narrow the range of voices one is willing to hear.
I continue to support the President and believe he should remain in office in accordance with the Constitution. But I am increasingly concerned by the direction in which some decisions are pointing. It is a road that begins with good confidence in one's own judgment, but can gradually evolve into something else entirely.
A road well known from the myth of Icarus, who flew too close to the sun
“At the faction meeting, the president said Fedorov has a systemic conflict with Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine's Armed Forces, and with the armed forces, and that it has proved impossible to resolve.”
https://t.co/qnUrz7bKTr
The decision to remove @FedorovMykhailo as Defence Minister is difficult to describe politely.
For once, Ukraine had a defence minister whose reforms were visibly moving in the direction the military had been asking for years and a real attempt to make soldiers’ voices reach the top.
You do not remove that kind of momentum in the middle of a war unless you have an exceptionally good reason. So far, I do not see one.
This looks like a textbook self-inflicted wound: unpopular with the public, badly understood by the military, and damaging to changes that were just starting to move in the right direction.
It takes real talent to make a decision this senseless.