@tr3cklist@suktabombil@GoI_MeitY I agree that comprehension is a bit hard. Op is tweeting about how both govt agencies are communicating with the public about security incidents. One is blaming the public. While the other is providing proper guidance.
The govt of India removing Bitchat from the app stores should tell you two separate things:
First, that the government of India acts with impunity and does whatever it wants giving reasons that it wants. It is a law unto itself and has zero consideration for the Constitution of India. When Bitchat was removed, I had said that that order is illegal, and I haven't see this one, but I would say that this action is illegal too. Back then, the govt had said that it is "capable of being misused", there's absence of surveillance, no mandatory registration, no phone number verification, and no central log of who said what. What's a feature for us, is a bug for the govt of India.
With courts either delaying action, inconsistent or rendered meaningless by the govt (they change things faster than courts can rule on them), or strangely selective in interpretations, we're in an autocracy.
Second, that large platforms are powerless against govt dictats and we cannot rely on Google, Facebook, Microsoft/Github to push back: they're as powerless as Indian companies are.
This is, of course, predictable: it's the outcome of centralisation of the Internet. I've been saying for half a decade now that the govt controls our speech through centralised platforms. What better proof than a decentralised messaging platform being banned because it's not centralised.
@DalitOnLine@AshwiniVaishnaw@PMOIndia@IRCTCofficial At the top it says "pay using autopay" and they mention they charge 1.8% on autopay. I have no idea what auto pay is, but 1.8% and then get on that would all come up to the extra Rs. 26.
What's more chilling to me is not the Government banning BitChat. Governments do what governments do.
It's the way people rush to defend such a ban.
"Public safety". "Terrorism".
As if this ban has anything to do with public safety.
It's only there to ensure the safety of the current government.
If BitChat can be banned because people are sending "unlawful" messages, then technically even phones can be banned. And then people talking to each other can be banned.
Basically the Indian government is saying, "You can't talk if we can't listen."
Statement : The removal of BitChat from the India App Store is unconstitutional. Section 69A permits the blocking of unlawful information, not of a messenger for working during internet shutdowns.
New Delhi, 3 October 2026
An Apple App Review notice published today by Jack Dorsey on X records that BitChat has been removed from the India App Store "per demand from the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology", issued under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, on the ground that the application "includes content that is illegal in India". The notice adds that BitChat's TestFlight builds are no longer available for testing in India. It does not identify the content said to be illegal or the ground under Section 69A invoked. The blocking order has not been published. The Internet Freedom Foundation condemns the order and calls for its immediate publication and withdrawal.
BitChat relays end-to-end encrypted messages between nearby phones over Bluetooth mesh. It has no servers and hosts no content of its own. What travels through it is the private speech of its users, so the claim that the application "includes" illegal content is incoherent. The State's actual objection stands recorded in the notices the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre issued on 23 July 2026 to GitHub, Google and Apple against BitChat, Briar and Bridgefy which stated that such applications work even during internet shutdowns and hamper lawful interception, attribution and traceability. Those notices, issued under Section 79(3)(b) were reportedly withdrawn after public disclosure. The same end has now been pursued through Section 69A. The objection is to capability of an application, not to content it transmits. A citizen's ability to speak to another citizen while the State has switched the internet off is not a ground of restriction under Section 69A or Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
Section 69A survived constitutional scrutiny in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) because of its safeguards which included the need for a reasoned, recorded order, committee review, and a hearing to the originator under Rule 8 of the Blocking Rules, 2009, which the Delhi High Court enforced in Tanul Thakur v. Union of India (2022). Further, Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) requires that orders restricting fundamental rights be published and adopt the least restrictive measure. However, it appears in this instance, each safeguard has been evaded. A secret order blocking an entire application, rather than any identified unlawful information, is the most restrictive and disproprotionate measure available. Further, the confidentiality claimed under Rule 16 cannot defeat the right to challenge an order, and the constitutionality of this blocking regime is itself pending consideration before the Supreme Court.
While removal from the App Store does not delete BitChat from phones, it stops new downloads and security updates, leaving existing users on unpatched versions, and it ends security testing in India through TestFlight. During the Jantar Mantar protests, when mobile internet was suspended and jammers were deployed, Bluetooth mesh messaging was a channel of last resort through which young people coordinated their safety. To our knowledge, Apple has removed BitChat on a government's demand in only one other country. This is in China, in April this year.
Our demands
1. MeitY must publish the blocking order, the ground invoked and the record of the committee's proceedings, and serve the developers with a copy and an opportunity of hearing.
2. The direction must be withdrawn. Any specific unlawful use must be met with targeted proceedings under due process, not the removal of a communications tool for everyone.
3. Apple must disclose the demand in its transparency reporting and notify its users in India, and must state whether parallel directions have been received in respect of other app stores.
4. The secrecy of the blocking regime must end. The Blocking Rules, 2009 should be amended to require publication of orders and notice to originators, without awaiting the outcome of the pending constitutional challenge.
The Internet Freedom Foundation will file applications under the Right to Information Act seeking a copy of the order, and stands ready to assist the developers and affected users in India.