Bonjour @MetaFrance.
Mise à jour : Facebook vient de supprimer sans explication intelligible un compte que j'utilise depuis 18 ans. Je perds ainsi l'accès à mes archives, à mes contacts et à des années de conversations Messenger, dont certaines constituent un véritable outil de travail avec des collaborateurs et des sources.
Plus inquiétant encore : l'écran de désactivation m'invite explicitement à « télécharger mes informations », mais cette fonction est inutilisable.
Après avoir fourni à Meta mon passeport puis ma carte d'identité, je n'ai donc plus accès ni à mon compte, ni à mes données, ni à une voie de recours interne.
Le seul motif fourni est que mon compte « peut être associé à un autre compte » ayant enfreint les règles. Aucun compte, aucune infraction ni aucun élément permettant de comprendre cette décision ne m'est communiqué.
Je sollicite donc un examen humain et une motivation intelligible de cette décision.
@Arcom_fr@EU_Commission : cette procédure et ce niveau d'information sont-ils conformes aux obligations de recours et de motivation prévues par le Digital Services Act ?
cc @jeremybonan
Let me explain exactly why Apple still uses drag-to-install in 2026, because the joke here accidentally proves Apple right.
A macOS .app is a single self-contained folder disguised as a file. Every dependency, every framework, every resource lives inside it. Drag it to Applications, it works. Drag it to Trash, it's gone. No registry entries. No leftover DLLs. No uninstaller that misses half the files.
Windows installers scatter fragments across Program Files, AppData, the registry, system32, and a dozen temp directories. Uninstalling a Windows app is an archaeological dig. Five years later you're still finding config files from software you forgot you owned.
Linux is worse. Dependency hell is so common they named it. Entire package managers exist to solve the problem of "I installed something and now nothing else works." Flatpak and Snap were invented specifically to copy what macOS bundles already did natively.
The macOS bundle architecture came from NeXTSTEP in 1989. Steve Jobs brought it to OS X in 2001. The core design hasn't changed because the core design was correct. An app is a folder. Installation is a copy. Removal is a delete. Three operations that map perfectly to how humans already think about files.
The drag-to-install window with the arrow isn't lazy UX. It's the entire thesis of the system made visible. You are literally just moving a folder. There is no "installation" step because there's nothing to install. The app is already complete.
Every other OS eventually tried to get here. Windows got MSIX. Linux got Flatpak. Mobile figured it out from day one because phones shipped after Apple proved the model. The pattern everyone else converged toward is the pattern this tweet is calling outdated.
The funniest part: the app being dragged in that screenshot is Claude. An AI that can write code, analyze documents, and reason about complex systems. And the most advanced step in getting it onto your machine is holding down a mouse button and moving your wrist two inches to the right.
That's not a design failure. That's a 37-year-old architecture so good that the most sophisticated software on earth still ships inside it.
Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack.
Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords.
LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm.
Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks.
Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages.
Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.
@gonzague vidéosurveillance d'une ville entière en vibe-coding sans gestion de permissions. genre le mec qui fait son site perso sauf que là c'est des caméras CNIL et des données sensibles. ça va très bien se passer
The number of teams who adopted Docker but skipped implementing any sort of image scanning is terrifying. You're not practicing DevOps, you're just shipping CVEs to production at record speed.
I don't understand why everyone is excited about @moltbook. We already have a social network where zombie bots talk to each other. It's called LinkedIn.
We hacked the AWS JavaScript SDK, a core library powering the entire @AWScloud ecosystem - including the AWS Console itself 🤯
How did we do it? Just two missing characters was all it took.
This is the story of #CodeBreach 🧵👇