The Interfold launch sequence begins.
Registration opens July 6. The FOLD auction begins July 8 on Uniswap, marking the first public milestone in the Interfold's launch sequence.
Read the launch post ↓ https://t.co/WGDVJQWRaG
Ethereum should not require users to expose their intent before execution.
The Interfold is joining the Encrypt the Mempool Coalition to support private, credibly neutral transaction infrastructure.
MACI made one thing clear:
private inputs and shared outcomes shouldn't depend on one operator.
Voting was the starting point.
The Interfold generalizes that pattern into a network for confidential coordination.
Meet Alessandro (@ctrlc03), Senior Engineer at The Interfold.
With experience spanning cybersecurity, cryptography, contributions to MACI, p0tion, and @PrivacyEthereum infrastructure, he's helping build the foundations for multiparty privacy at scale.
We're grateful to have him on our team!
https://t.co/DfJsyZWKU6
More people should know about the Interfold.
It's basically what I've been yelling at people to build with the MACI ideas ( https://t.co/mlDy84zXQo ) for almost a decade, and now it exists, in a generalized form.
The idea is: a privacy protocol optimized for things like voting (and other use cases eg. secret-ballot auctions). The mechanism generates a threshold encryption key, and people send in their votes onchain, using a ZKP to prove eligibility. An arbitrary computation on the votes gets run inside FHE, and then threshold-decrypted.
From what I can tell (the docs are good https://t.co/adzwK6ezMN ), it gets pretty optimal security guarantees:
* Voter anonymity can be made unconditional if eligibility is proven with ZK-SNARKs
* Censorship resistance is guaranteed by ethereum (votes can be posted directly onchain, and there's a proof that all posted votes are taking into account)
* The correctness of the outputted result can be ensured via ZK over FHE
* Liveness and coercion resistance depend on M-of-N honesty; unavoidable given present-day technology
The main limitation is that today "ZK over FHE" is only properly available for additive vote tallying, as it's too expensive for computations that involve multiplication or other more complicated manipulation at the moment. There's work in progress on slashing-based / optimistic computation for such situations.
(And of course ideally in the long term we'd figure out obfuscation so you can get rid of the M-of-N committees😃)
Privacy as shield solves one problem:
who gets access.
But it does not solve the harder one:
who controls execution.
That is where coordination breaks.
Confidential Coordination I: Beyond Privacy as Shield ↓
The Interfold is a distributed network for Confidential Coordination.
This week, we’re starting a deep-dive essay series on what that means.
Subscribe: https://t.co/v9s7OTME6U
Enclave is now The Interfold.
What we built isn’t a hardware enclave, but a distributed network for confidential coordination.
The Interfold names that network. 🌐
We take a slighty different approach at @EnclaveE3.
Each registered ID has a slot to which it can write its vote.
Anyone can write to any slot at any time.
In the case that no vote has yet been cast in a given slot, one must prove they either (a) hold the private key corresponding to the slot, and thus are authorized to write a vote to that slot, or (b) that the preimage to their ciphertext is equal to zero.
In the case that there is already a vote published to a given slot, one must prove that they either (a) hold the private key corresponding to the slot, and thus are authorized to over-write the ciphertext in that slot, or (b) that the ciphertext they are publishing is equal to the previous ciphertext + 0.
Critically, the verifier cannot know which pathway, (a) or (b), a given proof satisfies. Inspired by @kostascrypto's zkAuthenticator paper: https://t.co/UWkkKNUGWb
Essentially, this allows anyone to add noise to any/all votes and gives plausable deniability to all voters for any updates to their slot.
An attacker cannot know whether a given voter cast or changed their vote, or whether it was some other party adding noise to the system/masking votes.
Managing Safes shouldn't feel like this.
Today we're launching Zodiac, a safer and more flexible way to control how onchain execution actually happens.
🎬 🔊 👇
How do multiple parties compute on sensitive data without revealing it, while still proving correctness?
This diagram maps Enclave’s answer:
Encrypted Execution Environments (E3s) 💫
Today, we introduce Zodiac as an OS for onchain operations.
Bringing together years of Safe-native work into a single system, Zodiac gives teams programmable control over permissions, execution, and automation.
Zodiac launches with access limited to early teams.
New post: the first entry in our Enclave Cryptography series.
It examines a core issue in hybrid FHE–ZK systems:
how to prove that a ciphertext actually encrypts the value referenced in a ZK witness.
Private voting protects participants.
Verifiable secret ballots protect the process.
We’re thrilled to partner with @EnclaveE3 to begin work on expanding Aragon’s privacy stack, introducing confidential, verifiable voting that removes trusted intermediaries.
🌀 Enclave devnet is live
Encrypted execution for multi-agent systems.
Build programs for private coordination, verifiable compute, and shared logic — all without exposing data.
Confidential by default. Provable by design.
Here’s what’s live and how to get started:
“Private bids, public proofs.” Younes Talibi Alaoui @GnosisGuild proposes a cryptographic redesign for onchain auctions.
To be truly trustless, fair, and verifiable, you need all three: FHE, MPC, and ZKPs.
Auctions are coordination infrastructure — not just market mechanics.
0/ folks, I built something: noir-web
a minimal way to compile @NoirLang circuits, auto-generate dynamic types for frontends, and spin up a prover template — all in the browser.
we needed it at @EnclaveE3, but it might help if you’re benchmarking proof gen on the fly.
quick thread below
Introducing CRISP: A Secret Ballot Protocol
1/ Transparency doesn’t guarantee democracy — only visibility. This exposes digital voting and decision-making systems to coercion & manipulation.
CRISP, built with Enclave, offers secret ballots to safeguard privacy and trust.