Jack Watling

Senior Research Fellow - Applied Military Sciences, @RUSI_org; PhD History. Opinions my own.

[Jack Watling @Jack_Watling]

Statecraft: The New Rules of Power in a Divided World, out now - https://t.co/vmWAPrMejV

[Michael Kofman @KofmanMichael]

I don’t envy Drapaty considering the mess he will have to clean up after 2.5 years of absurd force generation and force management practices. Brigade creep. Brigades with attachments to their attachments. Units split on several parts of the front.

[Marcus Walker @WalkerMarcus]

You know how people asked “could we have repaired Notre Dame in Britain as quickly and as beautifully as they did in France?”

We now have the answer. The answer is no.

[Shashank Joshi @shashj]

For @TheEconomist subscribers: I spoke to Jack Watling on the latest episode of Inside Defence. We talked about Ukraine, what people misunderstand about drone warfare and the vital role played on the modern battlefield by the ancient art of digging. https://t.co/Fz8kncq7FW

[John Foreman CBE @John_ForemanCBE]

‘Preservation and modernisation of the nuclear submarine fleet as the basis of naval nuclear deterrence comes first, in Patrushev’s own words. Three further priorities are outlined: securing Russian energy exports along the most important sea lanes, expansion of the naval unmanned capabilities, and expanding space-based reconnaissance and targeting capabilities in support of the Navy’

https://t.co/zP6s4B4Kd9

[Jack Watling @Jack_Watling]

@marydejevsky Reluctantly because I feel that Ukrainians should be front and centre in explaining this and I don't want to come across like I am speaking on anyone's behalf.
And no, it doesn't call into question why the UK is supporting Ukraine or Ukrainian combat performance at the front.

[Jack Watling @Jack_Watling]

@Wilkmaster No - they can sort this out themselves. And are.

[Jack Watling @Jack_Watling]

Reluctantly, I offer some context for @RUSI_org on the recent removal of Minister Fedorov and the challenge of reform for the Ukrainian military: https://t.co/AtjhV4csDP

[RUSI @RUSI_org]

'For Ukraine’s civil society, having glimpsed the prospect of a successful conclusion of the war, the fear that Ukraine’s hopes may be smothered by elite squabbling is an unacceptable outcome.' writes @Jack_Watling in the latest RUSI Commentary on the removal of Ukrainian Defence Minister @FedorovMykhailo. https://t.co/DlrUY0btGb

[Jack Watling @Jack_Watling]

@EthanYang001 @clement_molin @AmosFox6 Operational manoeuvre is viable, but takes a different approach. https://t.co/pKIefROsSU Concepts also outlined in The Arms of the Future

[Jack Watling @Jack_Watling]

@michaeldweiss But it's the last thing they'd expect...

[Michael Bociurkiw @WorldAffairsPro]

#BREAKING Another foreign-flagged vessel takes a direct hit from a Russian missile in Odesa port. Enormous fire - the strike appears to have landed squarely on the bridge. No firefighting equipment in sight. Appears planned and targeted. Ships are being picked off like flies on a table. Could spell the end of Black Sea shipping for the foreseeable future: 3rd foreign-flagged vessel in less than 48hrs. #Odesa #Ukraine

[Franz-Stefan Gady @HoansSolo]

‚Fedorov outlined 11 major problems:
1. Ukraine's Armed Forces are fighting at the tactical level, although increasingly at the operational level too. Still, fundamentally, "we are still fighting tactically".

2. The corps system has not yet fully taken shape. "We have corps that are successful, that advance every month and do not lose territory. And we have corps where the commander is replaced every month. There are corps that have developed their own school of thought and philosophy, and there are corps where we do not even know how many brigades they have or what is happening inside them. Everything depends on organisation, but there are corps that do not distribute all their resources internally," Fedorov said.

3. Brigades and corps have been fragmented. "There are brigades that cannot even determine how many battalions they have. A battalion is pulled out of one brigade and thrown into another. It is impossible to build a management system under conditions like these," the defence minister said.‘

[Oliver Carroll @olliecarroll]

Pavlo Yelizarov, formerly one of Ukraine’s most effective drone commanders, causing $ billions damage to Russ equipment, latterly credited with massively improving shahed + cruise missile interception rates, has resigned in protest at the “evil” of Def min Fedorov’s sacking.

[Andreas Turunen @AndreasTurunen]

In my latest piece, I look at how Russia’s Aerospace Forces describe their own strike tactics, from glide bombs and drone-guided attacks to helicopter operations on a drone-saturated battlefield.

https://t.co/DvnmAaS5j0

[FOI @FOIresearch]

New analysis: Russian Electronic Warfare in Ukraine – A Key Area in Preparedness for Future Conflicts. The war in Ukraine has had a huge impact on modern electronic warfare (EW) in ways few nations were prepared for or could foresee. Read here ➡️https://t.co/pThRG7abR9

[Michael Kofman @KofmanMichael]

New article with Greg Whisler. We lay out how the Russian force expanded during the war leading to a paradox: as the quantity grew, its ability to employ force at scale decreased. As Moscow fielded more forces, the value of that mass steadily diminished. https://t.co/YF6aIj6SO6

[Dimko Zhluktenko 🇺🇦⚔️ @dim0kq]

I just came back from London, representing Ukraine's Armed Forces.

A Ukrainian soldier at the stage, in a room full of British generals and NATO planners, and they were taking notes.

It's the most distinguished audience I've ever spoken to.

Let me tell you what happened 🧵🇺🇦

[Michael Kofman @KofmanMichael]

@shashj There were several stories like this. In the South Ukraine’s 28th brigade stretched a battalion and tried to make it look as though the entire brigade was deployed, which stopped the lead elements from Russias 7th Air Assault Division who thought they faced a full brigade.

[Jack Watling @Jack_Watling]

@ChristopherJM @LawDavF Indeed. The cumulative effect of many individual acts of courage.

[Rob Lee @RALee85]

“At the heart of the operation in Tokyo is a secretive Russian military intelligence unit known as the 20th Directorate, whose role has never been publicly disclosed. Posing as diplomats or businesspeople, its officers work to buy or steal battlefield technology and smuggle it into Russia, according to current and former officials at five Western intelligence agencies.

The man overseeing the 20th Directorate’s operation in Tokyo maintains a cover identity as an employee of the Russian state airline Aeroflot, according to current officials from four of those intelligence agencies. He plays a crucial role in supplying Russia’s war machine…

Mr. Filchenkov began developing relationships with logistics companies that ship goods from Japan to Russia, according to business records and interviews. Western officials have warned Japan that relationships like these help G.R.U. officers buy sensitive technology under false pretenses and send it to Russia, sometimes using bogus shipping records.”
@jane__bradley @mschwirtz & Adam Goldman
https://t.co/psdA3qENtu