Khalid Mtelemko

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@YerickoNyerereT Na @EduTalktz alideclare kabisa ikitokea ametoka tumuite Shilole

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@EduTalkTz Sawa Shilole Mushi

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@BlackSingapore2 Hilo litakuwa la mama yako kwa sababu siku ile unazaliwa uliliona

[Getrude Mollel 🇹🇿 @Getrude_mollel]

THE SECRET BEHIND KENYA’S ROLE IN FUELING UNREST IN TANZANIA UNDER THE GUISE OF FIGHTING FOR DEMOCRACY.

By Dr. Geus Mbadika Nyaisanga
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

The General Election of the United Republic of Tanzania, held on October 29, 2025, marked another historic chapter in the country’s democratic journey since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992.

Millions of Tanzanians turned out peacefully to exercise their constitutional right to vote, despite reports of unrest in some major cities such as Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Arusha, Mbeya, and Songwe.

Starting on election day, October 29, and in the days that followed, violent incidents broke out. Fuel stations were set ablaze, rapid transit buses and stations were vandalized, several police posts and government offices were torched, and private property was looted and destroyed.

The Police Force, supported by other security organs, was compelled to intervene to contain the situation. Several areas were placed under special security monitoring, some temporarily closed, and digital communications were briefly restricted to curb the spread of inflammatory misinformation.

Dar es Salaam, as Tanzania’s economic hub, bore the greatest brunt of the destruction. Early assessments indicate extensive damage to the petroleum, public transport, and trade sectors. Multiple fuel stations were set on fire, rapid transit infrastructure was damaged, and private vehicles and shops were looted or destroyed.

Incitement through social media
Preliminary investigations reveal that the violence was not spontaneous. It was organized and coordinated through social media platforms — X (formerly Twitter), TikTok, Facebook, and WhatsApp — where videos, images, and audio recordings inciting unrest spread rapidly. Many of the accounts responsible for these activities were managed from outside Tanzania, particularly from Kenya.

On these platforms, numerous Kenyan users were seen celebrating the chaos, creating and sharing content that incited anger toward Tanzanian security forces and spread false claims about the election results. To a casual observer, this might appear as harmless regional commentary — yet upon deeper analysis, it reflects a larger, calculated economic and geopolitical agenda.

Why is Kenya fueling unrest in Tanzania?
Among over fifty African nations, why did Kenya appear most eager to provoke or celebrate instability in Tanzania? Is it neighborly concern, a passion for democracy — or something deeper?

It is neither. Kenya also borders Uganda and Rwanda, yet such efforts are not directed there. Nor can it be justified as a love for democracy, given that Kenya itself still faces democratic challenges, as do its neighbors Uganda and Rwanda.

The real motive lies in economic espionage and the broader strategic competition between Kenya and Tanzania — particularly over control of trade routes and port dominance in East Africa.

For decades, Kenya’s Mombasa Port has been the main gateway for regional trade. But recent years have witnessed Tanzania’s emergence as a formidable rival, following sweeping reforms and massive infrastructure investments at the Port of Dar es Salaam and along its connecting transport corridors.

Through a strategic partnership with Dubai Ports World (DP World), Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam Port has achieved dramatic improvements. Cargo discharge time has fallen from five days to just one, while several handling fees have been abolished — making the port significantly more efficient and attractive to traders.

A flagship project, the Dar es Salaam Maritime Gateway Project (DMGP) — worth USD 420 million — is expanding port capacity, deepening berths, upgrading storage facilities, and integrating the modern Kwala Inland Container Depot. Combined with the new Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) to Isaka and Kigoma, this network will streamline cargo movement to the DRC, Burundi, Zambia, Malawi, and Rwanda.

According to The East African Business Review (2024), traders from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, and the DRC have begun shifting their cargo routes from Mombasa to Dar es Salaam due to Kenya’s higher fees and delays. Uganda reports that over 50% of its trade costs stem from cargo handling and inland transport from Mombasa — undermining competitiveness.

By 2023, Mombasa Port’s throughput had dropped by 1.9%, a decline directly linked to Dar es Salaam’s rising competitiveness. While Tanzania has abolished numerous port charges, Kenya continues to impose surcharges, including a USD 3,000 deposit per container (recently scrapped after declining revenue).

Kenya’s new measures — reducing port fees, extending free storage days, and removing duplicate charges — are defensive attempts to recover lost clients amid Tanzania’s rapid progress.

Kenya’s fear of Tanzania’s economic rise
For decades, Kenya has held the mantle of East Africa’s commercial capital. But Tanzania’s consistent economic growth — averaging 6.1% over the past three years compared to Kenya’s 4.5% — now threatens that dominance (World Bank, 2024–2025). Booming sectors like mining, energy, ports, and construction have turned Tanzania into one of Africa’s most promising investment destinations.

Thus, internal instability in Tanzania would serve as the quickest way to undermine investor confidence — a direct advantage to Kenya, Tanzania’s main regional competitor.

This reality explains why certain online groups in Kenya might have both political and economic motives to spread anti-Tanzania propaganda under the banner of “defending democracy.”

Tanzania’s ongoing development of the Bagamoyo Port — projected to become East Africa’s largest — alongside major upgrades at Tanga Port and lake ports like Mbambabay (Lake Nyasa) and Tumbi (Lake Tanganyika), signals its ambition to expand its influence from the Indian Ocean to the Great Lakes region.

For Kenya, this is a clear warning. Once these projects are completed, large volumes of cargo from the DRC, Zambia, Malawi, and Rwanda will shift to Tanzanian routes. Kenya cannot accept such an outcome — and thus, stoking unrest in Tanzania becomes a means to delay progress and weaken investor trust.

The new economic cold war — fought online
In today’s digital age, wars are not only fought with weapons but also with information. Funded influencers, content creators, and youth activists have become tools in modern political and economic warfare.

Kenya’s social media landscape is deeply intertwined with its political economy. Organized digital campaigns can easily be weaponized to shape narratives — even to destabilize neighbors.

A 2023 study by the Oxford Internet Institute ranked Kenya among Africa’s top 10 countries conducting “orchestrated social media campaigns” — coordinated digital efforts to manipulate public opinion for political or commercial gain.

Given what happened during Tanzania’s October 29, 2025 election, there is compelling evidence that Kenyan media outlets and social platforms were part of a deliberate effort to disrupt Tanzania’s peace. While Tanzanians queued peacefully to vote, major Kenyan accounts on X, TikTok, and Facebook were flooded with sarcastic and misleading posts claiming “violence has erupted in Tanzania.”

Kenyan newspapers, television programs, and blogs echoed this narrative, using recycled images and videos from other countries to depict Tanzania as “descending into electoral chaos.” This campaign was neither accidental nor spontaneous — it was a calculated disinformation effort designed to erode confidence in Tanzanian institutions and legitimize unrest.

Tanzania’s security response
Despite this digital onslaught, Tanzanian security agencies acted swiftly and professionally to restore calm. The Police Force, Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF), the Intelligence and Security Service (TISS), and the Field Force Unit (FFU) worked in close coordination to stabilize the situation.

Dar es Salaam — where several fuel stations, rapid buses, and government offices were set ablaze — returned to normal within 48 hours. Operations were carried out with restraint, focusing on the protection of civilians and property. In other cities like Mwanza, Mbeya, and Arusha, security forces managed to disperse mobs without excessive force, adhering to human rights and legal standards.

Under the leadership of President Samia Suluhu Hassan, the government remained calm and steadfast, proving that Tanzania is not a fragile state susceptible to online manipulation. The events of October 29 were not merely political unrest but part of a digital economic cold war — a battle of narratives, images, and influence aimed at destabilizing a rising economy.

Tanzania’s experience mirrors global precedents: in Ukraine, Libya, Syria, and Sudan, external disinformation campaigns preceded major internal conflicts. Even in Latin America, countries like Venezuela and Bolivia have witnessed protests fueled by foreign-sponsored digital manipulation disguised as civic activism.

The unrest that shook Tanzania on October 29, 2025, cannot be viewed as ordinary election violence. It was part of a wider strategic struggle for regional economic dominance.

As Tanzania positions itself as East Africa’s new trade hub, Kenya faces the reality of losing its traditional role as the region’s commercial gateway. Through online propaganda, digital agitation, and the rhetoric of “defending democracy,” efforts are underway to slow Tanzania’s economic ascent.

The battle is no longer fought with guns — but with algorithms, narratives, and perception. Tanzania, however, has demonstrated resilience and discipline — proof that stability and progress are still its strongest weapons in this new age of silent wars.

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@DuniaSlaveDunia

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@HecheJohn Heche wa kwako wanasoma wapi ?

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@HecheJohn Malawi walijaribu kwa mpinzani wakaishia kijuta - milo yao ikabadilika kutoka 4 au 3 kwa siku mpaka 1 au hakuna kabisa , nchi ikashindwa kuwa na mafuta ( diesel + petrol) hata ya kutumika kwa wiki 2 ktk hali kama hiyo unategemea lipi !!?

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@Madaha360 @MarekaMalili Fafanua kidogo - inaumizaje wakulima ?

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@EduTalkTz Kwan we mkeo si Mtanzania !? Si ungempeleka ?

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@EduTalkTz We si Mtanzania huna nauli ya kwenda huko !!?

Au ni "kamdomo tu" kwenye kila jambo ndicho unachoweza !

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@Geoffrey87Lea Jofu hiyo ngeli ndio hivyo hivyoo au cheki vizuri kwenye dictionary ya English - Swahili 😂

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@tma_services Je ni kwa sehemu yote ya nchi au baadhi ya maeneo ( kama ndio mututajie tujue)

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@SamsonDanielDS @Liberatus80 Kwa dhamira ya dhati nafikiri linawezekana

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@Monalisandala1 Wamekunawa Mona hao dawa yao n kuwakabia juu ili wapumulie miguu 💨

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@HecheJohn Yaan siku hizi mmekuwa madebe tupu - ni keleke tu bila hoja

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@HecheJohn Na CDM ni genge la nini ?

Kwa sababu mlimnanga mzee white Hair kwa ufisadi mwisho wa picha akawa mgombea wenu wa Urais

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@JangoBist Ni zaidi ya issue wengi ktk sisi hatuwezi kukiongea tukiwa tumekasirika na ikatokea tunamajibidhano

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@HecheJohn @SuluhuSamia Haya ni maajabu

Kususa uchaguzi ususie wewe lawama ziende kwa Rais Samia

Safari hii hakuna wa kuwabembeleza - ongoza chama mkasaini kanuni za maadili muingie kwenye uchaguzi hizo ngonjera unazoimbaimba kwa kulialia kila uchao hazitawasaidia kwa lolote

[Khalid Mtelemko @khasemjr]

@masoudkipanya Moja haikai wala mbili