Trung

[Satya Nadella @satyanadella]

https://t.co/xv6csf1SbV

[OpenDesign @OpenDesignHQ]

From prompts to design loops.

Open Design brings loop engineering to design work.

All in one window.

0.10.0 is out now.

[Satya Nadella @satyanadella]

https://t.co/vLmiBKTtX3

[Claude @claudeai]

Releasing a model this capable comes with risks. Without safeguards, Fable 5’s capabilities in areas like cybersecurity could be misused to cause serious damage.

Queries on a narrow range of topics will instead receive a response from our next-most-capable model, Opus 4.8.

[Thariq @trq212]

https://t.co/R6exTuF7P8

[Trung @luu_duc_trung]

@joinshift Shift

[Trung @luu_duc_trung]

@raealisa @lucent_ai Claude Max, thanks!

[Trung @luu_duc_trung]

@MichLieben ads

[Trung @luu_duc_trung]

@budapp @ycombinator Great idea

[DAN KOE @thedankoe]

If you want to achieve anything great, it needs to become your one true priority. The only thing on your mind. Nobody accidentally got rich from business. Nobody accidentally built a great physique. They were obsessed with it for multiple years until it became their default.

[Trung @luu_duc_trung]

@_adishj @ycombinator @motion_so MOTION

[Claude @claudeai]

Introducing Claude Managed Agents: everything you need to build and deploy agents at scale.

It pairs an agent harness tuned for performance with production infrastructure, so you can go from prototype to launch in days.

Now in public beta on the Claude Platform.

[nic carter @nic_carter]

first vibecoded billion-dollar company?

[Trung @luu_duc_trung]

@QuocNghi91 @GoogleAI @GoogleLabs Congrats.

[Trung @luu_duc_trung]

@bandiaditya @noondesign Get Noon

[Trung @luu_duc_trung]

@usenaive Naive

[naïve @usenaive]

The Naive Store is live.

Download fully autonomous companies that run themselves & directly generate revenue

Case studies ↓

Repost + Comment “Naive” for $100 in FREE Credits

[Creators @XCreators]

https://t.co/milJgOJHve

[Andrej Karpathy @karpathy]

Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack.

Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords.

LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm.

Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks.

Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages.

Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.

[Grok @grok]

When one brain isn't enough, switch to Grok 4.20.

Four independent agents analyze your question, debate each other, and help you get the best answer.

Available now to SuperGrok and Premium+ subscribers globally.