Mathilde Velliet

PhD | Researcher @IFRI_, Geopolitics of Technology Center | US & Chinese technology policies | views are my own

[Mathilde Velliet @MathildeVelliet]

Depuis 2025, l’administration Trump a (re)lancé une offensive vigoureuse contre la réglementation du numérique, aux États-Unis et en Europe.

Un🧵sur cette campagne et ses conséquences, à l'occasion de la sortie de mon étude @IFRI_ à ce sujet aujourd'hui.

https://t.co/TV5U3FVW1X

[CNAS @CNASdc]

https://t.co/AVwDqT3oMs

[Institut français des relations internationales @IFRI_]

[Inscriptions conférence] 🌖 La nouvelle course à la Lune : quels enjeux géopolitiques ?

Alors que les États-Unis, la Chine et l'Inde concrétisent leurs ambitions lunaires, l'Europe cherche encore à définir sa position : doit-elle être un partenaire fiable ou un acteur stratégique autonome ?

Pour en débattre, le Programme Espace de l'Ifri sous la responsabilité de @paulwohrer organise une conférence le 17 juin 2026, de 16h30 à 19h à l'Ifri.

➡️ 16h30 - 17h | Ouverture :
Général Philippe Adam, Secrétaire général du Sommet international sur l’espace

➡️ 17h - 18h30 | Table ronde : Perspectives européennes sur la nouvelle course à la Lune

• @Alessandro__Ma, Responsable Défense, Sécurité et Espace, @IAIonline

• @AndreaRotter33, Chef de la division Politique étrangère et sécurité, Fondation @HannsSeidel

• @ZwaanTanja, Directrice adjointe et professeure à l'institut international de l'Air et de l'Espace, @UniLeidenNews

Modération : @CFArnould, Chercheuse senior au @BIGEurope

➡️ 18h30 - 19h | Conclusion : le rôle de l'Europe dans le programme Artemis

Scott Pace, Directeur du Space Policy Institute, George Washington University

Inscription obligatoire : https://t.co/0iLxpuKNvx

[Luca Bertuzzi @BertuzLuca]

UPDATE: As expected, EU ambassadors endorsed the mandate for the European Commission to sign the Pax Silica on behalf of the bloc. Formal green light at the ministerial level is now expected at the TTE Council on 8 June.

[Director Michael Kratsios @mkratsios47]

Today @POTUS signed an EO that keeps America leading in AI while putting frontier AI capabilities to work strengthening our cyber defenses.

AI systems are now the most powerful tools we have ever had to harden our cyber infrastructure and stay ahead of adversaries. It is a real blessing that these capabilities are being developed by American industry, and not by those who would use them against us.
https://t.co/tsXXVuMWZ9

[Institut français des relations internationales @IFRI_]

🇺🇸 États-Unis / 🇪🇺 Europe : la souveraineté numérique en question

Dans ce nouvel épisode du podcast "Le monde selon l'Ifri", @M_Hecker, directeur exécutif de l'Ifri, reçoit Anne-Thida Norodom, professeur de droit public à l'Université Paris Cité, et Emma Badaoui, doctorante en droit public à l'IRSEM et à l'Université de Bretagne occidentale pour décrypter les enjeux de souveraineté numérique auxquels l'Union européenne est confrontée dans ses relations avec les États-Unis.

🎧À écouter en entier ⤵️
https://t.co/gcI2WJ48wu

➡️ ALLER PLUS LOIN :
Lire l'étude de l'Ifri d'Anne-Thida Norodom et Emma Badaoui, intitulée "(Extra)territorialité des données : quelle souveraineté pour l'Europe ?" https://t.co/fmVn6OeG1H

[Chris McGuire @ChrisRMcGuire]

Tonight, the Secretary of the Treasury is personally vetting and approving each company that gets access to the most advanced U.S. AI model, because the risks of the model being misused to hurt US national security are so high.

Also tonight, Jensen Huang is flying on Air Force One with President Trump to Beijing to sell China the AI chips it will use to develop its own Mythos-level AI model as soon as possible.

The administration’s AI policy remains inconsistent and incoherent. It is impossible to justify these two approaches simultaneously.

[Rush Doshi @RushDoshi]

This scoop from @Lingling_Wei says the US and China are considering an AI dialogue or crisis hotline.

Here's what I told her, drawing from past experience.

Dialogue is absolutely essential, but we need to level-set expectations based on the track record:

1) We negotiated an AI dialogue in 2023, but the PRC tried to extract concessions on unrelated issues to even hold it; when we held the dialogue, they didn't send the right folks.

2) We do have crisis comms lines, but the PRC has not picked up the phone during crises (from EP-3 to the balloon). An AI crisis line may face similar challenges.

In short, the PRC has for decades been less serious about risk reduction and crisis communications than the Soviet Union was. What we do have, they rarely use and frequently pull down when they are upset (we don't do this).

That needs to change. But that only happens if the world collectively pushes for a different outcome.

[Institut français des relations internationales @IFRI_]

[🎧 #Podcast] 🇺🇸 🌐 L’offensive américaine contre la réglementation de la tech

Dans ce nouvel épisode du podcast "Le monde selon l'Ifri", @M_Hecker accueille @MathildeVelliet, chercheuse au Centre géopolitique des technologies de l'Ifri.

L'administration Trump II déploie une stratégie de déréglementation massive dans la Tech : suppression des garde-fous éthiques sur l'#IA, réduction drastique des effectifs de cybersécurité, démantèlement des équipes de lutte contre la désinformation. L'objectif affiché ? Éliminer dix réglementations pour chaque nouvelle règle adoptée, au nom de l'innovation et de la compétitivité face à la Chine.

À écouter ⤵️
https://t.co/ekSCUJUghZ

[Michael Pettis @michaelxpettis]

I share some of Zichen Wang's concerns here. The SCMP has some of the best reporting in the world on China, and especially on the Chinese economy, but some of its mainland-related science and technology articles seem a little eccentric.
https://t.co/BLosTuxvh4

[Ryan Fedasiuk @RyanFedasiuk]

Great to speak with @PunchbowlNews' @Dareasmunhoz about the MATCH Act—one of several pieces of legislation due for markup by @HouseForeign on Wednesday—which would require companies to apply for a license to provide maintenance service to their lithography machines in China.

I told Punchbowl about our recent research at @AEIfdp diving into the SME supply chain. Julia Torres and I estimate that, absent U.S. action, the hundreds of deep ultraviolet lithography machines imported by Chinese companies will be more than sufficient to manufacture huge numbers of cutting-edge AI chips in the years ahead.

On the other hand:

“If you take away the parts and prevent them from being serviced, then Huawei is going to be sitting on tens of billions of dollars of wasted investment—unable to make chips at a really critical moment in the trajectory of the global AI industry,” Ryan Fedasiuk, a fellow at @AEI, said.

Grateful to @RepBaumgartner and @BrianMastFL for their leadership on this important issue.

https://t.co/n4sllXAX69

[Thierry Breton @ThierryBreton]

Make election interference great again, @JDVance.

[Finbarr Bermingham @fbermingham]

Politico polling of six EU countries shows 36.5% on average now see the US as a threat vs 31% for China

Most wary of China: France, Belgium and Poland.

Most wary of the US: Spain, Italy, Belgium

[Ryan Fedasiuk @RyanFedasiuk]

The great irony is that, for many years, the United States had been pressing and leaning on China to establish a robust export control system — to help with securing dual-use material and preventing diversion to various actors in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

Ultimately, many of those calls went unheeded as several Chinese and Hong Kong entities facilitated transshipment and Beijing insisted it lacked the resources to implement a trade control system like the United States.

The past decade has totally inverted this dynamic as both sides, and particularly the United States, turned to export control and other national security tools to protect their supply chains. China began implementing its own bureaucratic machinery to keep pace with what it perceived as Washington’s overreach — implementing measures that in some cases extended well beyond the scope of initial U.S. restrictions.

We saw this play out in October with the announced rare earth licensing regime; and for many years before that — with opaque national security investigations designed to suspend certain American companies’ operations in China, and economic coercion deployed against faraway political rivals like Lithuania.

Today’s announcement brings us full circle: China has launched an ICTS-like investigation and review mechanism capable of singling out entities and even individual people deemed a threat to Chinese supply chains.

It’s a capability Beijing will almost certainly weaponize against the United States and its partners in the weeks and months ahead — even as the U.S. begins dismantling some of the machinery of economic security (like the ICTS office, or the delayed 1260H list) it had spent so many years preparing.

I wonder if we might even see its initial application in the run-up to the Trump-Xi Summit.

[Ryan Fedasiuk @RyanFedasiuk]

The great irony is that, for many years, the United States had been pressing and leaning on China to establish a robust export control system — to help with securing dual-use material and preventing diversion to various actors in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

Ultimately, many of those calls went unheeded as several Chinese and Hong Kong entities facilitated transshipment and Beijing insisted it lacked the resources to implement a trade control system like the United States.

The past decade has totally inverted this dynamic as both sides, and particularly the United States, turned to export control and other national security tools to protect their supply chains. China began implementing its own bureaucratic machinery to keep pace with what it perceived as Washington’s overreach — implementing measures that in some cases extended well beyond the scope of initial U.S. restrictions.

We saw this play out in October with the announced rare earth licensing regime; and for many years before that — with opaque national security investigations designed to suspend certain American companies’ operations in China, and economic coercion deployed against faraway political rivals like Lithuania.

Today’s announcement brings us full circle: China has launched an ICTS-like investigation and review mechanism capable of singling out entities and even individual people deemed a threat to Chinese supply chains.

It’s a capability Beijing will almost certainly weaponize against the United States and its partners in the weeks and months ahead — even as the U.S. begins dismantling some of the machinery of economic security (like the ICTS office, or the delayed 1260H list) it had spent so many years preparing.

I wonder if we might even see its initial application in the run-up to the Trump-Xi Summit.

[Mathilde Velliet @MathildeVelliet]

@IFRI_ @emile_marzolf @MathieuPollet_ @ClotildeBomont @mdups @LaurenceNardon @Lucas_Medv @CorentinSellin @guillaumgrallet in case of interest :)

[Mathilde Velliet @MathildeVelliet]

Depuis 2025, l’administration Trump a (re)lancé une offensive vigoureuse contre la réglementation du numérique, aux États-Unis et en Europe.

Un🧵sur cette campagne et ses conséquences, à l'occasion de la sortie de mon étude @IFRI_ à ce sujet aujourd'hui.

https://t.co/TV5U3FVW1X

[Mathilde Velliet @MathildeVelliet]

Si la chronologie de ce différend transatlantique est vouée à s'allonger, j'espère que cette étude vous aidera à le décrypter !
👉disponible sur https://t.co/TV5U3FVW1X

[Mathilde Velliet @MathildeVelliet]

Comment l’Europe peut-elle faire face ? Quelques pistes en conclusion :