CVE-2026-41089 (Critical RCE 0day PoC CVSS: 10)
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@anton_chuvakin You can read my internal take (plus most senior pss folks') well, internally, but tldr I think speed of exploitation is as important as volume, if not more.
This is just...
I barely even know what to say.
This has to be one of the absolute worst (meaning: most incredibly ridiculous) vulnerabilities in a major vendor product in the last decade.
Cisco's devs literally just forgot to invoke the authentication check.
I appreciate everyone dropping linux privesc 0days in the current AI renaissance, but to really make it feel like the good ol days someone needs to drop a weaponized pre-auth SMB or RDP RCE. We haven't had a good Windows worm in AGES.
@GuifreRuiz Yeah, I intuitively understand that and have seen tentative examples.
I've also seen good outcomes on scanning runtimes.
Code-level analysis though, not so much.
All the AI vulns I've seen so far - the confirmed ones, not the ones where you cheat to get an exploit - were egreppable. I've not seen many yet and maybe a library of greps Is fine. We'll see.
OTOH agentic attackers are very real.
Except that this httpd pre-auth “RCE” exploit does not work. A real exploit requires an infoleak, and the author conveniently supplied a “helper” that reads addresses directly from /proc/<pid>/mem.
We also found this bug in early April, submitted it, and were told it's a dup. Then we burned to develop an exploit, to no avail. Need an infoleak.
It's interesting that AI struggles exactly where humans struggle too.
A rogue DHCP server can inject arbitrary dhclient.conf directives via malicious DHCP options and get RCE as root in systems running dhclient:
https://t.co/LyJmj6AQ4k
That’s true, but not every company can realistically afford security by default. The real shift is that, before Mythos and similar players, the assumption was that, economically, these exploits would only be used against high-value targets. That assumption has now fundamentally changed.
That’s true, but not every company can realistically afford security by default. The real shift is that, before Mythos and similar players, the assumption was that, economically, these exploits would only be used against high-value targets. That assumption has now fundamentally changed.